From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Andy Chiu" <tchiu@tenstorrent.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] RISC-V: KVM: fix vcpu vector context handling for kernel-mode vector
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 05:34:41 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260715053441.E9BF41F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260715051629.1169645-4-tchiu@tenstorrent.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Critical] The `RISCV_V_VCPU_NEED_RESTORE` thread flag is leaked across KVM_RUN boundaries, leading to uninitialized kernel memory disclosure.
--
--- Patch [3]: [PATCH v2 3/3] RISC-V: KVM: fix vcpu vector context handling for kernel-mode vector ---
commit 48826c7676c07c389b4f37039e65e239445a85c8
Author: Andy Chiu <tchiu@tenstorrent.com>
RISC-V: KVM: fix vcpu vector context handling for kernel-mode vector
This patch registers an RCU-protected callback to flush the vector context
when the kernel-mode vector is serving a guest. This addresses vtype
corruption during vector workloads by correctly saving the guest's context
and sourcing the right status.VS.
> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu.c b/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu.c
> index cf6e231e76e25..b7b68809a5817 100644
> --- a/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu.c
> +++ b/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -765,6 +769,12 @@ static void noinstr kvm_riscv_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> kvm_riscv_vcpu_swap_in_guest_state(vcpu);
> guest_state_enter_irqoff();
>
> + if (current->thread.riscv_v_flags & RISCV_V_VCPU_NEED_RESTORE) {
> + current->thread.riscv_v_flags &= ~RISCV_V_VCPU_NEED_RESTORE;
> + __kvm_riscv_vector_restore(gcntx);
> + gcntx->sstatus = (gcntx->sstatus & ~SR_VS) | SR_VS_CLEAN;
> + }
> +
[Severity: Critical]
Could this leak uninitialized kernel memory to the guest if the thread flag
carries over from a previous vCPU run?
If a softirq uses Kernel Mode Vector while a vCPU is loaded, it sets
RISCV_V_VCPU_NEED_RESTORE via kvm_riscv_vcpu_flush_vector(). If the thread
subsequently exits KVM to userspace, and then runs a different vCPU (for
example, one without the vector extension), this code will consume the
leaked flag.
Will this blindly restore the new vCPU's uninitialized gcntx->vector.datap
(which was allocated via kmalloc) into the physical vector registers, and
illegitimately force SR_VS_CLEAN in the guest's sstatus?
[ ... ]
> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_vector.c b/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_vector.c
> index 62d2fb77bb9b9..d25c10bd99a89 100644
> --- a/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_vector.c
> +++ b/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_vector.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -72,6 +73,7 @@ void kvm_riscv_vcpu_host_vector_restore(struct kvm_cpu_context *cntx)
> {
> if (!kvm_riscv_isa_check_host(V))
> __kvm_riscv_vector_restore(cntx);
> + riscv_v_flags_set(riscv_v_flags() & ~RISCV_V_VCPU_CTX);
> }
[Severity: Critical]
Should RISCV_V_VCPU_NEED_RESTORE also be cleared here to prevent it from
leaking to the thread's future execution?
Since kvm_arch_vcpu_put() calls kvm_riscv_vcpu_host_vector_restore() during
KVM exit, clearing it here might prevent the cross-vCPU leakage described
above.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260715051629.1169645-1-tchiu@tenstorrent.com?part=3
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-15 5:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20260715051629.1169645-1-tchiu@tenstorrent.com>
2026-07-15 5:16 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] RISC-V: KVM: fix vcpu vector context handling for kernel-mode vector Andy Chiu
2026-07-15 5:34 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
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