From: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed@linux.dev>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 0/6] IBPB cleanups and a fixup
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2025 22:08:20 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250219220826.2453186-1-yosry.ahmed@linux.dev> (raw)
This series removes X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB, and fixes a KVM nVMX bug in
the process. The motivation is mostly the confusing name of
X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB, which sounds like it controls IBPBs in general,
but it only controls IBPBs for spectre_v2_mitigation. A side effect of
this confusion is the nVMX bug, where virtualizing IBRS correctly
depends on the spectre_v2_user mitigation.
The feature bit is mostly redundant, except in controlling the IBPB in
the vCPU load path. For that, a separate static branch is introduced,
similar to switch_mm_*_ibpb.
I wanted to do more, but decided to stay conservative. I was mainly
hoping to merge indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() with entry_ibpb()
to have a single IBPB primitive that always stuffs the RSB if the IBPB
doesn't, but this would add some overhead in paths that currently use
indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(), and I was not sure if that's
acceptable.
For the record, my measurements of the latency of
indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() and entry_ibpb() on Rome and Milan
(both do not have X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET) are as follows:
Rome:
400ns (indirect_branch_prediction_barrier) vs 500ns (entry_ibpb)
Milan:
220ns (indirect_branch_prediction_barrier) vs 280ns (entry_ibpb)
I also wanted to move controlling the IBPB on vCPU load from
being under spectre_v2_user to spectre_v2, because "user" in a lot of
mitigation contexts does not include VMs.
Just laying out these thoughts in case others have any comments.
Yosry Ahmed (6):
x86/bugs: Move the X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB check into callers
x86/mm: Remove X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB checks in cond_mitigation()
x86/bugs: Remove the X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB check in ib_prctl_set()
x86/bugs: Use a static branch to guard IBPB on vCPU load
KVM: nVMX: Always use IBPB to properly virtualize IBRS
x86/bugs: Remove X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 -
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 4 +++-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 7 +++++--
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 3 ++-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 3 ++-
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 3 +--
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 -
7 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--
2.48.1.601.g30ceb7b040-goog
next reply other threads:[~2025-02-19 22:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-02-19 22:08 Yosry Ahmed [this message]
2025-02-19 22:08 ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/bugs: Move the X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB check into callers Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-25 19:47 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-25 21:28 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-19 22:08 ` [PATCH 2/6] x86/mm: Remove X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB checks in cond_mitigation() Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-19 22:08 ` [PATCH 3/6] x86/bugs: Remove the X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB check in ib_prctl_set() Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-19 22:08 ` [PATCH 4/6] x86/bugs: Use a static branch to guard IBPB on vCPU load Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-25 19:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-25 21:27 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-25 22:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-26 2:49 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-27 0:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-27 0:54 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-19 22:08 ` [PATCH 5/6] KVM: nVMX: Always use IBPB to properly virtualize IBRS Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-19 23:09 ` Jim Mattson
2025-02-25 19:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-19 22:08 ` [PATCH 6/6] x86/bugs: Remove X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-20 19:04 ` [PATCH 0/6] IBPB cleanups and a fixup Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-20 19:59 ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-20 20:47 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-20 21:50 ` Yosry Ahmed
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