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From: "Xin Li (Intel)" <xin@zytor.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com, corbet@lwn.net,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
	xin@zytor.com, luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
	andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, chao.gao@intel.com, hch@infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v7 12/21] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking
Date: Fri, 29 Aug 2025 08:31:40 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250829153149.2871901-13-xin@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250829153149.2871901-1-xin@zytor.com>

From: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>

Set the VMX nested exception bit in VM-entry interruption information
field when injecting a nested exception using FRED event delivery to
ensure:
  1) A nested exception is injected on a correct stack level.
  2) The nested bit defined in FRED stack frame is set.

The event stack level used by FRED event delivery depends on whether
the event was a nested exception encountered during delivery of an
earlier event, because a nested exception is "regarded" as happening
on ring 0.  E.g., when #PF is configured to use stack level 1 in
IA32_FRED_STKLVLS MSR:
  - nested #PF will be delivered on the stack pointed by IA32_FRED_RSP1
    MSR when encountered in ring 3 and ring 0.
  - normal #PF will be delivered on the stack pointed by IA32_FRED_RSP0
    MSR when encountered in ring 3.

The VMX nested-exception support ensures a correct event stack level is
chosen when a VM entry injects a nested exception.

Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
[ Sean: reworked kvm_requeue_exception() to simply the code changes ]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Xuelian Guo <xuelian.guo@intel.com>
---

Change in v5:
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.

Change in v4:
* Move the check is_fred_enable() from kvm_multiple_exception() to
  vmx_inject_exception() thus avoid bleeding FRED details into
  kvm_multiple_exception() (Chao Gao).

Change in v3:
* Rework kvm_requeue_exception() to simply the code changes (Sean
  Christopherson).

Change in v2:
* Set the nested flag when there is an original interrupt (Chao Gao).
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  4 +++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h      |  5 ++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c          |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c          |  6 +++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              | 13 ++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.h              |  1 +
 6 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 5c48acc98939..b5a1fef8d637 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -759,6 +759,7 @@ struct kvm_queued_exception {
 	u32 error_code;
 	unsigned long payload;
 	bool has_payload;
+	bool nested;
 	u64 event_data;
 };
 
@@ -2228,7 +2229,8 @@ void kvm_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr);
 void kvm_queue_exception_e(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, u32 error_code);
 void kvm_queue_exception_p(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr, unsigned long payload);
 void kvm_requeue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int nr,
-			   bool has_error_code, u32 error_code, u64 event_data);
+			   bool has_error_code, u32 error_code, bool nested,
+			   u64 event_data);
 void kvm_inject_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct x86_exception *fault);
 void kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				    struct x86_exception *fault);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index 539af190ad3e..7b34a9357b28 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@
 #define VMX_BASIC_INOUT				BIT_ULL(54)
 #define VMX_BASIC_TRUE_CTLS			BIT_ULL(55)
 #define VMX_BASIC_NO_HW_ERROR_CODE_CC		BIT_ULL(56)
+#define VMX_BASIC_NESTED_EXCEPTION		BIT_ULL(58)
 
 static inline u32 vmx_basic_vmcs_revision_id(u64 vmx_basic)
 {
@@ -442,13 +443,15 @@ enum vmcs_field {
 #define INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK        0x700           /* 10:8 */
 #define INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK     0x800           /* 11 */
 #define INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI		0x1000		/* 12 */
+#define INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK	0x2000		/* 13 */
 #define INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK            0x80000000      /* 31 */
-#define INTR_INFO_RESVD_BITS_MASK       0x7ffff000
+#define INTR_INFO_RESVD_BITS_MASK       0x7fffd000
 
 #define VECTORING_INFO_VECTOR_MASK           	INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK
 #define VECTORING_INFO_TYPE_MASK        	INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK
 #define VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK    	INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK
 #define VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK       	INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK
+#define VECTORING_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK	INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK
 
