From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Shivank Garg" <shivankg@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 3/4] KVM: guest_memfd: add GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MIGRATABLE
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 09:28:13 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260728092814.372C11F00A3A@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260728-shivank-gmem-migrate-v2-3-269ac1f84e2b@amd.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] Accessing memslots in `__kvm_gmem_invalidate_start` without holding `kvm->srcu` allows a use-after-free if the memslot is concurrently deleted while the guest_memfd is being closed.
- [High] Concurrent execution of `kvm_gmem_unbind` on a dying file and `kvm_gmem_migrate_folio` causes asymmetric `kvm_mmu_invalidate_begin`/`end` pairing, permanently hanging the VM in page faults.
--
--- Patch [3]: [PATCH RFC v2 3/4] KVM: guest_memfd: add GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MIGRATABLE ---
commit 5a71d0799db0fa4a13e00aa0d626b30f60552d46
Author: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
KVM: guest_memfd: add GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MIGRATABLE
This commit introduces GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MIGRATABLE and
kvm_arch_supports_gmem_migration() to control migration support. It allocates
opted-in guest_memfds with GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE, allowing folios to be
migrated by the memory manager in non-confidential VMs.
[ ... ]
> diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> index ec881cabe8e3e..8ae455a6b38df 100644
> --- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> +++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -623,11 +628,16 @@ static int __kvm_gmem_create(struct kvm *kvm, loff_t size, u64 flags)
> inode->i_mapping->a_ops = &kvm_gmem_aops;
> inode->i_mode |= S_IFREG;
> inode->i_size = size;
> - mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_HIGHUSER);
> mapping_set_inaccessible(inode->i_mapping);
> - mapping_set_unmovable(inode->i_mapping);
> - /* Unmovable mappings are supposed to be marked unevictable as well. */
> - WARN_ON_ONCE(!mapping_unevictable(inode->i_mapping));
> + /* guest_memfd mappings should be marked unevictable. */
> + mapping_set_unevictable(inode->i_mapping);
> +
> + if (flags & GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MIGRATABLE) {
[Severity: Critical]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but enabling migration here
exposes a pre-existing use-after-free risk in __kvm_gmem_invalidate_start().
If an unprivileged user creates a migratable guest_memfd and binds it, then
concurrently closes the file descriptor and deletes the KVM memslot, memory
compaction can invoke kvm_gmem_migrate_folio() which calls
__kvm_gmem_invalidate_start().
Because kvm_gmem_unbind() bypasses filemap_invalidate_lock when the file
is dying, it does not wait for migration. __kvm_gmem_invalidate_start() then
dereferences the memslot without holding kvm->srcu:
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c:__kvm_gmem_invalidate_start() {
xa_for_each_range(&f->bindings, index, slot, start, end - 1) {
pgoff_t pgoff = slot->gmem.pgoff;
struct kvm_gfn_range gfn_range = {
.start = slot->base_gfn + max(pgoff, start) - pgoff,
...
}
Is there a risk that the memslot deletion path completes synchronize_srcu()
and calls kfree(slot) while __kvm_gmem_invalidate_start() is still accessing
it?
[Severity: High]
This is also a pre-existing issue, but exposing the migratable flag makes it
reachable. Could this lead to asymmetric kvm_mmu_invalidate_begin/end pairing
and a permanent VM hang?
When kvm_gmem_unbind() executes concurrently with kvm_gmem_migrate_folio()
on a dying file, it bypasses the lock and removes the binding from the
xarray between migration's invalidate_start and invalidate_end:
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c:kvm_gmem_unbind() {
if (!file) {
__kvm_gmem_unbind(slot, slot->gmem.file->private_data);
return;
}
}
When the migration finishes, __kvm_gmem_invalidate_end() conditionally
checks xa_find():
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c:__kvm_gmem_invalidate_end() {
if (xa_find(&f->bindings, &start, end - 1, XA_PRESENT)) {
KVM_MMU_LOCK(kvm);
kvm_mmu_invalidate_end(kvm);
KVM_MMU_UNLOCK(kvm);
}
}
Since the binding disappeared, doesn't this skip the _end notification,
permanently leaking KVM's mmu_invalidate_in_progress counter and causing
subsequent page faults to infinitely loop in mmu_invalidate_retry_gfn()?
> + mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE);
> + } else {
> + mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, GFP_HIGHUSER);
> + mapping_set_unmovable(inode->i_mapping);
> + }
>
> GMEM_I(inode)->flags = flags;
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260728-shivank-gmem-migrate-v2-0-269ac1f84e2b@amd.com?part=3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-28 9:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-28 9:05 [PATCH RFC v2 0/4] KVM: guest_memfd: folio migration for non-confidential VMs Shivank Garg
2026-07-28 9:05 ` [PATCH RFC v2 1/4] mm: split AS_UNMOVABLE back out of AS_INACCESSIBLE Shivank Garg
2026-07-28 9:05 ` [PATCH RFC v2 2/4] KVM: guest_memfd: implement folio migration for non-confidential VMs Shivank Garg
2026-07-28 9:20 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-28 9:05 ` [PATCH RFC v2 3/4] KVM: guest_memfd: add GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MIGRATABLE Shivank Garg
2026-07-28 9:28 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-07-28 9:05 ` [PATCH RFC v2 4/4] KVM: selftests: exercise guest_memfd folio migration Shivank Garg
2026-07-28 9:19 ` sashiko-bot
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