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From: "Xin Li (Intel)" <xin@zytor.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com, corbet@lwn.net,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
	xin@zytor.com, luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
	andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, chao.gao@intel.com, hch@infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v8 03/21] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2025 18:09:32 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251014010950.1568389-4-xin@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251014010950.1568389-1-xin@zytor.com>

From: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>

Do not virtualize FRED if FRED consistency checks fail.

Either on broken hardware, or when run KVM on top of another hypervisor
before the underlying hypervisor implements nested FRED correctly.

Suggested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Xuelian Guo <xuelian.guo@intel.com>
---

Changes in v5:
* Drop the cpu_feature_enabled() in cpu_has_vmx_fred() (Sean).
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.

Change in v4:
* Call out the reason why not check FRED VM-exit controls in
  cpu_has_vmx_fred() (Chao Gao).
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 10 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c          |  3 +++
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
index 6bd67c40ca3b..651507627ef3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
@@ -405,6 +405,16 @@ static inline bool vmx_pebs_supported(void)
 	return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PEBS) && kvm_pmu_cap.pebs_ept;
 }
 
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_fred(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * setup_vmcs_config() guarantees FRED VM-entry/exit controls
+	 * are either all set or none.  So, no need to check FRED VM-exit
+	 * controls.
+	 */
+	return (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_FRED);
+}
+
 static inline bool cpu_has_notify_vmexit(void)
 {
 	return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index d881f1c133fa..c6477cb36854 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -8001,6 +8001,9 @@ static __init void vmx_set_cpu_caps(void)
 		kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_DTES64);
 	}
 
+	if (!cpu_has_vmx_fred())
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_FRED);
+
 	if (!enable_pmu)
 		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_PDCM);
 	kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap = vmx_get_perf_capabilities();
-- 
2.51.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-10-14  1:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-10-14  1:09 [PATCH v8 00/21] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 01/21] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 02/21] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` Xin Li (Intel) [this message]
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 04/21] x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_ Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-23 14:20   ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 05/21] x86/cea: Export API for per-CPU exception stacks for KVM Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-23  1:20   ` Xin Li
2025-10-23  8:06   ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-10-23  8:55     ` Xin Li
2025-10-23 14:08       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-23 14:15         ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-10-23 15:03   ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 06/21] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 07/21] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 08/21] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 09/21] KVM: VMX: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 10/21] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 11/21] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 12/21] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 13/21] KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 14/21] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 15/21] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 16/21] KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 17/21] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 18/21] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields to nested VMX context handling Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  6:57   ` Chao Gao
2025-10-14  7:49     ` Xin Li
2025-10-22 23:10       ` Xin Li
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 19/21] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED-related VMCS field checks Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 20/21] KVM: nVMX: Add prerequisites to SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 21/21] KVM: nVMX: Allow VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  6:13 ` [syzbot ci] Re: Enable FRED with KVM VMX syzbot ci

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