From: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
To: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
bp@alien8.de, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: oe-kbuild-all@lists.linux.dev, mingo@redhat.com,
tglx@linutronix.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
pgonda@google.com, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
nikunj@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 07/19] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines
Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2024 15:42:30 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202410171505.gZbmXuo2-lkp@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241009092850.197575-8-nikunj@amd.com>
Hi Nikunj,
kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:
[auto build test WARNING on 8cf0b93919e13d1e8d4466eb4080a4c4d9d66d7b]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Nikunj-A-Dadhania/virt-sev-guest-Use-AES-GCM-crypto-library/20241009-173734
base: 8cf0b93919e13d1e8d4466eb4080a4c4d9d66d7b
patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009092850.197575-8-nikunj%40amd.com
patch subject: [PATCH v12 07/19] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines
config: x86_64-randconfig-121-20241017 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20241017/202410171505.gZbmXuo2-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: gcc-12 (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20241017/202410171505.gZbmXuo2-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202410171505.gZbmXuo2-lkp@intel.com/
sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
>> arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c:2663:24: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) @@ expected struct snp_secrets_page *secrets @@ got void [noderef] __iomem * @@
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c:2663:24: sparse: expected struct snp_secrets_page *secrets
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c:2663:24: sparse: got void [noderef] __iomem *
>> arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c:2694:22: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected void volatile [noderef] __iomem *addr @@ got struct snp_secrets_page *secrets @@
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c:2694:22: sparse: expected void volatile [noderef] __iomem *addr
arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c:2694:22: sparse: got struct snp_secrets_page *secrets
vim +2663 arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
2649
2650 struct snp_msg_desc *snp_msg_alloc(void)
2651 {
2652 struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc;
2653
2654 BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg) > PAGE_SIZE);
2655
2656 if (snp_mdesc)
2657 return snp_mdesc;
2658
2659 mdesc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct snp_msg_desc), GFP_KERNEL);
2660 if (!mdesc)
2661 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
2662
> 2663 mdesc->secrets = ioremap_encrypted(secrets_pa, PAGE_SIZE);
2664 if (!mdesc->secrets)
2665 return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
2666
2667 /* Allocate the shared page used for the request and response message. */
2668 mdesc->request = alloc_shared_pages(sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
2669 if (!mdesc->request)
2670 goto e_unmap;
2671
2672 mdesc->response = alloc_shared_pages(sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
2673 if (!mdesc->response)
2674 goto e_free_request;
2675
2676 mdesc->certs_data = alloc_shared_pages(SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE);
2677 if (!mdesc->certs_data)
2678 goto e_free_response;
2679
2680 /* initial the input address for guest request */
2681 mdesc->input.req_gpa = __pa(mdesc->request);
2682 mdesc->input.resp_gpa = __pa(mdesc->response);
2683 mdesc->input.data_gpa = __pa(mdesc->certs_data);
2684
2685 snp_mdesc = mdesc;
2686
2687 return mdesc;
2688
2689 e_free_response:
2690 free_shared_pages(mdesc->response, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
2691 e_free_request:
2692 free_shared_pages(mdesc->request, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
2693 e_unmap:
> 2694 iounmap(mdesc->secrets);
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-10-17 7:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-10-09 9:28 [PATCH v12 00/19] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 9:28 ` [PATCH v12 01/19] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 9:28 ` [PATCH v12 02/19] x86/sev: Handle failures from snp_init() Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-16 16:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-09 9:28 ` [PATCH v12 03/19] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 9:28 ` [PATCH v12 04/19] virt: sev-guest: Consolidate SNP guest messaging parameters to a struct Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 9:28 ` [PATCH v12 05/19] virt: sev-guest: Reduce the scope of SNP command mutex Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-10 18:32 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-09 9:28 ` [PATCH v12 06/19] virt: sev-guest: Carve out SNP message context structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 9:28 ` [PATCH v12 07/19] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-17 7:42 ` kernel test robot [this message]
2024-10-09 9:28 ` [PATCH v12 08/19] x86/sev: Relocate SNP guest messaging routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 9:28 ` [PATCH v12 09/19] x86/cc: Add CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-10 18:34 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-09 9:28 ` [PATCH v12 10/19] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 9:28 ` [PATCH v12 11/19] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 9:28 ` [PATCH v12 12/19] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 9:28 ` [PATCH v12 13/19] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 9:28 ` [PATCH v12 14/19] tsc: Use the GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR for discovering TSC frequency Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-10 19:39 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-14 3:36 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-09 9:28 ` [PATCH v12 15/19] tsc: Upgrade TSC clocksource rating Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 16:16 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-10 6:44 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-09 9:28 ` [PATCH v12 16/19] x86/kvmclock: Use clock source callback to update kvm sched clock Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 15:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-10 10:14 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-16 8:26 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-09 9:28 ` [PATCH v12 17/19] x86/kvmclock: Abort SecureTSC enabled guest when kvmclock is selected Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-10 19:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-14 3:37 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-09 9:28 ` [PATCH v12 18/19] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 9:28 ` [PATCH v12 19/19] x86/sev: Allow Secure TSC feature for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 16:08 ` [PATCH v12 00/19] Add Secure TSC support " Dave Hansen
2024-10-10 6:28 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
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