public inbox for kvm@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bp@alien8.de, x86@kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: mingo@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, pgonda@google.com,
	seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 09/19] x86/cc: Add CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 13:34:43 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <233f36d4-aab7-6b8d-c1c6-e46068d64618@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241009092850.197575-10-nikunj@amd.com>

On 10/9/24 04:28, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
> Add confidential compute platform attribute CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC
> that can be used by the guest to query whether the Secure TSC feature is
> active.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>

Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

(Although, this can probably be squashed into the next patch where it is
first used)

> ---
>  include/linux/cc_platform.h | 8 ++++++++
>  arch/x86/coco/core.c        | 3 +++
>  2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/cc_platform.h b/include/linux/cc_platform.h
> index caa4b4430634..cb7103dc124f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/cc_platform.h
> +++ b/include/linux/cc_platform.h
> @@ -88,6 +88,14 @@ enum cc_attr {
>  	 * enabled to run SEV-SNP guests.
>  	 */
>  	CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP,
> +
> +	/**
> +	 * @CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC: SNP Secure TSC is active.
> +	 *
> +	 * The platform/OS is running as a guest/virtual machine and actively
> +	 * using AMD SEV-SNP Secure TSC feature.
> +	 */
> +	CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC,
>  };
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
> diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/core.c
> index 0f81f70aca82..5b9a358a3254 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/coco/core.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/coco/core.c
> @@ -100,6 +100,9 @@ static bool noinstr amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
>  	case CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP:
>  		return cc_flags.host_sev_snp;
>  
> +	case CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC:
> +		return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC;
> +
>  	default:
>  		return false;
>  	}

  reply	other threads:[~2024-10-10 18:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-10-09  9:28 [PATCH v12 00/19] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 01/19] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 02/19] x86/sev: Handle failures from snp_init() Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-16 16:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 03/19] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 04/19] virt: sev-guest: Consolidate SNP guest messaging parameters to a struct Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 05/19] virt: sev-guest: Reduce the scope of SNP command mutex Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-10 18:32   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 06/19] virt: sev-guest: Carve out SNP message context structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 07/19] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-17  7:42   ` kernel test robot
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 08/19] x86/sev: Relocate SNP guest messaging routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 09/19] x86/cc: Add CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-10 18:34   ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 10/19] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 11/19] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 12/19] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 13/19] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 14/19] tsc: Use the GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR for discovering TSC frequency Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-10 19:39   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-14  3:36     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 15/19] tsc: Upgrade TSC clocksource rating Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 16:16   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-10  6:44     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 16/19] x86/kvmclock: Use clock source callback to update kvm sched clock Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 15:58   ` Sean Christopherson
2024-10-10 10:14     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-16  8:26       ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 17/19] x86/kvmclock: Abort SecureTSC enabled guest when kvmclock is selected Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-10 19:49   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-14  3:37     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 18/19] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09  9:28 ` [PATCH v12 19/19] x86/sev: Allow Secure TSC feature for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-09 16:08 ` [PATCH v12 00/19] Add Secure TSC support " Dave Hansen
2024-10-10  6:28   ` Nikunj A. Dadhania

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=233f36d4-aab7-6b8d-c1c6-e46068d64618@amd.com \
    --to=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=nikunj@amd.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=pgonda@google.com \
    --cc=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox