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From: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
To: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
	"Nikunj A . Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 2/2] KVM: SEV: Configure "ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES" VMCB Field
Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2024 17:19:38 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240822221938.2192109-3-kim.phillips@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240822221938.2192109-1-kim.phillips@amd.com>

AMD EPYC 5th generation processors have introduced a feature that allows
the hypervisor to control the SEV_FEATURES that are set for, or by, a
guest [1].  ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES can be used by the hypervisor to enforce
that SEV-ES and SEV-SNP guests cannot enable features that the
hypervisor does not want to be enabled.

When ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES is enabled, a VMRUN will fail if any
non-reserved bits are 1 in SEV_FEATURES but are 0 in
ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES.

Some SEV_FEATURES (currently PmcVirtualization and SecureAvic according
to Appendix B, Table B-4) require an opt-in via ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES,
i.e. are off-by-default, whereas all other features are effectively
on-by-default, but still honor ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES.

[1] Section 15.36.20 "Allowed SEV Features", AMD64 Architecture
    Programmer's Manual, Pub. 24593 Rev. 3.42 - March 2024:
    https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=306250

Signed-off-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikunj A. Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
---
v2:
 - Added some SEV_FEATURES require to be explicitly allowed by
   ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES wording (Sean).
 - Added Nikunj's Reviewed-by.

v1:
 https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240802015732.3192877-3-kim.phillips@amd.com/

 arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 6 +++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c     | 5 +++++
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index f0dea3750ca9..59516ad2028b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -158,7 +158,9 @@ struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_control_area {
 	u64 avic_physical_id;	/* Offset 0xf8 */
 	u8 reserved_7[8];
 	u64 vmsa_pa;		/* Used for an SEV-ES guest */
-	u8 reserved_8[720];
+	u8 reserved_8[40];
+	u64 allowed_sev_features;	/* Offset 0x138 */
+	u8 reserved_9[672];
 	/*
 	 * Offset 0x3e0, 32 bytes reserved
 	 * for use by hypervisor/software.
@@ -294,6 +296,8 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AVIC_
 	(SVM_SEV_FEAT_RESTRICTED_INJECTION |	\
 	 SVM_SEV_FEAT_ALTERNATE_INJECTION)
 
+#define VMCB_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES_VALID		BIT_ULL(63)
+
 struct vmcb_seg {
 	u16 selector;
 	u16 attrib;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index a16c873b3232..d12b4d615b32 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -899,6 +899,7 @@ static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 static int __sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				    int *error)
 {
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
 	struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa vmsa;
 	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
 	int ret;
@@ -908,6 +909,10 @@ static int __sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES))
+		svm->vmcb->control.allowed_sev_features = VMCB_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES_VALID |
+							  sev->vmsa_features;
+
 	/* Perform some pre-encryption checks against the VMSA */
 	ret = sev_es_sync_vmsa(svm);
 	if (ret)
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-08-22 22:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-08-22 22:19 [PATCH v2 0/2] KVM: SEV: Add support for the ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES feature Kim Phillips
2024-08-22 22:19 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/cpufeatures: Add "Allowed SEV Features" Feature Kim Phillips
2024-08-25 12:35   ` Thomas Gleixner
2024-08-22 22:19 ` Kim Phillips [this message]
2024-08-22 23:31   ` [PATCH v2 2/2] KVM: SEV: Configure "ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES" VMCB Field Sean Christopherson

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