From: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, hpa@zytor.com,
jpoimboe@kernel.org, kai.huang@intel.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
sandipan.das@amd.com, seanjc@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
x86@kernel.org, Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
Venkatesh Srinivas <venkateshs@chromium.org>
Subject: [PATCH v5 4/4] KVM: x86: AMD's IBPB is not equivalent to Intel's IBPB
Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2024 14:43:53 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241011214353.1625057-5-jmattson@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241011214353.1625057-1-jmattson@google.com>
From Intel's documention [1], "CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26]
enumerates support for indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS)
and the indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB)." Further, from [2],
"Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control the
predicted targets of indirect branches (4) executed after the command
on the same logical processor," where footnote 4 reads, "Note that
indirect branches include near call indirect, near jump indirect and
near return instructions. Because it includes near returns, it follows
that **RSB entries created before an IBPB command cannot control the
predicted targets of returns executed after the command on the same
logical processor.**" [emphasis mine]
On the other hand, AMD's IBPB "may not prevent return branch
predictions from being specified by pre-IBPB branch targets" [3].
However, some AMD processors have an "enhanced IBPB" [terminology
mine] which does clear the return address predictor. This feature is
enumerated by CPUID.80000008:EDX.IBPB_RET[bit 30] [4].
Adjust the cross-vendor features enumerated by KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID
accordingly.
[1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/cpuid-enumeration-and-architectural-msrs.html
[2] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigations.html#Footnotes
[3] https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1040.html
[4] https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/programmer-references/24594.pdf
Fixes: 0c54914d0c52 ("KVM: x86: use Intel speculation bugs and features as derived in generic x86 code")
Suggested-by: Venkatesh Srinivas <venkateshs@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 10 ++++++++--
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index 53112669be00..d695e7bc41ed 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -690,7 +690,9 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST);
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS))
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP);
@@ -763,8 +765,12 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
* arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c is kind enough to
* record that in cpufeatures so use them.
*/
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB);
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB))
+ kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET);
+ }
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS);
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
--
2.47.0.rc1.288.g06298d1525-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-10-11 21:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-11 21:43 [PATCH v5 0/4] Distinguish between variants of IBPB Jim Mattson
2024-10-11 21:43 ` [PATCH v5 1/4] x86/cpufeatures: Clarify semantics of X86_FEATURE_IBPB Jim Mattson
2024-10-11 21:43 ` [PATCH v5 2/4] x86/cpufeatures: Define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET Jim Mattson
2024-10-11 21:43 ` [PATCH v5 3/4] KVM: x86: Advertise AMD_IBPB_RET to userspace Jim Mattson
2024-10-11 21:43 ` Jim Mattson [this message]
2024-10-14 15:48 ` [PATCH v5 4/4] KVM: x86: AMD's IBPB is not equivalent to Intel's IBPB Tom Lendacky
2024-10-31 19:51 ` [PATCH v5 0/4] Distinguish between variants of IBPB Sean Christopherson
2024-11-01 15:40 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-11-01 16:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-11-01 19:28 ` Sean Christopherson
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