From: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
To: pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, kai.huang@intel.com,
adrian.hunter@intel.com, reinette.chatre@intel.com,
xiaoyao.li@intel.com, tony.lindgren@intel.com,
isaku.yamahata@intel.com, yan.y.zhao@intel.com,
chao.gao@intel.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
binbin.wu@linux.intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v2 02/20] KVM: TDX: Detect unexpected SEPT violations due to pending SPTEs
Date: Thu, 27 Feb 2025 09:20:03 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250227012021.1778144-3-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250227012021.1778144-1-binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
From: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
Detect SEPT violations that occur when an SEPT entry is in PENDING state
while the TD is configured not to receive #VE on SEPT violations.
A TD guest can be configured not to receive #VE by setting SEPT_VE_DISABLE
to 1 in tdh_mng_init() or modifying pending_ve_disable to 1 in TDCS when
flexible_pending_ve is permitted. In such cases, the TDX module will not
inject #VE into the TD upon encountering an EPT violation caused by an SEPT
entry in the PENDING state. Instead, TDX module will exit to VMM and set
extended exit qualification type to PENDING_EPT_VIOLATION and exit
qualification bit 6:3 to 0.
Since #VE will not be injected to such TDs, they are not able to be
notified to accept a GPA. TD accessing before accepting a private GPA
is regarded as an error within the guest.
Detect such guest error by inspecting the (extended) exit qualification
bits and make such VM dead.
Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
---
TDX "the rest" v2:
- Rebased on getting exit_qualification, ext_exit_qualification.
TDX "the rest" v1:
- New patch
---
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h | 2 ++
3 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index 9298fb9d4bb3..028f3b8db2af 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -585,12 +585,14 @@ enum vm_entry_failure_code {
#define EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE_BIT 1
#define EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR_BIT 2
#define EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_SHIFT 3
+#define EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_R3_LIN_BIT 6
#define EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID_BIT 7
#define EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED_BIT 8
#define EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ (1 << EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ_BIT)
#define EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE (1 << EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE_BIT)
#define EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR (1 << EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR_BIT)
#define EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_MASK (VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK << EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_SHIFT)
+#define EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_FOR_RING3_LIN (1 << EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_R3_LIN_BIT)
#define EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID (1 << EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID_BIT)
#define EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED (1 << EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED_BIT)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index 0e2c734070d6..b8701e343e80 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -1683,12 +1683,29 @@ void tdx_deliver_interrupt(struct kvm_lapic *apic, int delivery_mode,
trace_kvm_apicv_accept_irq(vcpu->vcpu_id, delivery_mode, trig_mode, vector);
}
+static inline bool tdx_is_sept_violation_unexpected_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ u64 eeq_type = to_tdx(vcpu)->ext_exit_qualification & TDX_EXT_EXIT_QUAL_TYPE_MASK;
+ u64 eq = vmx_get_exit_qual(vcpu);
+
+ if (eeq_type != TDX_EXT_EXIT_QUAL_TYPE_PENDING_EPT_VIOLATION)
+ return false;
+
+ return !(eq & EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_MASK) && !(eq & EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_FOR_RING3_LIN);
+}
+
static int tdx_handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
unsigned long exit_qual;
gpa_t gpa = to_tdx(vcpu)->exit_gpa;
if (vt_is_tdx_private_gpa(vcpu->kvm, gpa)) {
+ if (tdx_is_sept_violation_unexpected_pending(vcpu)) {
+ pr_warn("Guest access before accepting 0x%llx on vCPU %d\n",
+ gpa, vcpu->vcpu_id);
+ kvm_vm_dead(vcpu->kvm);
+ return -EIO;
+ }
/*
* Always treat SEPT violations as write faults. Ignore the
* EXIT_QUALIFICATION reported by TDX-SEAM for SEPT violations.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h
index a8071409498f..fcbf0d4abc5f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ struct tdx_cpuid_value {
#define TDX_TD_ATTR_KL BIT_ULL(31)
#define TDX_TD_ATTR_PERFMON BIT_ULL(63)
+#define TDX_EXT_EXIT_QUAL_TYPE_MASK GENMASK(3, 0)
+#define TDX_EXT_EXIT_QUAL_TYPE_PENDING_EPT_VIOLATION 6
/*
* TD_PARAMS is provided as an input to TDH_MNG_INIT, the size of which is 1024B.
*/
--
2.46.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-02-27 1:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-02-27 1:20 [PATCH v2 00/20] KVM: TDX: TDX "the rest" part Binbin Wu
2025-02-27 1:20 ` [PATCH v2 01/20] KVM: TDX: Handle EPT violation/misconfig exit Binbin Wu
2025-02-27 1:20 ` Binbin Wu [this message]
2025-02-27 1:20 ` [PATCH v2 03/20] KVM: TDX: Retry locally in TDX EPT violation handler on RET_PF_RETRY Binbin Wu
2025-02-27 1:20 ` [PATCH v2 04/20] KVM: TDX: Kick off vCPUs when SEAMCALL is busy during TD page removal Binbin Wu
2025-02-27 1:20 ` [PATCH v2 05/20] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV CPUID hypercall Binbin Wu
2025-02-27 1:20 ` [PATCH v2 06/20] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV HLT hypercall Binbin Wu
2025-02-27 1:20 ` [PATCH v2 07/20] KVM: x86: Move KVM_MAX_MCE_BANKS to header file Binbin Wu
2025-02-27 1:20 ` [PATCH v2 08/20] KVM: TDX: Implement callbacks for MSR operations Binbin Wu
2025-02-27 1:20 ` [PATCH v2 09/20] KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV rdmsr/wrmsr hypercall Binbin Wu
2025-02-27 1:20 ` [PATCH v2 10/20] KVM: TDX: Enable guest access to LMCE related MSRs Binbin Wu
2025-02-27 1:20 ` [PATCH v2 11/20] KVM: TDX: Handle TDG.VP.VMCALL<GetTdVmCallInfo> hypercall Binbin Wu
2025-02-27 1:20 ` [PATCH v2 12/20] KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to CPU state Binbin Wu
2025-02-27 1:20 ` [PATCH v2 13/20] KVM: TDX: Add method to ignore guest instruction emulation Binbin Wu
2025-02-27 1:20 ` [PATCH v2 14/20] KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore VMX preemption timer Binbin Wu
2025-02-27 1:20 ` [PATCH v2 15/20] KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to TSC Binbin Wu
2025-02-27 1:20 ` [PATCH v2 16/20] KVM: TDX: Ignore setting up mce Binbin Wu
2025-02-27 1:20 ` [PATCH v2 17/20] KVM: TDX: Add a method to ignore hypercall patching Binbin Wu
2025-02-27 1:20 ` [PATCH v2 18/20] KVM: TDX: Enable guest access to MTRR MSRs Binbin Wu
2025-02-27 1:20 ` [PATCH v2 19/20] KVM: TDX: Make TDX VM type supported Binbin Wu
2025-02-27 1:20 ` [PATCH v2 20/20] Documentation/virt/kvm: Document on Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) Binbin Wu
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