From: Andrew Jones <ajones@ventanamicro.com>
To: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
iommu@lists.linux.dev, kvm-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, zong.li@sifive.com,
tjeznach@rivosinc.com, joro@8bytes.org, will@kernel.org,
robin.murphy@arm.com, anup@brainfault.org, atish.patra@linux.dev,
alex.williamson@redhat.com, paul.walmsley@sifive.com,
palmer@dabbelt.com, alex@ghiti.fr
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 08/18] iommu/riscv: Use MSI table to enable IMSIC access
Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2025 10:50:56 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250923-e459316700c55d661c060b08@orel> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250923152702.GB2608121@nvidia.com>
On Tue, Sep 23, 2025 at 12:27:02PM -0300, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 23, 2025 at 10:12:42AM -0500, Andrew Jones wrote:
> > be able to reach be reachable by managing the IOMMU MSI table. This gives
> > us some level of isolation, but there is still the possibility a device
> > may raise an interrupt it should not be able to when its irqs are affined
> > to the same CPU as another device's
>
> Yes, exactly, this is the problem with basic VFIO support as there is
> no general idea of a virtualization context..
>
> > and the malicious/broken device uses the wrong MSI data.
>
> And to be clear it is not a malicious/broken device at issue here. In
> PCI MSI is simple a DMA to a magic address. *ANY* device can be
> commanded by system software to generate *ANY* address/data on PCIe.
>
> So any VFIO user can effectively generate any MSI it wants. It isn't a
> matter of device brokeness.
>
> > near isolated enough. However, for the virt case, Addr is set to guest
> > interrupt files (something like virtual IMSICs) which means there will be
> > no other host device or other guest device irqs sharing those Addrs.
> > Interrupts for devices assigned to guests are truly isolated (not within
> > the guest, but we need nested support to fully isolate within the guest
> > anyway).
>
> At least this is something, and I do think this is enough security to
> be a useful solution. However, Linux has no existing support for the
> idea of a VFIO device that only has access to "guest" interrupt HW.
>
> Presumably this is direct injection only now?
Yup
>
> I'm not even sure I could give you a sketch what that would look like,
> it involves co-operation between so many orthogonal layers it is hard
> to imagine :\
>
> kvm provides the virt context, iommufd controls the MSI aperture, irq
> remapping controls the remap table, vfio sets interrupts..
>
> VFIO needs to say 'irq layer only establish an interrupt on this KVM'
> as some enforced mode ?
>
Yes, this is the part that I'd like to lean on you for, since I understand
we want to avoid too much KVM/virt special casing for VFIO/IOMMUFD. I was
thinking that if I bit the bullet and implemented nested support than when
nesting was selected it would be apparent we're in virt context. However,
I was hoping to pull together a solution that works with current QEMU and
VFIO too.
Thanks,
drew
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-09-23 15:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-09-20 20:38 [RFC PATCH v2 00/18] iommu/riscv: Add irqbypass support Andrew Jones
2025-09-20 20:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/18] genirq/msi: Provide DOMAIN_BUS_MSI_REMAP Andrew Jones
2025-09-30 8:25 ` Nutty.Liu
2025-09-20 20:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/18] iommu/riscv: Move struct riscv_iommu_domain and info to iommu.h Andrew Jones
2025-09-30 8:26 ` Nutty.Liu
2025-09-20 20:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/18] iommu/riscv: Use data structure instead of individual values Andrew Jones
2025-09-24 3:25 ` Nutty.Liu
2025-09-24 13:31 ` Andrew Jones
2025-09-20 20:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/18] iommu/riscv: Add IRQ domain for interrupt remapping Andrew Jones
2025-09-28 9:30 ` Nutty.Liu
2025-09-29 15:50 ` Andrew Jones
2025-09-20 20:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/18] iommu/riscv: Prepare to use MSI table Andrew Jones
2025-10-05 8:30 ` Nutty.Liu
2025-09-20 20:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/18] iommu/riscv: Implement MSI table management functions Andrew Jones
2025-10-05 8:28 ` Nutty.Liu
2025-09-20 20:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/18] iommu/riscv: Export phys_to_ppn and ppn_to_phys Andrew Jones
2025-10-05 8:39 ` Nutty.Liu
2025-09-20 20:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/18] iommu/riscv: Use MSI table to enable IMSIC access Andrew Jones
2025-09-22 18:43 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-09-22 21:20 ` Andrew Jones
2025-09-22 23:56 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-09-23 10:12 ` Thomas Gleixner
2025-09-23 14:06 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-09-23 15:12 ` Andrew Jones
2025-09-23 15:27 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-09-23 15:50 ` Andrew Jones [this message]
2025-09-23 16:23 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-09-23 16:33 ` Andrew Jones
2026-03-24 9:12 ` Vincent Chen
2026-03-26 17:31 ` Andrew Jones
2025-09-23 14:37 ` Andrew Jones
2025-09-23 14:52 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-09-23 15:37 ` Andrew Jones
2025-10-23 13:47 ` Jinvas
2025-09-20 20:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/18] iommu/dma: enable IOMMU_DMA for RISC-V Andrew Jones
2025-10-05 8:40 ` Nutty.Liu
2025-09-20 20:39 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/18] RISC-V: Define irqbypass vcpu_info Andrew Jones
2025-10-05 8:41 ` Nutty.Liu
2025-09-20 20:39 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/18] iommu/riscv: Maintain each irq msitbl index with chip data Andrew Jones
2025-09-20 20:39 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/18] iommu/riscv: Add guest file irqbypass support Andrew Jones
2025-09-20 20:39 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/18] iommu/riscv: report iommu capabilities Andrew Jones
2025-10-05 8:43 ` Nutty.Liu
2025-09-20 20:39 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/18] RISC-V: KVM: Enable KVM_VFIO interfaces on RISC-V arch Andrew Jones
2025-10-05 8:44 ` Nutty.Liu
2025-09-20 20:39 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/18] RISC-V: KVM: Add guest file irqbypass support Andrew Jones
2025-09-20 20:39 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/18] vfio: enable IOMMU_TYPE1 for RISC-V Andrew Jones
2025-10-05 8:44 ` Nutty.Liu
2025-09-20 20:39 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/18] RISC-V: defconfig: Add VFIO modules Andrew Jones
2025-10-05 8:47 ` Nutty.Liu
2025-09-20 20:39 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/18] DO NOT UPSTREAM: RISC-V: KVM: Workaround kvm_riscv_gstage_ioremap() bug Andrew Jones
2025-10-20 13:12 ` fangyu.yu
2025-10-20 19:47 ` Daniel Henrique Barboza
2025-10-21 1:10 ` fangyu.yu
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