From: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
hpa@zytor.com, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
tony.luck@intel.com, peterz@infradead.org, fenghua.yu@intel.com,
x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/8] x86/split_lock: Ensure X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT means the existence of feature
Date: Fri, 6 Mar 2020 10:15:23 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20bc0919-72ac-0445-29f2-2b445230faad@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200305162311.GG11500@linux.intel.com>
On 3/6/2020 12:23 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 04, 2020 at 09:49:14AM +0800, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
>> On 3/4/2020 3:41 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>> On Tue, Mar 03, 2020 at 10:55:24AM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
>>>> On Thu, Feb 06, 2020 at 03:04:06PM +0800, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
>>>>> When flag X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT is set, it should ensure the
>>>>> existence of MSR_TEST_CTRL and MSR_TEST_CTRL.SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT bit.
>>>>
>>>> The changelog confused me a bit. "When flag X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT
>>>> is set" makes it sound like the logic is being applied after the feature
>>>> bit is set. Maybe something like:
>>>>
>>>> ```
>>>> Verify MSR_TEST_CTRL.SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT can be toggled via WRMSR prior to
>>>> setting the SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT feature bit so that runtime consumers,
>>>> e.g. KVM, don't need to worry about WRMSR failure.
>>>> ```
>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
>>>>> ---
>>>>> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------
>>>>> 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
>>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
>>>>> index 2b3874a96bd4..49535ed81c22 100644
>>>>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
>>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
>>>>> @@ -702,7 +702,8 @@ static void init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>>>>> if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_DISABLE)
>>>>> tsx_disable();
>>>>> - split_lock_init();
>>>>> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT))
>>>>> + split_lock_init();
>>>>> }
>>>>> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
>>>>> @@ -986,9 +987,26 @@ static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
>>>>> static void __init split_lock_setup(void)
>>>>> {
>>>>> + u64 test_ctrl_val;
>>>>> char arg[20];
>>>>> int i, ret;
>>>>> + /*
>>>>> + * Use the "safe" versions of rdmsr/wrmsr here to ensure MSR_TEST_CTRL
>>>>> + * and MSR_TEST_CTRL.SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT bit do exist. Because there may
>>>>> + * be glitches in virtualization that leave a guest with an incorrect
>>>>> + * view of real h/w capabilities.
>>>>> + */
>>>>> + if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_TEST_CTRL, &test_ctrl_val))
>>>>> + return;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + if (wrmsrl_safe(MSR_TEST_CTRL,
>>>>> + test_ctrl_val | MSR_TEST_CTRL_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT))
>>>>> + return;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + if (wrmsrl_safe(MSR_TEST_CTRL, test_ctrl_val))
>>>>> + return;a
>>>>
>>>> Probing the MSR should be skipped if SLD is disabled in sld_options, i.e.
>>>> move this code (and setup_force_cpu_cap() etc...) down below the
>>>> match_option() logic. The above would temporarily enable SLD even if the
>>>> admin has explicitly disabled it, e.g. makes the kernel param useless for
>>>> turning off the feature due to bugs.
>>>
>>> Hmm, but this prevents KVM from exposing SLD to a guest when it's off in
>>> the kernel, which would be a useful debug/testing scenario.
>>>
>>> Maybe add another SLD state to forcefully disable SLD? That way the admin
>>> can turn of SLD in the host kernel but still allow KVM to expose it to its
>>> guests. E.g.
>>
>> I don't think we need do this.
>>
>> IMO, this a the bug of split_lock_init(), which assume the initial value of
>> MSR_TEST_CTRL is zero, at least bit SPLIT_LOCK of which is zero.
>> This is problem, it's possible that BIOS has set this bit.
>
> Hmm, yeah, that's a bug. But it's a separate bug.
>
>> split_lock_setup() here, is to check if the feature really exists. So
>> probing MSR_TEST_CTRL and bit MSR_TEST_CTRL_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT here. If there
>> all exist, setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT) to indicate
>> feature does exist.
>> Only when feature exists, there is a need to parse the command line config
>> of split_lock_detect.
>
> Toggling SPLIT_LOCK before checking the kernel param is bad behavior, e.g.
> if someone has broken silicon that causes explosions if SPLIT_LOCK=1. The
> behavior is especially bad because cpu_set_core_cap_bits() enumerates split
> lock detection using FMS, i.e. clearcpuid to kill CORE_CAPABILITIES
> wouldn't work either.
>
It makes things complicated when we take all into account.
We check kernel param first in BSP, if it's sld_off, we don't set flag
X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT. Of course during APs booting, there is no
X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT, it won't do split_lock_init().
However, due to X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT flag not being set,
clearing SLD bit in each AP when sld_off in case BIOS has set it, won't
work. So in split_lock_setup() here, if sld_off, we don't set flag
X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT, and we also need to send IPI to each AP
to clear SLD bit ?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-03-06 2:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-02-06 7:04 [PATCH v3 0/8] kvm/split_lock: Add feature split lock detection support in kvm Xiaoyao Li
2020-02-06 7:04 ` [PATCH v3 1/8] x86/split_lock: Export handle_user_split_lock() Xiaoyao Li
2020-03-03 18:42 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-02-06 7:04 ` [PATCH v3 2/8] x86/split_lock: Ensure X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT means the existence of feature Xiaoyao Li
2020-03-03 18:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-03-03 19:41 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-03-04 1:49 ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-03-05 16:23 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-03-06 2:15 ` Xiaoyao Li [this message]
2020-03-04 2:20 ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-02-06 7:04 ` [PATCH v3 3/8] x86/split_lock: Cache the value of MSR_TEST_CTRL in percpu data Xiaoyao Li
2020-02-06 20:23 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-02-07 4:18 ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-03-03 19:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-03-05 6:48 ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-02-06 7:04 ` [PATCH v3 4/8] x86/split_lock: Add and export split_lock_detect_enabled() and split_lock_detect_fatal() Xiaoyao Li
2020-03-03 18:59 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-02-06 7:04 ` [PATCH v3 5/8] kvm: x86: Emulate split-lock access as a write Xiaoyao Li
2020-02-06 7:04 ` [PATCH v3 6/8] kvm: vmx: Extend VMX's #AC interceptor to handle split lock #AC happens in guest Xiaoyao Li
2020-03-03 19:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-02-06 7:04 ` [PATCH v3 7/8] kvm: x86: Emulate MSR IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES Xiaoyao Li
2020-02-06 7:04 ` [PATCH v3 8/8] x86: vmx: virtualize split lock detection Xiaoyao Li
2020-02-07 18:27 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-02-08 4:51 ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-03-03 19:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-03-05 14:16 ` Xiaoyao Li
2020-03-05 16:49 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-03-06 0:29 ` Xiaoyao Li
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