From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Jia Jia" <physicalmtea@gmail.com>
Cc: virtualization@lists.linux.dev,
"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
"Eugenio Perez" <eperezma@redhat.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] vhost-scsi: do not relock event vq mutex on send_evt fallback
Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2026 09:04:51 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260913090452.2B8221F00893@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260912090420.47439-1-physicalmtea@gmail.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] vhost_scsi_do_evt_work() accesses vq->iov[out] without verifying that the guest actually provided an input buffer, leading to arbitrary user-space memory corruption.
- [High] Events are processed in LIFO order instead of FIFO, which can cause state corruption for hotplug/hotunplug sequences.
--
commit 05830c30fc2e4dc682c270a9b487ae5abb66218b
Author: Jia Jia <physicalmtea@gmail.com>
vhost-scsi: do not relock event vq mutex on send_evt fallback
This commit resolves a deadlock during fallback event handling when the vhost
worker has disconnected. It splits event completion into an internal unlocked
helper and a locked wrapper to safely reuse the completion path.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260905005352.1E5B01F00A3D@smtp.kernel.org/
> diff --git a/drivers/vhost/scsi.c b/drivers/vhost/scsi.c
> index 4f8c0260bc9e7..42abf18291b75 100644
> --- a/drivers/vhost/scsi.c
> +++ b/drivers/vhost/scsi.c
> @@ -660,19 +660,26 @@ vhost_scsi_do_evt_work(struct vhost_scsi *vs, struct vhost_scsi_evt *evt)
> vhost_scsi_log_write(vq, vq_log, log_num);
> }
>
> -static void vhost_scsi_complete_events(struct vhost_scsi *vs, bool drop)
> +/* Caller must hold the event virtqueue mutex. */
> +static void __vhost_scsi_complete_events(struct vhost_scsi *vs, bool drop)
> {
> - struct vhost_virtqueue *vq = &vs->vqs[VHOST_SCSI_VQ_EVT].vq;
> struct vhost_scsi_evt *evt, *t;
> struct llist_node *llnode;
>
> - mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
> llnode = llist_del_all(&vs->vs_event_list);
> llist_for_each_entry_safe(evt, t, llnode, list) {
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this loop deliver events to the guest
in reverse order?
The events are added to vs_event_list using llist_add(), which constructs a
last-in, first-out list. Because lnode is retrieved locklessly with
llist_del_all(), and the iteration happens without first calling
llist_reverse_order(), the events appear to be processed from newest to
oldest.
Could this cause state corruption for hotplug and hotunplug sequences? For
example, if a device is plugged and then rapidly unplugged, the guest might
receive the unplug event first and the plug event second, leaving it
erroneously believing the device is still present.
> if (!drop)
> vhost_scsi_do_evt_work(vs, evt);
[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but can this function access out-of-bounds or
stale memory if the guest provides an empty input buffer?
Looking at vhost_scsi_do_evt_work() in drivers/vhost/scsi.c, the code uses
vhost_get_vq_desc() which populates vq->iov:
head = vhost_get_vq_desc(vq, vq->iov,
ARRAY_SIZE(vq->iov), &out, &in,
vq_log, &log_num);
...
if ((vq->iov[out].iov_len != sizeof(struct virtio_scsi_event))) {
vq_err(vq, "Expecting virtio_scsi_event, got %zu bytes\n",
vq->iov[out].iov_len);
If a guest submits a descriptor chain with only read-only descriptors,
vhost_get_vq_desc() sets in = 0. The out variable holds the count of
read-only descriptors, meaning the first writable descriptor expected by the
host would be at index out.
Does the length check above access vq->iov[out].iov_len without verifying
that in > 0?
If in is 0, vq->iov[out] was not populated by vhost_get_vq_desc() and
contains stale data from a previous request. Could a malicious guest use
this to force the kernel to write the event structure to a previously
legitimate but now hot-unplugged host virtual address via the
__copy_to_user() call later in the function?
> vhost_scsi_free_evt(vs, evt);
> }
> +}
[ ... ]
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260912090420.47439-1-physicalmtea@gmail.com?part=1
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-13 9:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-12 9:04 [PATCH] vhost-scsi: do not relock event vq mutex on send_evt fallback Jia Jia
2026-09-13 9:04 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
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