From: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
To: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Chang S . Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>, Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>,
Yosry Ahmed <yosry@kernel.org>,
Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>,
David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>,
Bala-Vignesh-Reddy <reddybalavignesh9979@gmail.com>,
Kishen Maloor <kishen.maloor@intel.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 2/7] KVM: x86: Use linear_read_system() to read the TSS I/O bitmap
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2026 22:03:03 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2f8e907e-1c77-416d-90be-9428ce8242f6@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <41a327bd-cbbd-4530-9f30-9175c5840014@linux.intel.com>
Thank you for reviewing the patch.
On 8/18/2026 8:19 PM, Binbin Wu wrote:
> On 8/6/2026 9:15 AM, Sohil Mehta wrote:
>> TSS I/O permission bitmap reads are implicit supervisor accesses which
>> are subject to Linear Address Space Separation (LASS) enforcement.
>
> I am not sure about it.
>
> According to SDM vol 3a (253668-089US), Chapter "LINEAR-ADDRESS PRE-PROCESSING",
> section "MODE-BASED ACCESSES AND LINEAR-ADDRESS-SPACE PARTITIONING", it defines
> and limits "implicit supervisor-mode accesses" to the following operations:
The way I understand it, this list isn't exhaustive. The wording in
those sections, "Such accesses include the following.." and "Examples of
such accesses include.." suggests that this is not limiting.
> - accesses to the global descriptor table (GDT) or local descriptor table (LDT)
> to load a segment descriptor
> - accesses to the interrupt descriptor table (IDT) when delivering an interrupt
> or exception
> - accesses to the task-state segment (TSS) as part of a task switch or change of
> CPL
> - accesses to a user posted-interrupt descriptor (UPID) during user-interrupt
> notification processing
>
For example, this doesn't list the SENDUIPI instruction's access to the
UITT (IA32_UINTR_TT). That one is an implicit supervisor-mode access to
a kernel address at CPL = 3.
In section 5.6.1 (Determination of Access Rights), immediately following
the above examples the SDM says: "All these accesses are called
implicit supervisor-mode accesses regardless of CPL."
> IIUC, the TSS I/O bitmap read during ordinary instruction execution
> (under CPL = 3) rather than during a task switch or CPL transition, I don't
> think they fall under the classification of implicit supervisor-mode accesses.
>
AFAIU, the entire TSS struct (including the I/O bitmap portion) is
mapped at struct cpu_entry_area using CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE with
PAGE_KERNEL_RO permissions. So bit 63 will always be 1 and U/S = 0.
Yes, the TSS I/O bitmap access happens at CPL = 3 but it still has to be
an implicit supervisor access. If it weren't, any user instruction
access to the I/O bitmap would always generate a fault (even without
LASS), right?
Sohil
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-19 5:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-06 1:15 [PATCH v4 0/7] KVM: x86: Add LASS virtualization support Sohil Mehta
2026-08-06 1:15 ` [PATCH v4 1/7] KVM: x86: Add an emulator flag to differentiate branch targets from fetches Sohil Mehta
2026-08-06 1:15 ` [PATCH v4 2/7] KVM: x86: Use linear_read_system() to read the TSS I/O bitmap Sohil Mehta
2026-08-19 3:19 ` Binbin Wu
2026-08-19 5:03 ` Sohil Mehta [this message]
2026-08-19 5:21 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-08-19 5:26 ` Binbin Wu
2026-08-06 1:15 ` [PATCH v4 3/7] KVM: x86: Add LASS violation checks during instruction emulation Sohil Mehta
2026-08-19 5:58 ` Binbin Wu
2026-08-06 1:15 ` [PATCH v4 4/7] KVM: VMX: Implement LASS violation check Sohil Mehta
2026-08-06 1:52 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-07 1:42 ` Sohil Mehta
2026-08-19 8:49 ` Binbin Wu
2026-08-06 1:15 ` [PATCH v4 5/7] KVM: x86: Virtualize LASS and advertise support to userspace Sohil Mehta
2026-08-19 9:01 ` Binbin Wu
2026-08-06 1:15 ` [PATCH v4 6/7] KVM: selftests: Add coverage for LASS CPUID and CR4 handling Sohil Mehta
2026-08-20 6:01 ` Binbin Wu
2026-08-06 1:15 ` [PATCH v4 7/7] selftests/x86: Add a userspace test for LASS enforcement Sohil Mehta
2026-08-20 6:36 ` Binbin Wu
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