From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org>,
Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>,
Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 01/10] KVM: SVM: Save host DR masks on CPUs with DebugSwap
Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2025 17:25:32 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250227012541.3234589-2-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250227012541.3234589-1-seanjc@google.com>
When running SEV-SNP guests on a CPU that supports DebugSwap, always save
the host's DR0..DR3 mask MSR values irrespective of whether or not
DebugSwap is enabled, to ensure the host values aren't clobbered by the
CPU. And for now, also save DR0..DR3, even though doing so isn't
necessary (see below).
SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATE is deeply flawed in that it allows the *guest* to
create a VMSA with guest-controlled SEV_FEATURES. A well behaved guest
can inform the hypervisor, i.e. KVM, of its "requested" features, but on
CPUs without ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES support, nothing prevents the guest from
lying about which SEV features are being enabled (or not!).
If a misbehaving guest enables DebugSwap in a secondary vCPU's VMSA, the
CPU will load the DR0..DR3 mask MSRs on #VMEXIT, i.e. will clobber the
MSRs with '0' if KVM doesn't save its desired value.
Note, DR0..DR3 themselves are "ok", as DR7 is reset on #VMEXIT, and KVM
restores all DRs in common x86 code as needed via hw_breakpoint_restore().
I.e. there is no risk of host DR0..DR3 being clobbered (when it matters).
However, there is a flaw in the opposite direction; because the guest can
lie about enabling DebugSwap, i.e. can *disable* DebugSwap without KVM's
knowledge, KVM must not rely on the CPU to restore DRs. Defer fixing
that wart, as it's more of a documentation issue than a bug in the code.
Note, KVM added support for DebugSwap on commit d1f85fbe836e ("KVM: SEV:
Enable data breakpoints in SEV-ES"), but that is not an appropriate Fixes,
as the underlying flaw exists in hardware, not in KVM. I.e. all kernels
that support SEV-SNP need to be patched, not just kernels with KVM's full
support for DebugSwap (ignoring that DebugSwap support landed first).
Opportunistically fix an incorrect statement in the comment; on CPUs
without DebugSwap, the CPU does NOT save or load debug registers, i.e.
Fixes: e366f92ea99e ("KVM: SEV: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org>
Cc: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 13 ++++++++++---
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 74525651770a..5c3d8618b722 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -4568,6 +4568,8 @@ void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa)
{
+ struct kvm *kvm = svm->vcpu.kvm;
+
/*
* All host state for SEV-ES guests is categorized into three swap types
* based on how it is handled by hardware during a world switch:
@@ -4591,10 +4593,15 @@ void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct sev_es_save_are
/*
* If DebugSwap is enabled, debug registers are loaded but NOT saved by
- * the CPU (Type-B). If DebugSwap is disabled/unsupported, the CPU both
- * saves and loads debug registers (Type-A).
+ * the CPU (Type-B). If DebugSwap is disabled/unsupported, the CPU does
+ * not save or load debug registers. Sadly, on CPUs without
+ * ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES, KVM can't prevent SNP guests from enabling
+ * DebugSwap on secondary vCPUs without KVM's knowledge via "AP Create".
+ * Save all registers if DebugSwap is supported to prevent host state
+ * from being clobbered by a misbehaving guest.
*/
- if (sev_vcpu_has_debug_swap(svm)) {
+ if (sev_vcpu_has_debug_swap(svm) ||
+ (sev_snp_guest(kvm) && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP))) {
hostsa->dr0 = native_get_debugreg(0);
hostsa->dr1 = native_get_debugreg(1);
hostsa->dr2 = native_get_debugreg(2);
--
2.48.1.711.g2feabab25a-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-02-27 1:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-02-27 1:25 [PATCH v2 00/10] KVM: SVM: Attempt to cleanup SEV_FEATURES Sean Christopherson
2025-02-27 1:25 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-02-27 1:25 ` [PATCH v2 02/10] KVM: SVM: Don't rely on DebugSwap to restore host DR0..DR3 Sean Christopherson
2025-02-27 1:25 ` [PATCH v2 03/10] KVM: SVM: Refuse to attempt VRMUN if an SEV-ES+ guest has an invalid VMSA Sean Christopherson
2025-02-27 16:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-02-27 16:56 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2025-02-27 1:25 ` [PATCH v2 04/10] KVM: SVM: Don't change target vCPU state on AP Creation VMGEXIT error Sean Christopherson
2025-02-27 10:25 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2025-02-27 1:25 ` [PATCH v2 05/10] KVM: SVM: Require AP's "requested" SEV_FEATURES to match KVM's view Sean Christopherson
2025-02-27 7:12 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2025-02-27 14:33 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-27 15:18 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2025-02-27 15:42 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-02-27 1:25 ` [PATCH v2 06/10] KVM: SVM: Simplify request+kick logic in SNP AP Creation handling Sean Christopherson
2025-02-27 1:25 ` [PATCH v2 07/10] KVM: SVM: Use guard(mutex) to simplify SNP AP Creation error handling Sean Christopherson
2025-02-27 16:51 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2025-02-27 1:25 ` [PATCH v2 08/10] KVM: SVM: Mark VMCB dirty before processing incoming snp_vmsa_gpa Sean Christopherson
2025-02-27 1:25 ` [PATCH v2 09/10] KVM: SVM: Use guard(mutex) to simplify SNP vCPU state updates Sean Christopherson
2025-02-27 1:25 ` [PATCH v2 10/10] KVM: SVM: Invalidate "next" SNP VMSA GPA even on failure Sean Christopherson
2025-03-05 1:05 ` [PATCH v2 00/10] KVM: SVM: Attempt to cleanup SEV_FEATURES Sean Christopherson
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