From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Subject: [PULL 15/19] KVM: SEV: Avoid WBINVD for HVA-based MMU notifications for SNP
Date: Fri, 10 May 2024 16:10:20 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240510211024.556136-16-michael.roth@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240510211024.556136-1-michael.roth@amd.com>
From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
With SNP/guest_memfd, private/encrypted memory should not be mappable,
and MMU notifications for HVA-mapped memory will only be relevant to
unencrypted guest memory. Therefore, the rationale behind issuing a
wbinvd_on_all_cpus() in sev_guest_memory_reclaimed() should not apply
for SNP guests and can be ignored.
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[mdr: Add some clarifications in commit]
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Message-ID: <20240501085210.2213060-17-michael.roth@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index d603c97493b9..2b88ae9a4f48 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -3039,7 +3039,13 @@ static void sev_flush_encrypted_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void *va)
void sev_guest_memory_reclaimed(struct kvm *kvm)
{
- if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+ /*
+ * With SNP+gmem, private/encrypted memory is unreachable via the
+ * hva-based mmu notifiers, so these events are only actually
+ * pertaining to shared pages where there is no need to perform
+ * the WBINVD to flush associated caches.
+ */
+ if (!sev_guest(kvm) || sev_snp_guest(kvm))
return;
wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-05-10 21:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 48+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-05-10 21:10 [PULL 00/19] KVM: Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 01/19] KVM: MMU: Disable fast path if KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT is needed Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 02/19] KVM: SEV: Select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 03/19] KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 04/19] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 05/19] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 06/19] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 07/19] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 08/19] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 09/19] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle " Michael Roth
2024-05-12 2:06 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 10/19] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle RMP nested page faults Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 11/19] KVM: SEV: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 12/19] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for initializing private pages Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 13/19] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for invalidating " Michael Roth
2024-05-15 22:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-16 3:11 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-21 16:55 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-16 12:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 14/19] KVM: x86: Implement hook for determining max NPT mapping level Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` Michael Roth [this message]
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 16/19] KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to enable SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 17/19] KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2024-05-17 20:41 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-05-17 22:01 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-18 15:04 ` [PATCH] KVM: SEV: Fix guest memory leak when handling guest requests Michael Roth
2024-05-20 14:17 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-20 22:50 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-20 23:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-21 2:00 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-21 14:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-21 15:34 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-21 16:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-21 21:00 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-20 23:02 ` [PATCH v2] " Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 18/19] KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_EXTENDED_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2024-05-13 15:19 ` Nathan Chancellor
2024-05-13 16:53 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-13 17:05 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-13 17:20 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-13 21:18 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 19/19] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_VLEK_LOAD command Michael Roth
2024-05-12 7:14 ` [PULL 00/19] KVM: Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-12 8:17 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-13 1:06 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-13 22:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-31 3:22 ` Michael Roth
2024-06-03 16:44 ` Paolo Bonzini
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