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From: "Xin Li (Intel)" <xin@zytor.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com, corbet@lwn.net,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com,
	xin@zytor.com, luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
	andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, chao.gao@intel.com, hch@infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v8 05/21] x86/cea: Export API for per-CPU exception stacks for KVM
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2025 18:09:34 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251014010950.1568389-6-xin@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251014010950.1568389-1-xin@zytor.com>

Convert the __this_cpu_ist_{top,bottom}_va() macros into proper functions,
and export __this_cpu_ist_top_va() to allow KVM to retrieve the top of the
per-CPU exception stack.

FRED introduced new fields in the host-state area of the VMCS for stack
levels 1->3 (HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP[123]), each respectively corresponding to
per-CPU exception stacks for #DB, NMI and #DF.  KVM must populate these
fields each time a vCPU is loaded onto a CPU.

To simplify access to the exception stacks in struct cea_exception_stacks,
a union is used to create an array alias, enabling array-style indexing of
the stack entries.

Signed-off-by: Xin Li (Intel) <xin@zytor.com>
---

Change in v7:
* Remove Suggested-bys (Dave Hansen).
* Move rename code in a separate patch (Dave Hansen).
* Access cea_exception_stacks using array indexing (Dave Hansen).
* Use BUILD_BUG_ON(ESTACK_DF != 0) to ensure the starting index is 0
  (Dave Hansen).

Change in v5:
* Export accessor instead of data (Christoph Hellwig).
* Add TB from Xuelian Guo.

Change in v4:
* Rewrite the change log and add comments to the export (Dave Hansen).
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h | 51 +++++++++++++--------------
 arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c          | 25 +++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
index d0f884c28178..58cd71144e5e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h
@@ -16,6 +16,19 @@
 #define VC_EXCEPTION_STKSZ	0
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * The exception stack ordering in [cea_]exception_stacks
+ */
+enum exception_stack_ordering {
+	ESTACK_DF,
+	ESTACK_NMI,
+	ESTACK_DB,
+	ESTACK_MCE,
+	ESTACK_VC,
+	ESTACK_VC2,
+	N_EXCEPTION_STACKS
+};
+
 /* Macro to enforce the same ordering and stack sizes */
 #define ESTACKS_MEMBERS(guardsize, optional_stack_size)		\
 	char	ESTACK_DF_stack_guard[guardsize];		\
@@ -39,37 +52,29 @@ struct exception_stacks {
 
 /* The effective cpu entry area mapping with guard pages. */
 struct cea_exception_stacks {
-	ESTACKS_MEMBERS(PAGE_SIZE, EXCEPTION_STKSZ)
-};
-
-/*
- * The exception stack ordering in [cea_]exception_stacks
- */
-enum exception_stack_ordering {
-	ESTACK_DF,
-	ESTACK_NMI,
-	ESTACK_DB,
-	ESTACK_MCE,
-	ESTACK_VC,
-	ESTACK_VC2,
-	N_EXCEPTION_STACKS
+	union{
+		struct {
+			ESTACKS_MEMBERS(PAGE_SIZE, EXCEPTION_STKSZ)
+		};
+		struct {
+			char stack_guard[PAGE_SIZE];
+			char stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ];
+		} event_stacks[N_EXCEPTION_STACKS];
+	};
 };
 
 #define CEA_ESTACK_SIZE(st)					\
 	sizeof(((struct cea_exception_stacks *)0)->st## _stack)
 
-#define CEA_ESTACK_BOT(ceastp, st)				\
-	((unsigned long)&(ceastp)->st## _stack)
-
-#define CEA_ESTACK_TOP(ceastp, st)				\
-	(CEA_ESTACK_BOT(ceastp, st) + CEA_ESTACK_SIZE(st))
-
 #define CEA_ESTACK_OFFS(st)					\
 	offsetof(struct cea_exception_stacks, st## _stack)
 
 #define CEA_ESTACK_PAGES					\
 	(sizeof(struct cea_exception_stacks) / PAGE_SIZE)
 
