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From: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed@linux.dev>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 4/6] x86/bugs: Use a static branch to guard IBPB on vCPU load
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2025 22:08:24 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250219220826.2453186-5-yosry.ahmed@linux.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250219220826.2453186-1-yosry.ahmed@linux.dev>

Instead of using X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB to guard the IBPB execution in the
vCPU load path, introduce a static branch, similar to switch_mm_*_ibpb.

This makes it obvious in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() what
exactly is being toggled, instead of the unclear X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB
(which will be shortly removed). It also provides more fine-grained
control, making it simpler to change/add paths that control the IBPB in
the vCPU load path without affecting other IBPBs.

Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed@linux.dev>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           | 5 +++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c               | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c               | 2 +-
 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 7cbb76a2434b9..a22836c5fb338 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -552,6 +552,8 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
 
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(vcpu_load_ibpb);
+
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
 
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index a5d0998d76049..685a6f97fea8f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -113,6 +113,10 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
 /* Control unconditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
 
+/* Control IBPB on vCPU load */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(vcpu_load_ibpb);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vcpu_load_ibpb);
+
 /* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before idling (halt, mwait) */
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear);
@@ -1365,6 +1369,7 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void)
 	/* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
+		static_branch_enable(&vcpu_load_ibpb);
 
 		spectre_v2_user_ibpb = mode;
 		switch (cmd) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index a4ba5b4e3d682..043d56d276ad6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -1560,7 +1560,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
 		sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb;
 
 		if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT) &&
-		    cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB))
+		    static_branch_likely(&vcpu_load_ibpb))
 			indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
 	}
 	if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 729a8ee24037b..7f950d0b50757 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1478,7 +1478,7 @@ void vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu,
 		 * may switch the active VMCS multiple times).
 		 */
 		if (!buddy || WARN_ON_ONCE(buddy->vmcs != prev))
-			if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB))
+			if (static_branch_likely(&vcpu_load_ibpb))
 				indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
 	}
 
-- 
2.48.1.601.g30ceb7b040-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-02-19 22:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-02-19 22:08 [PATCH 0/6] IBPB cleanups and a fixup Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-19 22:08 ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/bugs: Move the X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB check into callers Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-25 19:47   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-25 21:28     ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-19 22:08 ` [PATCH 2/6] x86/mm: Remove X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB checks in cond_mitigation() Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-19 22:08 ` [PATCH 3/6] x86/bugs: Remove the X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB check in ib_prctl_set() Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-19 22:08 ` Yosry Ahmed [this message]
2025-02-25 19:49   ` [PATCH 4/6] x86/bugs: Use a static branch to guard IBPB on vCPU load Sean Christopherson
2025-02-25 21:27     ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-25 22:40       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-26  2:49         ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-27  0:46           ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-27  0:54             ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-19 22:08 ` [PATCH 5/6] KVM: nVMX: Always use IBPB to properly virtualize IBRS Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-19 23:09   ` Jim Mattson
2025-02-25 19:50   ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-19 22:08 ` [PATCH 6/6] x86/bugs: Remove X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-20 19:04 ` [PATCH 0/6] IBPB cleanups and a fixup Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-20 19:59   ` Yosry Ahmed
2025-02-20 20:47     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-02-20 21:50       ` Yosry Ahmed

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