From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: "David Woodhouse" Subject: Re: [RFC 05/10] x86/speculation: Add basic IBRS support infrastructure Date: Sun, 21 Jan 2018 15:25:38 -0000 Message-ID: <37cf9ba3941a51e8db27f9f4c21b5b7e.squirrel@twosheds.infradead.org> References: <1516476182-5153-1-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon.de> <1516476182-5153-6-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon.de> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain;charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Cc: "KarimAllah Ahmed" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Andi Kleen" , "Andrea Arcangeli" , "Andy Lutomirski" , "Arjan van de Ven" , "Ashok Raj" , "Asit Mallick" , "Borislav Petkov" , "Dan Williams" , "Dave Hansen" , "David Woodhouse" , "Greg Kroah-Hartman" , "H . Peter Anvin" , "Ingo Molnar" , "Janakarajan Natarajan" , "Joerg Roedel" , "Jun Nakajima" , "Laura Abbott" , "Li To: "Thomas Gleixner" Return-path: In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: kvm.vger.kernel.org > On Sat, 20 Jan 2018, KarimAllah Ahmed wrote: >> From: David Woodhouse >> >> Not functional yet; just add the handling for it in the Spectre v2 >> mitigation selection, and the X86_FEATURE_IBRS flag which will control >> the code to be added in later patches. >> >> Also take the #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE from around the RSB-stuffing; IBRS >> mode will want that too. >> >> For now we are auto-selecting IBRS on Skylake. We will probably end up >> changing that but for now let's default to the safest option. >> >> XX: Do we want a microcode blacklist? > > Oh yes, we want a microcode blacklist. Ideally we refuse to load the > affected microcode in the first place and if its already loaded then at > least avoid to use the borked features. > > PR texts promising that Intel is committed to transparency in this matter > are not sufficient. Intel, please provide the facts, i.e. a proper list of > micro codes and affected SKUs, ASAP. Perhaps we could start with the list already published by VMware at https://kb.vmware.com/s/article/52345 -- dwmw2