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From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	<bp@alien8.de>, <x86@kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <mingo@redhat.com>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <pgonda@google.com>,
	<seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>, <nikunj@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v12 03/19] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address
Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2024 14:58:34 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241009092850.197575-4-nikunj@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241009092850.197575-1-nikunj@amd.com>

Instead of calling get_secrets_page(), which parses the CC blob every time
to get the secrets page physical address (secrets_pa), save the secrets
page physical address during snp_init() from the CC blob. Since
get_secrets_page() is no longer used, remove the function.

Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 51 +++++++++-------------------------------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
index de1df0cb45da..1b0facfe658b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
@@ -92,6 +92,9 @@ static struct ghcb *boot_ghcb __section(".data");
 /* Bitmap of SEV features supported by the hypervisor */
 static u64 sev_hv_features __ro_after_init;
 
+/* Secrets page physical address from the CC blob */
+static u64 secrets_pa __ro_after_init;
+
 /* #VC handler runtime per-CPU data */
 struct sev_es_runtime_data {
 	struct ghcb ghcb_page;
@@ -722,45 +725,13 @@ void noinstr __sev_es_nmi_complete(void)
 	__sev_put_ghcb(&state);
 }
 
-static u64 __init get_secrets_page(void)
-{
-	u64 pa_data = boot_params.cc_blob_address;
-	struct cc_blob_sev_info info;
-	void *map;
-
-	/*
-	 * The CC blob contains the address of the secrets page, check if the
-	 * blob is present.
-	 */
-	if (!pa_data)
-		return 0;
-
-	map = early_memremap(pa_data, sizeof(info));
-	if (!map) {
-		pr_err("Unable to locate SNP secrets page: failed to map the Confidential Computing blob.\n");
-		return 0;
-	}
-	memcpy(&info, map, sizeof(info));
-	early_memunmap(map, sizeof(info));
-
-	/* smoke-test the secrets page passed */
-	if (!info.secrets_phys || info.secrets_len != PAGE_SIZE)
-		return 0;
-
-	return info.secrets_phys;
-}
-
 static u64 __init get_snp_jump_table_addr(void)
 {
 	struct snp_secrets_page *secrets;
 	void __iomem *mem;
-	u64 pa, addr;
-
-	pa = get_secrets_page();
-	if (!pa)
-		return 0;
+	u64 addr;
 
-	mem = ioremap_encrypted(pa, PAGE_SIZE);
+	mem = ioremap_encrypted(secrets_pa, PAGE_SIZE);
 	if (!mem) {
 		pr_err("Unable to locate AP jump table address: failed to map the SNP secrets page.\n");
 		return 0;
@@ -2300,6 +2271,11 @@ bool __head snp_init(struct boot_params *bp)
 	if (!cc_info)
 		return false;
 
+	if (cc_info->secrets_phys && cc_info->secrets_len == PAGE_SIZE)
+		secrets_pa = cc_info->secrets_phys;
+	else
+		return false;
+
 	setup_cpuid_table(cc_info);
 
 	svsm_setup(cc_info);
@@ -2513,16 +2489,11 @@ static struct platform_device sev_guest_device = {
 static int __init snp_init_platform_device(void)
 {
 	struct sev_guest_platform_data data;
-	u64 gpa;
 
 	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
 		return -ENODEV;
 
-	gpa = get_secrets_page();
-	if (!gpa)
-		return -ENODEV;
-
-	data.secrets_gpa = gpa;
+	data.secrets_gpa = secrets_pa;
 	if (platform_device_add_data(&sev_guest_device, &data, sizeof(data)))
 		return -ENODEV;
 
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-10-09  9:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-10-09  9:28 [PATCH v12 00/19] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 01/19] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 02/19] x86/sev: Handle failures from snp_init() Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-16 16:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-09  9:28 ` Nikunj A Dadhania [this message]
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 04/19] virt: sev-guest: Consolidate SNP guest messaging parameters to a struct Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 05/19] virt: sev-guest: Reduce the scope of SNP command mutex Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-10 18:32   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 06/19] virt: sev-guest: Carve out SNP message context structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 07/19] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-17  7:42   ` kernel test robot
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 08/19] x86/sev: Relocate SNP guest messaging routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 09/19] x86/cc: Add CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-10 18:34   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 10/19] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 11/19] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 12/19] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 13/19] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 14/19] tsc: Use the GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR for discovering TSC frequency Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-10 19:39   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-14  3:36     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 15/19] tsc: Upgrade TSC clocksource rating Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 16:16   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-10  6:44     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 16/19] x86/kvmclock: Use clock source callback to update kvm sched clock Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 15:58   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-10 10:14     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-16  8:26       ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 17/19] x86/kvmclock: Abort SecureTSC enabled guest when kvmclock is selected Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-10 19:49   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-14  3:37     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 18/19] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 19/19] x86/sev: Allow Secure TSC feature for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 16:08 ` [PATCH v12 00/19] Add Secure TSC support " Dave Hansen
2024-10-10  6:28   ` Nikunj A. Dadhania

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