From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: d.riley@proxmox.com, jon@nutanix.com
Subject: [PATCH 25/28] KVM: x86/mmu: add support for GMET to NPT page table walks
Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2026 11:07:44 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260430150747.76749-26-pbonzini@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260430150747.76749-1-pbonzini@redhat.com>
GMET allows page table entries to be created with U=0 in NPT.
However, when GMET=1 U=0 only affects execution, not reads or
writes. Ignore user faults on non-fetch accesses for NPT GMET.
Tested-by: David Riley <d.riley@proxmox.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 18 ++++++++++++------
arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c | 10 +++++++---
4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 7dde4ca87752..1da3d5c59e15 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -370,6 +370,8 @@ union kvm_mmu_page_role {
* cr4_smep is also set for EPT MBEC. Because it affects
* which pages are considered non-present (bit 10 additionally
* must be zero if MBEC is on) it has to be in the base role.
+ * It also has to be in the base role for AMD GMET because
+ * kernel-executable pages need to have U=0 with GMET enabled.
*/
unsigned cr4_smep:1;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
index 1b354e1f2d81..ddf4e467c071 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_ept_masks(bool has_ad_bits);
void kvm_init_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void kvm_init_shadow_npt_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4,
- u64 efer, gpa_t nested_cr3);
+ u64 efer, gpa_t nested_cr3, u64 misc_ctl);
void kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool execonly,
int huge_page_level, bool accessed_dirty,
bool mbec, gpa_t new_eptp);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 32845edd14fa..015085ef6e46 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
#include <asm/io.h>
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
+#include <asm/svm.h>
#include <asm/vmx.h>
#include "trace.h"
@@ -5572,7 +5573,7 @@ reset_ept_shadow_zero_bits_mask(struct kvm_mmu *context, bool execonly)
(14 & (access) ? 1 << 14 : 0) | \
(15 & (access) ? 1 << 15 : 0))
-static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_mmu *mmu, bool ept)
+static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_mmu *mmu, bool tdp, bool ept)
{
unsigned byte;
@@ -5633,7 +5634,12 @@ static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_mmu *mmu, bool ept)
/* Faults from kernel mode accesses to user pages */
u16 kf = (pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK) ? 0 : u;
- uf = (pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK) ? (u16)~u : 0;
+ /*
+ * For NPT GMET, U=0 does not affect reads and writes. Fetches
+ * are handled below via cr4_smep.
+ */
+ if (!(tdp && cr4_smep))
+ uf = (pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK) ? (u16)~u : 0;
if (efer_nx)
ff = (pfec & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) ? (u16)~x : 0;
@@ -5744,7 +5750,7 @@ static void reset_guest_paging_metadata(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
return;
reset_guest_rsvds_bits_mask(vcpu, mmu);
- update_permission_bitmask(mmu, false);
+ update_permission_bitmask(mmu, mmu == &vcpu->arch.guest_mmu, false);
update_pkru_bitmask(mmu);
}
@@ -5940,7 +5946,7 @@ static void kvm_init_shadow_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
}
void kvm_init_shadow_npt_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4,
- u64 efer, gpa_t nested_cr3)
+ u64 efer, gpa_t nested_cr3, u64 misc_ctl)
{
struct kvm_mmu *context = &vcpu->arch.guest_mmu;
struct kvm_mmu_role_regs regs = {
@@ -5953,7 +5959,7 @@ void kvm_init_shadow_npt_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4,
/* NPT requires CR0.PG=1. */
WARN_ON_ONCE(cpu_role.base.direct || !cpu_role.base.guest_mode);
- cpu_role.base.cr4_smep = false;
+ cpu_role.base.cr4_smep = (misc_ctl & SVM_MISC_ENABLE_GMET) != 0;
root_role = cpu_role.base;
root_role.level = kvm_mmu_get_tdp_level(vcpu);
@@ -6011,7 +6017,7 @@ void kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool execonly,
context->gva_to_gpa = ept_gva_to_gpa;
context->sync_spte = ept_sync_spte;
- update_permission_bitmask(context, true);
+ update_permission_bitmask(context, true, true);
context->pkru_mask = 0;
reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(vcpu, context, execonly, huge_page_level);
reset_ept_shadow_zero_bits_mask(context, execonly);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
index a1cffd274000..7adfa7da210d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
@@ -95,7 +95,8 @@ static void nested_svm_init_mmu_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
*/
kvm_init_shadow_npt_mmu(vcpu, svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.cr4,
svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.efer,
- svm->nested.ctl.nested_cr3);
+ svm->nested.ctl.nested_cr3,
+ svm->nested.ctl.misc_ctl);
vcpu->arch.mmu->get_guest_pgd = nested_svm_get_tdp_cr3;
vcpu->arch.mmu->get_pdptr = nested_svm_get_tdp_pdptr;
vcpu->arch.mmu->inject_page_fault = nested_svm_inject_npf_exit;
@@ -2076,12 +2077,15 @@ static gpa_t svm_translate_nested_gpa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
