From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Subject: [PULL 01/19] KVM: MMU: Disable fast path if KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT is needed
Date: Fri, 10 May 2024 16:10:06 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240510211024.556136-2-michael.roth@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240510211024.556136-1-michael.roth@amd.com>
For hardware-protected VMs like SEV-SNP guests, certain conditions like
attempting to perform a write to a page which is not in the state that
the guest expects it to be in can result in a nested/extended #PF which
can only be satisfied by the host performing an implicit page state
change to transition the page into the expected shared/private state.
This is generally handled by generating a KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT event
that gets forwarded to userspace to handle via
KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES.
However, the fast_page_fault() code might misconstrue this situation as
being the result of a write-protected access, and treat it as a spurious
case when it sees that writes are already allowed for the sPTE. This
results in the KVM MMU trying to resume the guest rather than taking any
action to satisfy the real source of the #PF such as generating a
KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT, resulting in the guest spinning on nested #PFs.
Check for this condition and bail out of the fast path if it is
detected.
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 4ec88a2a0061..9c7ab06ce454 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -3296,7 +3296,7 @@ static int kvm_handle_noslot_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
return RET_PF_CONTINUE;
}
-static bool page_fault_can_be_fast(struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
+static bool page_fault_can_be_fast(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
{
/*
* Page faults with reserved bits set, i.e. faults on MMIO SPTEs, only
@@ -3307,6 +3307,26 @@ static bool page_fault_can_be_fast(struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
if (fault->rsvd)
return false;
+ /*
+ * For hardware-protected VMs, certain conditions like attempting to
+ * perform a write to a page which is not in the state that the guest
+ * expects it to be in can result in a nested/extended #PF. In this
+ * case, the below code might misconstrue this situation as being the
+ * result of a write-protected access, and treat it as a spurious case
+ * rather than taking any action to satisfy the real source of the #PF
+ * such as generating a KVM_EXIT_MEMORY_FAULT. This can lead to the
+ * guest spinning on a #PF indefinitely, so don't attempt the fast path
+ * in this case.
+ *
+ * Note that the kvm_mem_is_private() check might race with an
+ * attribute update, but this will either result in the guest spinning
+ * on RET_PF_SPURIOUS until the update completes, or an actual spurious
+ * case might go down the slow path. Either case will resolve itself.
+ */
+ if (kvm->arch.has_private_mem &&
+ fault->is_private != kvm_mem_is_private(kvm, fault->gfn))
+ return false;
+
/*
* #PF can be fast if:
*
@@ -3407,7 +3427,7 @@ static int fast_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
u64 *sptep;
uint retry_count = 0;
- if (!page_fault_can_be_fast(fault))
+ if (!page_fault_can_be_fast(vcpu->kvm, fault))
return ret;
walk_shadow_page_lockless_begin(vcpu);
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-05-10 21:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 48+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-05-10 21:10 [PULL 00/19] KVM: Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` Michael Roth [this message]
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 02/19] KVM: SEV: Select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 03/19] KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 04/19] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 05/19] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 06/19] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 07/19] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 08/19] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 09/19] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle " Michael Roth
2024-05-12 2:06 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 10/19] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle RMP nested page faults Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 11/19] KVM: SEV: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 12/19] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for initializing private pages Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 13/19] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for invalidating " Michael Roth
2024-05-15 22:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-16 3:11 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-21 16:55 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-16 12:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 14/19] KVM: x86: Implement hook for determining max NPT mapping level Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 15/19] KVM: SEV: Avoid WBINVD for HVA-based MMU notifications for SNP Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 16/19] KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to enable SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 17/19] KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2024-05-17 20:41 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2024-05-17 22:01 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-18 15:04 ` [PATCH] KVM: SEV: Fix guest memory leak when handling guest requests Michael Roth
2024-05-20 14:17 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-20 22:50 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-20 23:32 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-21 2:00 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-21 14:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-21 15:34 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-21 16:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-21 21:00 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-20 23:02 ` [PATCH v2] " Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 18/19] KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_EXTENDED_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2024-05-13 15:19 ` Nathan Chancellor
2024-05-13 16:53 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-13 17:05 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-13 17:20 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-13 21:18 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-10 21:10 ` [PULL 19/19] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_VLEK_LOAD command Michael Roth
2024-05-12 7:14 ` [PULL 00/19] KVM: Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-12 8:17 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-05-13 1:06 ` Michael Roth
2024-05-13 22:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-05-31 3:22 ` Michael Roth
2024-06-03 16:44 ` Paolo Bonzini
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