From: "Yang, Weijiang" <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
To: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Cc: <seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
<dave.hansen@intel.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <peterz@infradead.org>,
<chao.gao@intel.com>, <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
<john.allen@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 26/26] KVM: nVMX: Enable CET support for nested guest
Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2023 23:15:39 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <26313af3-3a75-4a3c-9935-526b07a6277d@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <53a25a11927f0c4b3f689d532af2a0ee67826fa8.camel@redhat.com>
On 12/7/2023 1:24 AM, Maxim Levitsky wrote:
> On Wed, 2023-12-06 at 17:22 +0800, Yang, Weijiang wrote:
>> On 12/5/2023 6:12 PM, Maxim Levitsky wrote:
>>> On Mon, 2023-12-04 at 16:50 +0800, Yang, Weijiang wrote:
>> [...]
>>
>>>>>> vmx->nested.force_msr_bitmap_recalc = false;
>>>>>> @@ -2469,6 +2491,18 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02_rare(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
>>>>>> if (kvm_mpx_supported() && vmx->nested.nested_run_pending &&
>>>>>> (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS))
>>>>>> vmcs_write64(GUEST_BNDCFGS, vmcs12->guest_bndcfgs);
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + if (vmx->nested.nested_run_pending &&
>>>>> I don't think that nested.nested_run_pending check is needed.
>>>>> prepare_vmcs02_rare is not going to be called unless the nested run is pending.
>>>> But there're other paths along to call prepare_vmcs02_rare(), e.g., vmx_set_nested_state()-> nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode()-> prepare_vmcs02_rare(), especially when L1 instead of L2 was running. In this case, nested.nested_run_pending == false,
>>>> we don't need to update vmcs02's fields at the point until L2 is being resumed.
>>> - If we restore VM from migration stream when L2 is *not running*, then prepare_vmcs02_rare won't be called,
>>> because nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode will not be called, because in turn there is no nested vmcs to load.
>>>
>>> - If we restore VM from migration stream when L2 is *about to run* (KVM emulated the VMRESUME/VMLAUNCH,
>>> but we didn't do the actual hardware VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME on vmcs02, then the 'nested_run_pending' will be true, it will be restored
>>> from the migration stream.
>>>
>>> - If we migrate while nested guest was run once but didn't VMEXIT to L1 yet, then yes, nested.nested_run_pending will be false indeed,
>>> but we still need to setup vmcs02, otherwise it will be left with default zero values.
>> Thanks a lot for recapping these cases! I overlooked some nested flags before. It makes sense to remove nested.nested_run_pending.
>>> Remember that prior to setting nested state the VM wasn't running even once usually, unlike when the guest enters nested state normally.
>>>
>>>>>> + (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE)) {
>>>>>> + if (guest_can_use(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
>>>>>> + vmcs_writel(GUEST_SSP, vmcs12->guest_ssp);
>>>>>> + vmcs_writel(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE,
>>>>>> + vmcs12->guest_ssp_tbl);
>>>>>> + }
>>>>>> + if (guest_can_use(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
>>>>>> + guest_can_use(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT))
>>>>>> + vmcs_writel(GUEST_S_CET, vmcs12->guest_s_cet);
>>>>>> + }
>>>>>> }
>>>>>>
>>>>>> if (nested_cpu_has_xsaves(vmcs12))
>>>>>> @@ -4300,6 +4334,15 @@ static void sync_vmcs02_to_vmcs12_rare(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>>>>>> vmcs12->guest_pending_dbg_exceptions =
>>>>>> vmcs_readl(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS);
>>>>>>
>>>>>> + if (guest_can_use(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
>>>>>> + vmcs12->guest_ssp = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SSP);
>>>>>> + vmcs12->guest_ssp_tbl = vmcs_readl(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE);
>>>>>> + }
>>>>>> + if (guest_can_use(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) ||
>>>>>> + guest_can_use(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
>>>>>> + vmcs12->guest_s_cet = vmcs_readl(GUEST_S_CET);
>>>>>> + }
>>>>> The above code should be conditional on VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE - if the guest (L2) state
>>>>> was loaded, then it must be updated on exit - this is usually how VMX works.
>>>> I think this is not for L2 VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE, it happens in prepare_vmcs02_rare(). IIUC, the guest registers will be saved into VMCS fields unconditionally when vm-exit happens,
>>>> so these fields for L2 guest should be synced to L1 unconditionally.
>>> "the guest registers will be saved into VMCS fields unconditionally"
>>> This is not true, unless there is a bug.
>> I checked the latest SDM, there's no such kind of wording regarding CET entry/exit control bits. The wording comes from
>> the individual CET spec.:
>> "10.6 VM Exit
>> On processors that support CET, the VM exit saves the state of IA32_S_CET, SSP and IA32_INTERRUPT_SSP_TABLE_ADDR MSR to the VMCS guest-state area unconditionally."
>> But since it doesn't appear in SDM, I shouldn't take it for granted.
