From: "Xin Li (Intel)" <xin@zytor.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com, corbet@lwn.net,
tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
xin@zytor.com, luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, chao.gao@intel.com, hch@infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 03/23] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail
Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2025 10:53:21 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250723175341.1284463-4-xin@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250723175341.1284463-1-xin@zytor.com>
From: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Do not virtualize FRED if FRED consistency checks fail.
Either on broken hardware, or when run KVM on top of another hypervisor
before the underlying hypervisor implements nested FRED correctly.
Suggested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Xuelian Guo <xuelian.guo@intel.com>
---
Changes in v5:
* Drop the cpu_feature_enabled() in cpu_has_vmx_fred() (Sean).
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.
Change in v4:
* Call out the reason why not check FRED VM-exit controls in
cpu_has_vmx_fred() (Chao Gao).
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 10 ++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 3 +++
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
index 7cdc855f8968..76c69685b9be 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
@@ -399,6 +399,16 @@ static inline bool vmx_pebs_supported(void)
return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PEBS) && kvm_pmu_cap.pebs_ept;
}
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_fred(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * setup_vmcs_config() guarantees FRED VM-entry/exit controls
+ * are either all set or none. So, no need to check FRED VM-exit
+ * controls.
+ */
+ return (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED);
+}
+
static inline bool cpu_has_notify_vmexit(void)
{
return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 463fc4a65788..c893ea2db9de 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -7883,6 +7883,9 @@ static __init void vmx_set_cpu_caps(void)
kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_DTES64);
}
+ if (!cpu_has_vmx_fred())
+ kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_FRED);
+
if (!enable_pmu)
kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_PDCM);
kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap = vmx_get_perf_capabilities();
--
2.50.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-07-23 17:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-07-23 17:53 [PATCH v5 00/23] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2025-07-23 17:53 ` [PATCH v5 01/23] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-07-23 17:53 ` [PATCH v5 02/23] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2025-07-23 17:53 ` Xin Li (Intel) [this message]
2025-07-23 17:53 ` [PATCH v5 04/23] x86/cea: Export an API to get per CPU exception stacks for KVM to use Xin Li (Intel)
2025-07-23 17:53 ` [PATCH v5 05/23] KVM: VMX: Fix an indentation Xin Li (Intel)
2025-07-23 17:53 ` [PATCH v5 06/23] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-07-23 17:53 ` [PATCH v5 07/23] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts Xin Li (Intel)
2025-07-23 17:53 ` [PATCH v5 08/23] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2025-07-23 17:53 ` [PATCH v5 09/23] KVM: VMX: Add host MSR read/write helpers to streamline preemption logic Xin Li (Intel)
2025-07-23 17:53 ` [PATCH v5 10/23] KVM: VMX: Add support for FRED context save/restore Xin Li (Intel)
2025-07-24 5:35 ` Chao Gao
2025-07-24 18:01 ` Xin Li
2025-08-02 17:15 ` [PATCH v5A " Xin Li (Intel)
2025-07-23 17:53 ` [PATCH v5 11/23] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2025-07-23 17:53 ` [PATCH v5 12/23] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2025-07-23 17:53 ` [PATCH v5 13/23] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-07-23 17:53 ` [PATCH v5 14/23] Documentation: kvm: Fix a section number typo Xin Li (Intel)
2025-07-23 17:53 ` [PATCH v5 15/23] KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-07-23 17:53 ` [PATCH v5 16/23] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li (Intel)
2025-07-23 17:53 ` [PATCH v5 17/23] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2025-07-23 17:53 ` [PATCH v5 18/23] KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED Xin Li (Intel)
2025-07-23 17:53 ` [PATCH v5 19/23] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-07-23 17:53 ` [PATCH v5 20/23] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields to nested VMX context handling Xin Li (Intel)
2025-07-24 6:50 ` Chao Gao
2025-07-31 7:24 ` Xin Li
2025-08-02 17:17 ` [PATCH v5A " Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-02 17:33 ` Xin Li
2025-08-04 6:03 ` Xin Li
2025-07-23 17:53 ` [PATCH v5 21/23] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED-related VMCS field checks Xin Li (Intel)
2025-07-23 17:53 ` [PATCH v5 22/23] KVM: nVMX: Allow VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-07-23 17:53 ` [PATCH v5 23/23] KVM: nVMX: Add prerequisites to SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros Xin Li (Intel)
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