public inbox for kvm@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, hpa@zytor.com,
	 jpoimboe@kernel.org, kai.huang@intel.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,  mingo@redhat.com,
	pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	 sandipan.das@amd.com, seanjc@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	x86@kernel.org,  Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	Venkatesh Srinivas <venkateshs@chromium.org>
Subject: [PATCH v5 4/4] KVM: x86: AMD's IBPB is not equivalent to Intel's IBPB
Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2024 14:43:53 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241011214353.1625057-5-jmattson@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241011214353.1625057-1-jmattson@google.com>

From Intel's documention [1], "CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26]
enumerates support for indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS)
and the indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB)." Further, from [2],
"Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control the
predicted targets of indirect branches (4) executed after the command
on the same logical processor," where footnote 4 reads, "Note that
indirect branches include near call indirect, near jump indirect and
near return instructions. Because it includes near returns, it follows
that **RSB entries created before an IBPB command cannot control the
predicted targets of returns executed after the command on the same
logical processor.**" [emphasis mine]

On the other hand, AMD's IBPB "may not prevent return branch
predictions from being specified by pre-IBPB branch targets" [3].

However, some AMD processors have an "enhanced IBPB" [terminology
mine] which does clear the return address predictor. This feature is
enumerated by CPUID.80000008:EDX.IBPB_RET[bit 30] [4].

Adjust the cross-vendor features enumerated by KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID
accordingly.

[1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/cpuid-enumeration-and-architectural-msrs.html
[2] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigations.html#Footnotes
[3] https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1040.html
[4] https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/programmer-references/24594.pdf

Fixes: 0c54914d0c52 ("KVM: x86: use Intel speculation bugs and features as derived in generic x86 code")
Suggested-by: Venkatesh Srinivas <venkateshs@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index 53112669be00..d695e7bc41ed 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -690,7 +690,9 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
 	kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST);
 	kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
 
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET) &&
+	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB) &&
+	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS))
 		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
 		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP);
@@ -763,8 +765,12 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
 	 * arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c is kind enough to
 	 * record that in cpufeatures so use them.
 	 */
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
 		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB);
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
+		    !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB))
+			kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET);
+	}
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
 		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS);
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
-- 
2.47.0.rc1.288.g06298d1525-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-10-11 21:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-10-11 21:43 [PATCH v5 0/4] Distinguish between variants of IBPB Jim Mattson
2024-10-11 21:43 ` [PATCH v5 1/4] x86/cpufeatures: Clarify semantics of X86_FEATURE_IBPB Jim Mattson
2024-10-11 21:43 ` [PATCH v5 2/4] x86/cpufeatures: Define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET Jim Mattson
2024-10-11 21:43 ` [PATCH v5 3/4] KVM: x86: Advertise AMD_IBPB_RET to userspace Jim Mattson
2024-10-11 21:43 ` Jim Mattson [this message]
2024-10-14 15:48   ` [PATCH v5 4/4] KVM: x86: AMD's IBPB is not equivalent to Intel's IBPB Tom Lendacky
2024-10-31 19:51 ` [PATCH v5 0/4] Distinguish between variants of IBPB Sean Christopherson
2024-11-01 15:40   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-01 16:03     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-11-01 19:28       ` Sean Christopherson

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20241011214353.1625057-5-jmattson@google.com \
    --to=jmattson@google.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=jpoimboe@kernel.org \
    --cc=kai.huang@intel.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=sandipan.das@amd.com \
    --cc=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=venkateshs@chromium.org \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox