From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Jörg Rödel" <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] kvm: sev: Acquire a writeable page reference for CPUID pages
Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 09:33:34 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260623093335.3C1F91F00A3A@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260623091556.1500930-5-joro@8bytes.org>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] Incorrect unmap order for `kmap_local` mappings in the CPUID error reporting path leads to host kernel crashes.
- [High] Missing dirty tracking for user pages modified by the kernel, leading to potential silent data loss.
- [High] Data race and Use-After-Free on `kvm_memory_slot` between memslot teardown and `kvm_gmem_error_folio`.
--
commit 53ff0fbc410035f0e257e032a520eacbc8269a5c
Author: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
kvm: sev: Acquire a writeable page reference for CPUID pages
When the PSP checks on a user-provided CPUID page fail KVM will write
back the detailed error information to the user-provided buffer.
Make sure this buffer is actually writable to not write the errors to
a read-only page.
Fixes: 2a62345b3052 ("KVM: guest_memfd: GUP source pages prior to populating guest memory")
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -2415,6 +2415,7 @@ static int snp_launch_update(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
> struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
> long npages, count;
> void __user *src;
> + int write;
>
> if (!sev_snp_guest(kvm) || !sev->snp_context)
> return -EINVAL;
[ ... ]
> @@ -2475,7 +2476,10 @@ static int snp_launch_update(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
> sev_populate_args.sev_fd = argp->sev_fd;
> sev_populate_args.type = params.type;
>
> - count = kvm_gmem_populate(kvm, params.gfn_start, src, npages, 0,
> + /* Acquire a write-reference for CPUID pages as kernel might write to it */
> + write = params.type == KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID;
> +
> + count = kvm_gmem_populate(kvm, params.gfn_start, src, npages, write,
> sev_gmem_post_populate, &sev_populate_args);
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but does kvm_gmem_populate()
handle dirtying the page correctly after sev_gmem_post_populate() modifies it?
When a user-provided CPUID page triggers SEV_RET_INVALID_PARAM, the error
path modifies the page directly via memcpy():
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c:sev_gmem_post_populate() {
...
memcpy(src_vaddr, dst_vaddr, PAGE_SIZE);
...
}
Since this bypasses hardware PTE dirty tracking, and kvm_gmem_populate()
releases the page without marking it dirty:
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c:kvm_gmem_populate() {
...
if (src_page)
put_page(src_page);
...
}
Could this result in the userspace VMM permanently losing the error details if
the memory is file-backed or pushed to swap and discarded without writeback?
[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does sev_gmem_post_populate() unmap pages
in the correct order?
If __sev_issue_cmd() fails, it maps src_vaddr and dst_vaddr, but appears to
unmap them in FIFO order:
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c:sev_gmem_post_populate() {
...
kunmap_local(src_vaddr);
kunmap_local(dst_vaddr);
...
}
Since the kmap_local API strictly requires LIFO unmapping, could an untrusted
VMM intentionally passing an invalid CPUID page trigger a host kernel crash or
corrupt the per-CPU kmap_ctrl stack?
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but is there a data race and use-after-free
risk on kvm_memory_slot between memslot teardown and kvm_gmem_error_folio()?
When KVM destroys a memslot, kvm_gmem_unbind() fast-paths the teardown if
there is no file:
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c:kvm_gmem_unbind() {
if (!file) {
__kvm_gmem_unbind(slot, slot->gmem.file->private_data);
return;
}
...
}
This deliberately skips acquiring filemap_invalidate_lock(file->f_mapping).
If a hardware memory failure concurrently triggers kvm_gmem_error_folio(),
it iterates over f->bindings holding only filemap_invalidate_lock_shared().
Because xa_for_each_range() drops the internal RCU lock for each element,
could it yield the slot pointer right as kvm_gmem_unbind() completes and
frees it, leading to a dereference of freed memory here?
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c:__kvm_gmem_invalidate_begin() {
...
.start = slot->base_gfn + max(pgoff, start) - pgoff,
...
}
> if (count < 0) {
> argp->error = sev_populate_args.fw_error;
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260623091556.1500930-1-joro@8bytes.org?part=4
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-23 9:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-23 9:15 [PATCH 0/4] kvm: sev: Fix issues reported by Sashiko Jörg Rödel
2026-06-23 9:15 ` [PATCH 1/4] kvm: sev: Fix user-space triggerable WARN_ON on snp_launch_update path Jörg Rödel
2026-06-23 9:32 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 9:15 ` [PATCH 2/4] kvm: sev: Unmap pages in correct order in sev_gmem_post_populate() Jörg Rödel
2026-06-23 9:24 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 9:30 ` Jörg Rödel
2026-06-23 12:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-06-23 9:15 ` [PATCH 3/4] KVM: guest_memfd: Add `write` parameter to kvm_gmem_populate() Jörg Rödel
2026-06-23 9:32 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-23 12:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2026-06-23 9:15 ` [PATCH 4/4] kvm: sev: Acquire a writeable page reference for CPUID pages Jörg Rödel
2026-06-23 9:33 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
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