From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Lu Baolu" <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/5] iommu/vt-d: Reserve MSB of domain ID space for TDX module
Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2026 08:11:50 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260915081150.D79E21F000FF@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260915074235.1219183-6-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] iommu: missing TDX teardown and mt_pages leak on IOMMU hot-remove
--
commit 8a16aba70396ddc74c834953ff8123fae8be9bad
Author: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
iommu/vt-d: Reserve MSB of domain ID space for TDX module
When an Intel IOMMU is enabled for TDX Connect, the VT-d DID namespace
must be split so the TDX module can use the MSB-tagged half for trusted
DMA translations, while the host/VMM uses the lower half.
> diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/tdxc.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/tdxc.c
> index b5dfdeeb23dba..1ca03257d4563 100644
> --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/tdxc.c
> +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/tdxc.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -154,17 +159,27 @@ static int intel_iommu_bringup_tdxc(struct intel_iommu *iommu, unsigned int nr_p
> return -EFAULT;
> }
>
> + /*
> + * Intel TDX Connect Architecture Specification, Section 2.2 Trusted DMA
> + *
> + * When IOMMU is enabled to support TDX Connect, the IOMMU restricts
> + * the VMM’s DID setting, reserving the MSB bit for the TDX module. The
> + * TDX module always sets this reserved bit on the trusted DMA table.
> + */
> + iommu->max_domain_id = ndoms >> 1;
> iommu->tdx_iommu_id = tdx_iommu_id;
> iommu->mt_pages = no_free_ptr(iommu_mt);
>
> - /* Bring-up is not complete yet; report as unsupported for now. */
> - return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + pr_info("%s: trusted DMA for TEE/IO initialized\n", iommu->name);
> +
> + return 0;
[Severity: High]
With TDX bring-up now successfully completing here, if this IOMMU is later
hot-removed, does this leak the TDX metadata pages (iommu->mt_pages) and leave
dangling hardware state in the SEAM firmware?
When ACPI hotplug invokes dmar_iommu_hotplug() with insert=false, the IOMMU
is destroyed via:
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c:dmar_iommu_hotplug() {
...
disable_dmar_iommu(iommu);
free_dmar_iommu(iommu);
...
}
Because this hot-remove path never calls intel_iommu_teardown_tdxc(), it
appears iommu->mt_pages is leaked and tdh_iommu_clear() is never called before
the IOMMU structure itself is freed.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260915074235.1219183-1-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com?part=5
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-15 8:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-15 7:42 [PATCH 0/5] iommu/vt-d: Introduce trusted DMA initialization support Lu Baolu
2026-09-15 7:42 ` [PATCH 1/5] x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL wrappers for IOMMU setup/clear Lu Baolu
2026-09-15 7:42 ` [PATCH 2/5] x86/virt/tdx: Read global metadata for trusted IOMMU Lu Baolu
2026-09-15 7:42 ` [PATCH 3/5] iommu/vt-d: Add interfaces for trusted DMA initialization Lu Baolu
2026-09-15 7:42 ` [PATCH 4/5] iommu/vt-d: Add helpers to set up and tear down TDX extensions Lu Baolu
2026-09-15 8:04 ` sashiko-bot
2026-09-16 8:37 ` Baolu Lu
2026-09-15 7:42 ` [PATCH 5/5] iommu/vt-d: Reserve MSB of domain ID space for TDX module Lu Baolu
2026-09-15 8:11 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-09-16 8:25 ` Baolu Lu
2026-09-18 2:30 ` [PATCH 0/5] iommu/vt-d: Introduce trusted DMA initialization support Tian, Kevin
2026-09-19 4:04 ` Baolu Lu
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