From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
<bp@alien8.de>, <x86@kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <mingo@redhat.com>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <pgonda@google.com>,
<seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>, <nikunj@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v15 07/13] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource
Date: Tue, 3 Dec 2024 14:30:39 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20241203090045.942078-8-nikunj@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241203090045.942078-1-nikunj@amd.com>
In SNP guest environment with Secure TSC enabled, unlike other clock
sources (such as HPET, ACPI timer, APIC, etc.), the RDTSC instruction is
handled without causing a VM exit, resulting in minimal overhead and
jitters. Hence, mark Secure TSC as the only reliable clock source,
bypassing unstable calibration.
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Tested-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
index 774f9677458f..fa0bc52ef707 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
@@ -541,6 +541,10 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void)
* kernel mapped.
*/
snp_update_svsm_ca();
+
+ /* Mark the TSC as reliable when Secure TSC is enabled */
+ if (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC)
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE);
}
void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void)
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-12-03 9:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 96+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-12-03 9:00 [PATCH v15 00/13] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 01/13] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-03 14:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-03 14:35 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03 14:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-03 14:52 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-04 9:30 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-04 10:00 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-04 20:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-05 6:23 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-06 20:27 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-07 0:27 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2024-12-09 15:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-09 6:16 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-09 15:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-10 6:38 ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-04 19:06 ` Francesco Lavra
2025-01-06 4:14 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 02/13] x86/sev: Relocate SNP guest messaging routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-04 20:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-05 6:25 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 03/13] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-05 11:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-06 4:19 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-16 16:06 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-17 6:12 ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-04 20:26 ` Francesco Lavra
2025-01-06 4:34 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 04/13] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-09 15:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-10 5:02 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-10 11:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-10 16:44 ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-10 14:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-10 16:59 ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-11 19:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-11 22:01 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-11 22:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-11 22:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 05/13] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-10 11:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 06/13] x86/sev: Prevent GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-10 12:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-10 17:13 ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-10 17:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-12 4:53 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-17 10:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-18 5:20 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-24 11:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-01 8:44 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-01 16:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 5:03 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-02 9:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 9:30 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-02 14:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-01-02 14:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-10 17:22 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-03 9:00 ` Nikunj A Dadhania [this message]
2024-12-11 20:32 ` [PATCH v15 07/13] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Borislav Petkov
2024-12-12 5:07 ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 08/13] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-17 11:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-18 5:21 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 09/13] tsc: Use the GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR for discovering TSC frequency Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-16 16:31 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-17 6:27 ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-17 7:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-17 7:57 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-30 11:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-01 8:56 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-01 16:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 5:10 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-02 9:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 10:01 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-02 10:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 13:10 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-03 12:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-03 13:59 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-04 10:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 10/13] tsc: Upgrade TSC clocksource rating Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-30 11:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 5:20 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-02 9:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-03 10:09 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-03 12:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-03 14:03 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 11/13] tsc: Switch to native sched clock Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 12/13] x86/kvmclock: Abort SecureTSC enabled guest when kvmclock is selected Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-16 16:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-30 17:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-01 9:44 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-01 16:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 5:34 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-02 9:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 10:06 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03 9:00 ` [PATCH v15 13/13] x86/sev: Allow Secure TSC feature for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
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