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From: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
To: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
	bp@alien8.de, x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: mingo@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, pgonda@google.com,
	seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v13 03/13] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests
Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2024 10:12:32 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <396e511f-e5cc-4850-bf72-0a2111f7683c@wanadoo.fr> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241021055156.2342564-4-nikunj@amd.com>

Le 21/10/2024 à 07:51, Nikunj A Dadhania a écrit :
> Add support for Secure TSC in SNP-enabled guests. Secure TSC allows guests
> to securely use RDTSC/RDTSCP instructions, ensuring that the parameters
> used cannot be altered by the hypervisor once the guest is launched.
> 
> Secure TSC-enabled guests need to query TSC information from the AMD
> Security Processor. This communication channel is encrypted between the AMD
> Security Processor and the guest, with the hypervisor acting merely as a
> conduit to deliver the guest messages to the AMD Security Processor. Each
> message is protected with AEAD (AES-256 GCM). Use a minimal AES GCM library
> to encrypt and decrypt SNP guest messages for communication with the PSP.
> 
> Use mem_encrypt_init() to fetch SNP TSC information from the AMD Security
> Processor and initialize snp_tsc_scale and snp_tsc_offset. During secondary
> CPU initialization, set the VMSA fields GUEST_TSC_SCALE (offset 2F0h) and
> GUEST_TSC_OFFSET (offset 2F8h) with snp_tsc_scale and snp_tsc_offset,
> respectively.
> 
> Add confidential compute platform attribute CC_ATTR_GUEST_SNP_SECURE_TSC
> that can be used by the guest to query whether the Secure TSC feature is
> active.
> 
> Since handle_guest_request() is common routine used by both the SEV guest
> driver and Secure TSC code, move it to the SEV header file.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
> Tested-by: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---

..

> +static int __init snp_get_tsc_info(void)
> +{
> +	static u8 buf[SNP_TSC_INFO_RESP_SZ + AUTHTAG_LEN];
> +	struct snp_guest_request_ioctl rio;
> +	struct snp_tsc_info_resp tsc_resp;
> +	struct snp_tsc_info_req *tsc_req;
> +	struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc;
> +	struct snp_guest_req req;
> +	int rc;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * The intermediate response buffer is used while decrypting the
> +	 * response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the
> +	 * authtag.
> +	 */
> +	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(buf) < (sizeof(tsc_resp) + AUTHTAG_LEN));
> +
> +	mdesc = snp_msg_alloc();
> +	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mdesc))
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	rc = snp_msg_init(mdesc, snp_vmpl);
> +	if (rc)
> +		return rc;
> +
> +	tsc_req = kzalloc(sizeof(struct snp_tsc_info_req), GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!tsc_req)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
> +	memset(&rio, 0, sizeof(rio));
> +	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
> +
> +	req.msg_version = MSG_HDR_VER;
> +	req.msg_type = SNP_MSG_TSC_INFO_REQ;
> +	req.vmpck_id = snp_vmpl;
> +	req.req_buf = tsc_req;
> +	req.req_sz = sizeof(*tsc_req);
> +	req.resp_buf = buf;
> +	req.resp_sz = sizeof(tsc_resp) + AUTHTAG_LEN;
> +	req.exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST;
> +
> +	rc = snp_send_guest_request(mdesc, &req, &rio);
> +	if (rc)
> +		goto err_req;
> +
> +	memcpy(&tsc_resp, buf, sizeof(tsc_resp));
> +	pr_debug("%s: response status %x scale %llx offset %llx factor %x\n",
> +		 __func__, tsc_resp.status, tsc_resp.tsc_scale, tsc_resp.tsc_offset,
> +		 tsc_resp.tsc_factor);
> +
> +	if (tsc_resp.status == 0) {
> +		snp_tsc_scale = tsc_resp.tsc_scale;
> +		snp_tsc_offset = tsc_resp.tsc_offset;
> +	} else {
> +		pr_err("Failed to get TSC info, response status %x\n", tsc_resp.status);
> +		rc = -EIO;
> +	}
> +
> +err_req:
> +	/* The response buffer contains the sensitive data, explicitly clear it. */
> +	memzero_explicit(buf, sizeof(buf));
> +	memzero_explicit(&tsc_resp, sizeof(tsc_resp));
> +	memzero_explicit(&req, sizeof(req));

req does not seem to hold sensitive data.
Is it needed, or maybe should it be tsc_req?

> +
> +	return rc;
> +}

...

CJ

  reply	other threads:[~2024-10-21  8:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-10-21  5:51 [PATCH v13 00/13] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 01/13] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21  7:48   ` Christophe JAILLET
2024-10-22  4:12     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 02/13] x86/sev: Relocate SNP guest messaging routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 03/13] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21  8:12   ` Christophe JAILLET [this message]
2024-10-22  4:15     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 04/13] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-23  3:25   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-24  6:24     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-24  7:31       ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-24 10:16         ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 05/13] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-24  7:56   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-24  8:44     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-24 15:34       ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 06/13] x86/sev: Prevent GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21 14:08   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-22  4:20     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 07/13] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 08/13] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 09/13] tsc: Use the GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR for discovering TSC frequency Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21 14:33   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-22  4:24     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 10/13] tsc: Upgrade TSC clocksource rating Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 11/13] tsc: Switch to native sched clock Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21 14:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-22  4:26     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21 21:30   ` kernel test robot
2024-10-21 23:03   ` kernel test robot
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 12/13] x86/kvmclock: Abort SecureTSC enabled guest when kvmclock is selected Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-10-21 15:00   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-10-22  4:28     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-10-21  5:51 ` [PATCH v13 13/13] x86/sev: Allow Secure TSC feature for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania

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