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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "David Woodhouse" <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: media-ci@linuxtv.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 03/11] KVM: SEV: Remove struct page dependency from SNP gmem paths
Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2026 15:30:46 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260716153047.0E18A1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f069aec751d2c7f18666efbe213bb0a70dc76b67.1784194290.git.dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] An unprivileged userspace process can trigger a host kernel warning in sev_clflush_pfn(), violating KVM subsystem rules.
--

--- Patch [3]: [RFC PATCH 03/11] KVM: SEV: Remove struct page dependency from SNP gmem paths ---
commit 23550409886d9ce92ccb0c443cb1bc2d231b31b3
Author: Connor Williamson <connordw@amazon.com>

KVM: SEV: Remove struct page dependency from SNP gmem paths

This commit updates KVM SEV-SNP paths to support memory without a struct page
by falling back to memremap() instead of relying on kmap_local_page(). It
relaxes RMP helpers and updates cache flush paths to handle page-less PFNs.

> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index 4272293478766..2be9e3b80d85e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c

[ ... ]

> @@ -5117,6 +5155,28 @@ int sev_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, int max_order)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +/*
> + * Flush the CPU caches for a guest_memfd PFN.  A PFN from an external
> + * guest_memfd provider may have no direct map alias, so fall back to a
> + * temporary memremap() mapping for the cache flush.
> + */
> +static void sev_clflush_pfn(kvm_pfn_t pfn, size_t size)
> +{
> +	void *va;
> +
> +	if (pfn_valid(pfn)) {
> +		clflush_cache_range(__va(pfn_to_hpa(pfn)), size);
> +		return;
> +	}
> +
> +	va = memremap(pfn_to_hpa(pfn), size, MEMREMAP_WB);
> +	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!va))

[Severity: High]
Is it safe to use WARN_ON_ONCE(!va) here when memremap() fails?

Since userspace can trigger sev_clflush_pfn() during guest_memfd hole-punching
(via sev_gmem_invalidate()), an unprivileged process might be able to trigger
this warning by inducing memory pressure or vmalloc space exhaustion.

This could result in a host denial of service if panic_on_warn is set.

Should we drop the assertion here to prevent unprivileged userspace from
intentionally triggering host warnings?

> +		return;
> +
> +	clflush_cache_range(va, size);
> +	memunmap(va);
> +}

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/f09647f427565c1789a6979470045aab78661563.1784194290.git.dwmw@amazon.co.uk?part=3

  reply	other threads:[~2026-07-16 15:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-16  9:31 [RFC PATCH 00/11] KVM: Allow alternative providers of guest_memfd backed by PFNMAP memory David Woodhouse
2026-07-16  9:31 ` [RFC PATCH 01/11] KVM: selftests: sev_smoke_test: Only run VM types the host offers David Woodhouse
2026-07-16  9:31   ` [RFC PATCH 02/11] KVM: selftests: sev_init2_tests: Derive SEV availability from KVM David Woodhouse
2026-07-16  9:31   ` [RFC PATCH 03/11] KVM: SEV: Remove struct page dependency from SNP gmem paths David Woodhouse
2026-07-16 15:30     ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-07-16  9:31   ` [RFC PATCH 04/11] KVM: guest_memfd: Introduce guest memory ops and route native gmem through them David Woodhouse
2026-07-16 15:30     ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-16  9:31   ` [RFC PATCH 05/11] iommufd: Look up private-interconnect phys via exporter symbols David Woodhouse
2026-07-16 15:33     ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-16  9:31   ` [RFC PATCH 06/11] iommufd: Plumb dma-buf memory-type (RAM vs MMIO) through the phys map David Woodhouse
2026-07-16 15:41     ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-16  9:31   ` [RFC PATCH 07/11] KVM: guest_memfd: Add ops-driven page revocation David Woodhouse
2026-07-16 15:42     ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-16  9:31   ` [RFC PATCH 08/11] samples/kvm: Add guest_memfd backing sample David Woodhouse
2026-07-16 15:53     ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-16  9:31   ` [RFC PATCH 09/11] selftests/kvm: gmem_provider KVM-only tests David Woodhouse
2026-07-16 15:46     ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-16  9:31   ` [RFC PATCH 10/11] selftests/kvm: gmem_provider iommufd tests David Woodhouse
2026-07-16 15:48     ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-16  9:31   ` [RFC PATCH 11/11] samples/kvm, selftests/kvm: Allow the gmem_provider NVMe DMA test on arm64 David Woodhouse
2026-07-16 15:54     ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-16 15:31   ` [RFC PATCH 01/11] KVM: selftests: sev_smoke_test: Only run VM types the host offers sashiko-bot

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