From: Yosry Ahmed <yosry@kernel.org>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Yosry Ahmed <yosry@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v4 4/9] KVM: SVM: Move RAX legality check to SVM insn interception handlers
Date: Mon, 16 Mar 2026 20:27:27 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260316202732.3164936-5-yosry@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260316202732.3164936-1-yosry@kernel.org>
When #GP is intercepted by KVM, the #GP interception handler checks
whether the GPA in RAX is legal and reinjects the #GP accordingly.
Otherwise, it calls into the appropriate interception handler for
VMRUN/VMLOAD/VMSAVE. The intercept handlers do not check RAX.
However, the intercept handlers need to do the RAX check, because if the
guest has a smaller MAXPHYADDR, RAX could be legal from the hardware
perspective (i.e. CPU does not inject #GP), but not from the vCPU's
perspective. Note that with allow_smaller_maxphyaddr, both NPT and VLS
cannot be used, so VMLOAD/VMSAVE have to be intercepted, and RAX can
always be checked against the vCPU's MAXPHYADDR.
Move the check into the interception handlers for VMRUN/VMLOAD/VMSAVE as
the CPU does not check RAX before the interception. Read RAX using
kvm_register_read() to avoid a false negative on page_address_valid() on
32-bit due to garbage in the higher bits.
Keep the check in the #GP intercept handler in the nested case where
a #VMEXIT is synthesized into L1, as the RAX check is still needed there
and takes precedence over the intercept.
Opportunistically add a FIXME about the #VMEXIT being synthesized into
L1, as it needs to be conditional.
Signed-off-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c | 6 +++++-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++----
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
index 5ff01d2ac85e4..75943a607777c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
@@ -1113,7 +1113,11 @@ int nested_svm_vmrun(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!svm->nested.initialized))
return -EINVAL;
- vmcb12_gpa = svm->vmcb->save.rax;
+ vmcb12_gpa = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX);
+ if (!page_address_valid(vcpu, vmcb12_gpa)) {
+ kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+ return 1;
+ }
ret = nested_svm_copy_vmcb12_to_cache(vcpu, vmcb12_gpa);
if (ret) {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 3122a98745ab7..a511ee1139725 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -2182,6 +2182,7 @@ static int intr_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static int vmload_vmsave_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool vmload)
{
+ u64 vmcb12_gpa = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX);
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
struct vmcb *vmcb12;
struct kvm_host_map map;
@@ -2190,7 +2191,12 @@ static int vmload_vmsave_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool vmload)
if (nested_svm_check_permissions(vcpu))
return 1;
- ret = kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(svm->vmcb->save.rax), &map);
+ if (!page_address_valid(vcpu, vmcb12_gpa)) {
+ kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ ret = kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(vmcb12_gpa), &map);
if (ret) {
if (ret == -EINVAL)
kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
@@ -2282,10 +2288,17 @@ static int gp_interception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (svm_exit_code) {
unsigned long rax = kvm_register_read(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RAX);
- if (!page_address_valid(vcpu, rax))
- goto reinject;
-
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
+ if (!page_address_valid(vcpu, rax))
+ goto reinject;
+
+ /*
+ * FIXME: Only synthesize a #VMEXIT if L1 sets the
+ * intercept, but only after the VMLOAD/VMSAVE exit
+ * handlers can properly handle VMLOAD/VMSAVE from L2
+ * with VLS enabled in L1 (i.e. RAX is an L2 GPA that
+ * needs translation through L1's NPT).
+ */
nested_svm_simple_vmexit(svm, svm_exit_code);
return 1;
}
--
2.53.0.851.ga537e3e6e9-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-16 20:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-16 20:27 [PATCH v4 0/9] KVM: SVM: Fixes for VMCB12 checks and mapping Yosry Ahmed
2026-03-16 20:27 ` [PATCH v4 1/9] KVM: SVM: Properly check RAX in the emulator for SVM instructions Yosry Ahmed
2026-03-16 20:56 ` Yosry Ahmed
2026-03-16 20:27 ` [PATCH v4 2/9] KVM: SVM: Refactor SVM instruction handling on #GP intercept Yosry Ahmed
2026-04-03 18:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-04-03 21:45 ` Yosry Ahmed
2026-03-16 20:27 ` [PATCH v4 3/9] KVM: SVM: Properly check RAX on #GP intercept of SVM instructions Yosry Ahmed
2026-04-03 17:39 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-04-03 19:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-04-03 21:43 ` Yosry Ahmed
2026-04-03 22:16 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-03-16 20:27 ` Yosry Ahmed [this message]
2026-03-16 20:27 ` [PATCH v4 5/9] KVM: SVM: Check EFER.SVME and CPL " Yosry Ahmed
2026-03-16 20:27 ` [PATCH v4 6/9] KVM: SVM: Treat mapping failures equally in VMLOAD/VMSAVE emulation Yosry Ahmed
2026-03-16 20:27 ` [PATCH v4 7/9] KVM: nSVM: Fail emulation of VMRUN/VMLOAD/VMSAVE if mapping vmcb12 fails Yosry Ahmed
2026-03-16 20:27 ` [PATCH v4 8/9] KVM: selftests: Rework svm_nested_invalid_vmcb12_gpa Yosry Ahmed
2026-03-16 20:27 ` [PATCH v4 9/9] KVM: selftests: Drop 'invalid' from svm_nested_invalid_vmcb12_gpa's name Yosry Ahmed
2026-04-03 19:05 ` [PATCH v4 0/9] KVM: SVM: Fixes for VMCB12 checks and mapping Sean Christopherson
2026-04-03 21:45 ` Yosry Ahmed
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