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From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	<bp@alien8.de>, <x86@kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <mingo@redhat.com>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <pgonda@google.com>,
	<seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>, <nikunj@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v12 11/19] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2024 14:58:42 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241009092850.197575-12-nikunj@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241009092850.197575-1-nikunj@amd.com>

Secure TSC enabled guests should not write to MSR_IA32_TSC(10H) register as
the subsequent TSC value reads are undefined. MSR_IA32_TSC read/write
accesses should not exit to the hypervisor for such guests.

Accesses to MSR_IA32_TSC needs special handling in the #VC handler for the
guests with Secure TSC enabled. Writes to MSR_IA32_TSC should be ignored,
and reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return the result of the RDTSC
instruction.

Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Tested-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
index d7e92fa1f6ff..5f555f905fad 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
@@ -1335,6 +1335,30 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
 		return ES_OK;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * TSC related accesses should not exit to the hypervisor when a
+	 * guest is executing with SecureTSC enabled, so special handling
+	 * is required for accesses of MSR_IA32_TSC:
+	 *
+	 * Writes: Writing to MSR_IA32_TSC can cause subsequent reads
+	 *         of the TSC to return undefined values, so ignore all
+	 *         writes.
+	 * Reads:  Reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return the current TSC
+	 *         value, use the value returned by RDTSC.
+	 */
+	if (regs->cx == MSR_IA32_TSC && cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC)) {
+		u64 tsc;
+
+		if (exit_info_1)
+			return ES_OK;
+
+		tsc = rdtsc();
+		regs->ax = UINT_MAX & tsc;
+		regs->dx = UINT_MAX & (tsc >> 32);
+
+		return ES_OK;
+	}
+
 	ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, regs->cx);
 	if (exit_info_1) {
 		ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, regs->ax);
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-10-09  9:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-10-09  9:28 [PATCH v12 00/19] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 01/19] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 02/19] x86/sev: Handle failures from snp_init() Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-16 16:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 03/19] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 04/19] virt: sev-guest: Consolidate SNP guest messaging parameters to a struct Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 05/19] virt: sev-guest: Reduce the scope of SNP command mutex Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-10 18:32   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 06/19] virt: sev-guest: Carve out SNP message context structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 07/19] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-17  7:42   ` kernel test robot
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 08/19] x86/sev: Relocate SNP guest messaging routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 09/19] x86/cc: Add CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-10 18:34   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 10/19] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` Nikunj A Dadhania [this message]
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 12/19] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 13/19] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 14/19] tsc: Use the GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR for discovering TSC frequency Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-10 19:39   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-14  3:36     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 15/19] tsc: Upgrade TSC clocksource rating Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 16:16   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-10  6:44     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 16/19] x86/kvmclock: Use clock source callback to update kvm sched clock Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 15:58   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-10 10:14     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-16  8:26       ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 17/19] x86/kvmclock: Abort SecureTSC enabled guest when kvmclock is selected Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-10 19:49   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-14  3:37     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 18/19] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 19/19] x86/sev: Allow Secure TSC feature for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 16:08 ` [PATCH v12 00/19] Add Secure TSC support " Dave Hansen
2024-10-10  6:28   ` Nikunj A. Dadhania

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