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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com,
	pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	konrad.wilk@oracle.com, peterz@infradead.org,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, seanjc@google.com,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, nik.borisov@suse.com,
	kpsingh@kernel.org, longman@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: Set BHI_NO in guest when host is not affected by BHI
Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2024 15:13:00 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2afb20af-d42e-4535-a660-0194de1d0099@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <abbaeb7c-a0d3-4b2d-8632-d32025b165d7@oracle.com>

On 11/04/2024 2:32 pm, Alexandre Chartre wrote:
>
> On 4/11/24 15:22, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 11:34 AM Alexandre Chartre
>> <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> So you mean we can't set ARCH_CAP_BHI_NO for the guest because we
>>> don't know
>>> if the guest will run the (other) existing mitigations which are
>>> believed to
>>> suffice to mitigate BHI?
>>>
>>> The problem is that we can end up with a guest running extra BHI
>>> mitigations
>>> while this is not needed. Could we inform the guest that eIBRS is
>>> not available
>>> on the system so a Linux guest doesn't run with extra BHI mitigations?
>>
>> The (Linux or otherwise) guest will make its own determinations as to
>> whether BHI mitigations are necessary. If the guest uses eIBRS, it
>> will run with mitigations. If you hide bit 1 of
>> MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES from the guest, it may decide to disable
>> it. But if the guest decides to use eIBRS, I think it should use
>> mitigations even if the host doesn't.
>
> The problem is not on servers which have eIBRS, but on servers which
> don't.
>
> If there is no eIBRS on the server, then the guest doesn't know if
> there is
> effectively no eIBRS on the server or if eIBRS is hidden by the
> virtualization
> so it applies the BHI mitigation even when that's not needed (i.e.
> when eIBRS
> is effectively not present the server).
>
>> It's a different story if the host isn't susceptible altogether. The
>> ARCH_CAP_BHI_NO bit *can* be set if the processor doesn't have the bug
>> at all, which would be true if cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist,
>> NO_BHI). I would apply a patch to do that.
>>
>
> Right. I have just suggested to enumerate cpus which have eIBRS with
> NO_BHI,
> but we need would that precise list of cpus.

Intel stated that there are no current CPUs for which NO_BHI would be true.

What I take this to mean is "no CPUs analysing backwards as far as Intel
cared to go".

~Andrew

  reply	other threads:[~2024-04-11 14:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-11  7:24 [PATCH] KVM: x86: Set BHI_NO in guest when host is not affected by BHI Alexandre Chartre
2024-04-11  7:34 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-04-11  7:49   ` Alexandre Chartre
2024-04-11  7:51 ` Greg KH
2024-04-11  8:00   ` Alexandre Chartre
2024-04-11  7:51 ` Nikolay Borisov
2024-04-11  8:43 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-04-11  9:33   ` Alexandre Chartre
2024-04-11  9:38     ` Andrew Cooper
2024-04-11 11:14       ` Chao Gao
2024-04-11 13:20         ` Alexandre Chartre
2024-04-15 15:14           ` Alexandre Chartre
2024-04-15 17:17             ` Dave Hansen
2024-04-16  8:41               ` Alexandre Chartre
2024-04-25 20:45                 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2024-04-11 13:22     ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-11 13:32       ` Alexandre Chartre
2024-04-11 14:13         ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2024-04-11 14:33           ` Alexandre Chartre
2024-04-11 14:46             ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-11 15:12               ` Alexandre Chartre
2024-04-11 15:20                 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-04-11 15:56                   ` Chao Gao
2024-04-11 20:50                     ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2024-04-12  3:24                       ` Chao Gao
2024-04-12 16:33                         ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk

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