From: Patrick Bellasi <derkling@google.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed@linux.dev>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Patrick Bellasi <derkling@matbug.net>,
Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@google.com>,
David Kaplan <David.Kaplan@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH final?] x86/bugs: KVM: Add support for SRSO_MSR_FIX
Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2025 14:42:57 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250218144257.1033452-1-derkling@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250218111306.GFZ7RrQh3RD4JKj1lu@fat_crate.local>
> in the interest of finally making some progress here I'd like to commit this
> below (will test it one more time just in case but it should work :-P). It is
> simple and straight-forward and doesn't need an IBPB when the bit gets
> cleared.
That's indeed simple and straight-forward for the time being.
Maybe a small improvement we could add on top is to have a separate and
dedicated cmdline option?
Indeed, with `X86_FEATURE_SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO` we are not effectively using an
IBPB on VM-Exit anymore. Something like the diff down below?
Best,
Patrick
---
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 1d7afc40f2272..7609d80eda123 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -2531,6 +2531,7 @@ enum srso_mitigation_cmd {
SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET,
SRSO_CMD_IBPB,
SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT,
+ SRSO_CMD_BP_SPEC_REDUCE,
};
static const char * const srso_strings[] = {
@@ -2562,6 +2563,8 @@ static int __init srso_parse_cmdline(char *str)
srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_IBPB;
else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb-vmexit"))
srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "spec-reduce"))
+ srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_BP_SPEC_REDUCE;
else
pr_err("Ignoring unknown SRSO option (%s).", str);
@@ -2617,7 +2620,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
case SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET:
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO))
- goto ibpb_on_vmexit;
+ goto spec_reduce;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)) {
/*
@@ -2670,14 +2673,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
}
break;
-ibpb_on_vmexit:
case SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_BP_SPEC_REDUCE)) {
- pr_notice("Reducing speculation to address VM/HV SRSO attack vector.\n");
- srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_BP_SPEC_REDUCE;
- break;
- }
-
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
if (has_microcode) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
@@ -2694,6 +2690,14 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
}
break;
+
+spec_reduce:
+ case SRSO_CMD_BP_SPEC_REDUCE:
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_BP_SPEC_REDUCE)) {
+ pr_notice("Reducing speculation to address VM/HV SRSO attack vector.\n");
+ srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_BP_SPEC_REDUCE;
+ break;
+ }
default:
break;
}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-02-18 14:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 72+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-12-02 12:04 [PATCH v2 0/4] x86/bugs: Adjust SRSO mitigation to new features Borislav Petkov
2024-12-02 12:04 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] x86/bugs: Add SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO support Borislav Petkov
2024-12-10 6:53 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-12-10 15:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-11 7:53 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-12-11 20:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-11 22:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-16 17:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-02 12:04 ` [PATCH v2 2/4] KVM: x86: Advertise SRSO_USER_KERNEL_NO to userspace Borislav Petkov
2024-12-02 12:04 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] x86/bugs: KVM: Add support for SRSO_MSR_FIX Borislav Petkov
2024-12-11 22:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-16 17:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-16 18:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-17 9:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-30 11:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 13:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-08 15:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 17:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-08 18:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 18:37 ` Jim Mattson
2025-01-08 19:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-08 19:43 ` Jim Mattson
2025-01-08 19:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-11 12:52 ` [PATCH] " Borislav Petkov
2025-01-17 18:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-18 15:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-23 16:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-23 17:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-23 18:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-24 12:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-11 19:19 ` Jim Mattson
2025-02-11 20:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-13 10:53 ` Patrick Bellasi
2025-02-13 13:44 ` Patrick Bellasi
2025-02-13 14:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-13 17:50 ` Patrick Bellasi
2025-02-14 20:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-15 0:57 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-15 9:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-17 5:47 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-17 15:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-15 12:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-17 5:59 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-17 16:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-17 19:56 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-17 20:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-02-17 20:32 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-18 11:13 ` [PATCH final?] " Borislav Petkov
2025-02-18 14:42 ` Patrick Bellasi [this message]
2025-02-18 15:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-29 13:25 ` x86/bugs: KVM: Add support for SRSO_MSR_FIX, back for moar Borislav Petkov
2025-04-30 23:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-01 0:42 ` Michael Larabel
2025-05-01 8:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-01 16:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-05 15:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-05 15:40 ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-05 15:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-05 16:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-05 16:42 ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-05 18:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-05-05 18:25 ` Kaplan, David
2024-12-02 12:04 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] Documentation/kernel-parameters: Fix a typo in kvm.enable_virt_at_load text Borislav Petkov
2024-12-03 14:30 ` [PATCH v2 0/4] x86/bugs: Adjust SRSO mitigation to new features Nikolay Borisov
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2025-02-26 18:45 [PATCH final?] x86/bugs: KVM: Add support for SRSO_MSR_FIX Patrick Bellasi
2025-02-26 19:51 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-03-03 13:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-03 14:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-03 15:05 Patrick Bellasi
2025-03-11 12:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-03-11 13:36 ` Brendan Jackman
2025-03-12 19:17 ` Borislav Petkov
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