Re: [PATCH v15 29/41] KVM: SEV: Synchronize MSR_IA32_XSS from the GHCB when it's valid

Sean Christopherson
2025-09-16T19:54:00Z

On Tue, Sep 16, 2025, John Allen wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 12, 2025 at 04:23:07PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > Synchronize XSS from the GHCB to KVM's internal tracking if the guest
> > marks XSS as valid on a #VMGEXIT. Like XCR0, KVM needs an up-to-date copy
> > of XSS in order to compute the required XSTATE size when emulating
> > CPUID.0xD.0x1 for the guest.
> >
> > Treat the incoming XSS change as an emulated write, i.e. validatate the
> > guest-provided value, to avoid letting the guest load garbage into KVM's
> > tracking. Simply ignore bad values, as either the guest managed to get an
> > unsupported value into hardware, or the guest is misbehaving and providing
> > pure garbage. In either case, KVM can't fix the broken guest.
> >
> > Note, emulating the change as an MSR write also takes care of side effects,
> > e.g. marking dynamic CPUID bits as dirty.
> >
> > Suggested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 3 +++
> > arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 +
> > 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> > index 0cd77a87dd84..0cd32df7b9b6 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> > @@ -3306,6 +3306,9 @@ static void sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> > if (kvm_ghcb_xcr0_is_valid(svm))
> > __kvm_set_xcr(vcpu, 0, kvm_ghcb_get_xcr0(ghcb));
> >
> > + if (kvm_ghcb_xss_is_valid(svm))
> > + __kvm_emulate_msr_write(vcpu, MSR_IA32_XSS, kvm_ghcb_get_xss(ghcb));
> > +
>
> It looks like this is the change that caused the selftest regression
> with sev-es. It's not yet clear to me what the problem is though.

Do you see any WARNs in the guest kernel log?

The most obvious potential bug is that KVM is missing a CPUID update, e.g. due
to dropping an XSS write, consuming stale data, not setting cpuid_dynamic_bits_dirty,
etc. But AFAICT, CPUID.0xD.1.EBX (only thing that consumes the current XSS) is
only used by init_xstate_size(), and I would expect the guest kernel's sanity
checks in paranoid_xstate_size_valid() to yell if KVM botches CPUID emulation.

Another possibility is that unconditionally setting cpuid_dynamic_bits_dirty
was masking a pre-existing (or just different) bug, and that "fixing" that flaw
by eliding cpuid_dynamic_bits_dirty when "vcpu->arch.ia32_xss == data" exposed
the bug.