> SDM spec from September 2023:
>
> 28.3.1 Saving Control Registers, Debug Registers, and MSRs
>
> "If the processor supports the 1-setting of the “load CET” VM-entry control, the contents of the IA32_S_CET and
> IA32_INTERRUPT_SSP_TABLE_ADDR MSRs are saved into the corresponding fields. On processors that do not
> support Intel 64 architecture, bits 63:32 of these MSRs are not saved."
>
> Honestly it's not 100% clear if the “load CET” should be set to 1 to trigger the restore, or that this control just needs to be
> supported on the CPU.
> It does feel like you are right here, that CPU always saves the guest state, but allows to not load it on VM entry via
> “load CET” VM entry control.
>
> IMHO its best to check what the bare metal does by rigging a test by patching the host kernel to not set the 'load CET' control,
> and see if the CPU still updates the guest CET fields on the VM exit.
OK, I'll do some tests to see what's happening, thanks!
>>> the vmcs12 VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE should be passed through as is to vmcs02, so if the nested guest doesn't set this bit
>>> the entry/exit using vmcs02 will not touch the CET state, which is unusual but allowed by the spec I think - a nested hypervisor can opt for example to save/load
>>> this state manually or use msr load/store lists instead.
>> Right although the use case should be rare, will modify the code to check VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE. Thanks!
>
>>> Regardless of this,
>>> if the guest didn't set VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE, then vmcs12 guest fields should neither be loaded on VM entry (copied to vmcs02) nor updated on VM exit,
>>> (that is copied back to vmcs12) this is what is written in the VMX spec.
>> What's the VMX spec. your're referring to here?
> SDM.
>
> In fact, now that I am thinking about this again, it should be OK to unconditionally copy the CET fields from vmcs12 to vmcs02, because as long as the
> VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE is not set, the CPU should care about their values in the vmcs02.
>
> And about the other way around, assuming that I made a mistake as I said above, then the other way around is indeed unconditional.
>
>
> Sorry for a bit of a confusion.
NP, I also double check it with HW Arch and get it back.
Thanks for raising these questions!
> Best regards,
> Maxim Levitsky
>
>
>>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-12-08 15:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 105+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-11-24 5:53 [PATCH v7 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 01/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Always preserve non-user xfeatures/flags in __state_perm Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:24 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 02/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Refine CET user xstate bit enabling Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 9:40 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-27 2:55 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-28 1:31 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-28 8:50 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-28 1:31 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-28 7:52 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:26 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 6:51 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 9:53 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-06 1:03 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-06 15:57 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-08 14:57 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-08 15:15 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-13 9:30 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-13 13:31 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-13 17:01 ` Chang S. Bae
2023-12-14 3:12 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Add CET supervisor mode state support Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 9:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-27 4:06 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-28 3:38 ` Li, Xin3
2023-11-28 1:34 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-30 17:27 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 7:01 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 9:53 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 04/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XFEATURE_MASK_KERNEL_DYNAMIC xfeature set Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28 1:46 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-28 8:00 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:33 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 7:49 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 9:55 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-06 3:00 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-06 16:11 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-08 15:57 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 05/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce fpu_guest_cfg for guest FPU configuration Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28 14:58 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-29 14:12 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-29 17:08 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-30 13:28 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:29 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-30 18:02 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-30 17:29 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 06/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Create guest fpstate with guest specific config Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28 15:19 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-29 14:16 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:36 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 8:36 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 9:57 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 07/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Warn if kernel dynamic xfeatures detected in normal fpstate Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28 15:25 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-29 14:18 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 08/26] KVM: x86: Rework cpuid_get_supported_xcr0() to operate on vCPU data Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 09/26] KVM: x86: Rename kvm_{g,s}et_msr() to menifest emulation operations Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:36 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 10/26] KVM: x86: Refine xsave-managed guest register/MSR reset handling Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:36 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 11/26] KVM: x86: Add kvm_msr_{read,write}() helpers Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:37 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 12/26] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 13/26] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:37 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 14/26] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 15/26] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:38 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 16/26] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 17/26] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:40 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 18/26] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 19/26] KVM: x86: Use KVM-governed feature framework to track "SHSTK/IBT enabled" Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:40 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 20/26] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:41 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 21/26] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:42 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 2:23 ` Chao Gao
2023-12-04 0:45 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:02 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 8:55 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 22/26] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:44 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 6:33 ` Chao Gao
2023-12-05 10:04 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 9:45 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:07 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 23/26] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 24/26] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:46 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 16:15 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:07 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 25/26] KVM: nVMX: Introduce new VMX_BASIC bit for event error_code delivery to L1 Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 26/26] KVM: nVMX: Enable CET support for nested guest Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:53 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-04 8:50 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:12 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-06 9:22 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-06 17:24 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-08 15:15 ` Yang, Weijiang [this message]
2023-12-08 15:22 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-12 8:56 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-12 11:09 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-15 2:29 ` [PATCH v7 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization Yang, Weijiang
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