struct x86_exception *exception,
u64 pte_access)
{
+ struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.mmu;
BUG_ON(!mmu_is_nested(vcpu));
- /* NPT walks are always user-walks */
- access |= PFERR_USER_MASK;
+ /* Non-GMET walks are always user-walks */
+ if (!(svm->nested.ctl.misc_ctl & SVM_MISC_ENABLE_GMET))
+ access |= PFERR_USER_MASK;
+
return mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, mmu, gpa, access, exception);
}
--
2.52.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-30 15:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-30 15:07 [PATCH v5 00/28] KVM: combined patchset for MBEC/GMET support Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 01/28] KVM: TDX/VMX: rework EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_FOR_RING3_LIN into PROT_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 02/28] KVM: x86/mmu: remove SPTE_PERM_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 03/28] KVM: x86/mmu: free up bit 10 of PTEs in preparation for MBEC Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 18:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 04/28] KVM: x86/mmu: shuffle high bits of SPTEs " Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 18:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 05/28] KVM: x86/mmu: remove SPTE_EPT_* Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 06/28] KVM: x86/mmu: merge make_spte_{non,}executable Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 18:22 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-05-01 3:51 ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 07/28] KVM: x86/mmu: rename and clarify BYTE_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 18:39 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 08/28] KVM: x86/mmu: separate more EPT/non-EPT permission_fault() Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 18:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 09/28] KVM: x86/mmu: introduce ACC_READ_MASK Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 10/28] KVM: x86/mmu: pass PFERR_GUEST_PAGE/FINAL_MASK to kvm_translate_gpa Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 18:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-05-01 3:52 ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 11/28] KVM: x86/mmu: pass pte_access for final nGPA->GPA walk Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 12/28] KVM: x86: make translate_nested_gpa vendor-specific Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 18:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-05-01 3:53 ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 13/28] KVM: x86/mmu: split XS/XU bits for EPT Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 14/28] KVM: x86/mmu: move cr4_smep to base role Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 15/28] KVM: VMX: enable use of MBEC Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 19:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-05-05 10:02 ` David Riley
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 16/28] KVM: nVMX: pass advanced EPT violation vmexit info to guest Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 17/28] KVM: nVMX: pass PFERR_USER_MASK to MMU on EPT violations Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 19:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 18/28] KVM: x86/mmu: add support for MBEC to EPT page table walks Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 19/28] KVM: nVMX: advertise MBEC to nested guests Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 20/28] KVM: nVMX: allow MBEC with EVMCS Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 21/28] KVM: x86/mmu: propagate access mask from root pages down Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 22/28] KVM: x86/mmu: introduce cpu_role bit for availability of PFEC.I/D Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 23/28] KVM: SVM: add GMET bit definitions Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 24/28] KVM: x86/mmu: hard code more bits in kvm_init_shadow_npt_mmu Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 19:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-05-01 3:50 ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-01 13:29 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-04-30 15:07 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 26/28] KVM: SVM: enable GMET and set it in MMU role Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 19:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-05-01 3:59 ` Paolo Bonzini
2026-05-01 14:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 27/28] KVM: SVM: work around errata 1218 Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 15:07 ` [PATCH 28/28] KVM: nSVM: enable GMET for guests Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 16:16 ` [PATCH v5 00/28] KVM: combined patchset for MBEC/GMET support Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-30 19:17 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-05-01 3:46 ` Paolo Bonzini
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-04-28 11:09 [PATCH v4 " Paolo Bonzini
2026-04-28 11:09 ` [PATCH 25/28] KVM: x86/mmu: add support for GMET to NPT page table walks Paolo Bonzini
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