 #define INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR		(EVENT_TYPE_EXTINT << 8)	/* external interrupt */
 #define INTR_TYPE_RESERVED		(EVENT_TYPE_RESERVED << 8)	/* reserved */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 9feca6b90380..c4402e50c828 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -4127,7 +4127,7 @@ static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 		kvm_requeue_exception(vcpu, vector,
 				      exitintinfo & SVM_EXITINTINFO_VALID_ERR,
-				      error_code, 0);
+				      error_code, false, 0);
 		break;
 	}
 	case SVM_EXITINTINFO_TYPE_INTR:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 1abfba2139a5..3d968584d854 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1856,8 +1856,11 @@ void vmx_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
 			     vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len);
 		intr_info |= INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION;
-	} else
+	} else {
 		intr_info |= INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION;
+		if (ex->nested && is_fred_enabled(vcpu))
+			intr_info |= INTR_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK;
+	}
 
 	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, intr_info);
 
@@ -7318,6 +7321,7 @@ static void __vmx_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		kvm_requeue_exception(vcpu, vector,
 				      idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK,
 				      error_code,
+				      idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_NESTED_EXCEPTION_MASK,
 				      event_data);
 		break;
 	}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index dbcf00c55012..7598b8d72b07 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -871,6 +871,10 @@ static void kvm_multiple_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int nr,
 		vcpu->arch.exception.pending = true;
 		vcpu->arch.exception.injected = false;
 
+		vcpu->arch.exception.nested = vcpu->arch.exception.nested ||
+					      vcpu->arch.nmi_injected ||
+					      vcpu->arch.interrupt.injected;
+
 		vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code = has_error;
 		vcpu->arch.exception.vector = nr;
 		vcpu->arch.exception.error_code = error_code;
@@ -900,8 +904,13 @@ static void kvm_multiple_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int nr,
 		vcpu->arch.exception.injected = false;
 		vcpu->arch.exception.pending = false;
 
+		/* #DF is NOT a nested event, per its definition. */
+		vcpu->arch.exception.nested = false;
+
 		kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, DF_VECTOR, 0);
 	} else {
+		vcpu->arch.exception.nested = true;
+
 		/* replace previous exception with a new one in a hope
 		   that instruction re-execution will regenerate lost
 		   exception */
@@ -930,7 +939,8 @@ static void kvm_queue_exception_e_p(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned nr,
 }
 
 void kvm_requeue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int nr,
-			   bool has_error_code, u32 error_code, u64 event_data)
+			   bool has_error_code, u32 error_code, bool nested,
+			   u64 event_data)
 {
 
 	/*
@@ -955,6 +965,7 @@ void kvm_requeue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int nr,
 	vcpu->arch.exception.error_code = error_code;
 	vcpu->arch.exception.has_payload = false;
 	vcpu->arch.exception.payload = 0;
+	vcpu->arch.exception.nested = nested;
 	vcpu->arch.exception.event_data = event_data;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_requeue_exception);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index b6dc23c478ff..685eb710b1f2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -198,6 +198,7 @@ static inline void kvm_clear_exception_queue(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	vcpu->arch.exception.pending = false;
 	vcpu->arch.exception.injected = false;
+	vcpu->arch.exception.nested = false;
 	vcpu->arch.exception_vmexit.pending = false;
 }
 
-- 
2.51.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-08-29 15:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-08-29 15:31 [PATCH v7 00/21] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 01/21] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 02/21] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 03/21] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 04/21] x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_ Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 05/21] x86/cea: Export API for per-CPU exception stacks for KVM Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 16:52   ` Xin Li
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 06/21] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 07/21] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 08/21] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 09/21] KVM: VMX: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 10/21] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 11/21] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` Xin Li (Intel) [this message]
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 13/21] KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 14/21] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 15/21] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 16/21] KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 17/21] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 18/21] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields to nested VMX context handling Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 19/21] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED-related VMCS field checks Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 20/21] KVM: nVMX: Add prerequisites to SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros Xin Li (Intel)
2025-08-29 15:31 ` [PATCH v7 21/21] KVM: nVMX: Allow VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)

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