+extern unsigned long __this_cpu_ist_top_va(enum exception_stack_ordering stack);
+extern unsigned long __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va(enum exception_stack_ordering stack);
+
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
@@ -144,10 +149,4 @@ static __always_inline struct entry_stack *cpu_entry_stack(int cpu)
 	return &get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->entry_stack_page.stack;
 }
 
-#define __this_cpu_ist_top_va(name)					\
-	CEA_ESTACK_TOP(__this_cpu_read(cea_exception_stacks), name)
-
-#define __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va(name)					\
-	CEA_ESTACK_BOT(__this_cpu_read(cea_exception_stacks), name)
-
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
index 9fa371af8abc..595c2e03ddd5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c
@@ -18,6 +18,31 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct entry_stack_page, entry_stack_storage)
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct exception_stacks, exception_stacks);
 DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct cea_exception_stacks*, cea_exception_stacks);
 
+/*
+ * FRED introduced new fields in the host-state area of the VMCS for
+ * stack levels 1->3 (HOST_IA32_FRED_RSP[123]), each respectively
+ * corresponding to per CPU stacks for #DB, NMI and #DF.  KVM must
+ * populate these each time a vCPU is loaded onto a CPU.
+ *
+ * Called from entry code, so must be noinstr.
+ */
+noinstr unsigned long __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va(enum exception_stack_ordering stack)
+{
+	struct cea_exception_stacks *s;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(ESTACK_DF != 0);
+
+	s = __this_cpu_read(cea_exception_stacks);
+
+	return (unsigned long)&s->event_stacks[stack].stack;
+}
+
+noinstr unsigned long __this_cpu_ist_top_va(enum exception_stack_ordering stack)
+{
+	return __this_cpu_ist_bottom_va(stack) + EXCEPTION_STKSZ;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__this_cpu_ist_top_va);
+
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(unsigned long, _cea_offset);
 
 static __always_inline unsigned int cea_offset(unsigned int cpu)
-- 
2.51.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-10-14  1:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-10-14  1:09 [PATCH v8 00/21] Enable FRED with KVM VMX Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 01/21] KVM: VMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 02/21] KVM: VMX: Initialize VM entry/exit FRED controls in vmcs_config Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 03/21] KVM: VMX: Disable FRED if FRED consistency checks fail Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 04/21] x86/cea: Prefix event stack names with ESTACK_ Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-23 14:20   ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-14  1:09 ` Xin Li (Intel) [this message]
2025-10-23  1:20   ` [PATCH v8 05/21] x86/cea: Export API for per-CPU exception stacks for KVM Xin Li
2025-10-23  8:06   ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-10-23  8:55     ` Xin Li
2025-10-23 14:08       ` Sean Christopherson
2025-10-23 14:15         ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-10-23 15:03   ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 06/21] KVM: VMX: Initialize VMCS FRED fields Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 07/21] KVM: VMX: Set FRED MSR intercepts Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 08/21] KVM: VMX: Save/restore guest FRED RSP0 Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 09/21] KVM: VMX: Add support for saving and restoring FRED MSRs Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 10/21] KVM: x86: Add a helper to detect if FRED is enabled for a vCPU Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 11/21] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED event_data Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 12/21] KVM: VMX: Virtualize FRED nested exception tracking Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 13/21] KVM: x86: Save/restore the nested flag of an exception Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 14/21] KVM: x86: Mark CR4.FRED as not reserved Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 15/21] KVM: VMX: Dump FRED context in dump_vmcs() Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 16/21] KVM: x86: Advertise support for FRED Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 17/21] KVM: nVMX: Add support for the secondary VM exit controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 18/21] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED VMCS fields to nested VMX context handling Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  6:57   ` Chao Gao
2025-10-14  7:49     ` Xin Li
2025-10-22 23:10       ` Xin Li
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 19/21] KVM: nVMX: Add FRED-related VMCS field checks Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 20/21] KVM: nVMX: Add prerequisites to SHADOW_FIELD_R[OW] macros Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  1:09 ` [PATCH v8 21/21] KVM: nVMX: Allow VMX FRED controls Xin Li (Intel)
2025-10-14  6:13 ` [syzbot ci] Re: Enable FRED with KVM VMX syzbot ci

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