From: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>,
John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>,
Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>,
Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>,
Zhang Yi Z <yi.z.zhang@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v15 14/41] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs
Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2025 15:52:46 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <47d96d1e-a09e-4f0b-8dc3-bdf87ead1dfe@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250912232319.429659-15-seanjc@google.com>
On 9/13/2025 7:22 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
>
> Add emulation interface for CET MSR access. The emulation code is split
> into common part and vendor specific part. The former does common checks
> for MSRs, e.g., accessibility, data validity etc., then passes operation
> to either XSAVE-managed MSRs via the helpers or CET VMCS fields.
>
> SSP can only be read via RDSSP. Writing even requires destructive and
> potentially faulting operations such as SAVEPREVSSP/RSTORSSP or
> SETSSBSY/CLRSSBSY. Let the host use a pseudo-MSR that is just a wrapper
> for the GUEST_SSP field of the VMCS.
>
> Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
> Tested-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
> Tested-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
> [sean: drop call to kvm_set_xstate_msr() for S_CET, consolidate code]
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 18 ++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 23 +++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> index 227b45430ad8..4fc1dbba2eb0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
> @@ -2106,6 +2106,15 @@ int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> else
> msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_a[index / 2];
> break;
> + case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
> + msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_S_CET);
> + break;
> + case MSR_KVM_INTERNAL_GUEST_SSP:
> + msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SSP);
> + break;
> + case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
> + msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE);
> + break;
> case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
> msr_info->data = vmx_guest_debugctl_read();
> break;
> @@ -2424,6 +2433,15 @@ int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> else
> vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_a[index / 2] = data;
> break;
> + case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
> + vmcs_writel(GUEST_S_CET, data);
> + break;
> + case MSR_KVM_INTERNAL_GUEST_SSP:
> + vmcs_writel(GUEST_SSP, data);
> + break;
> + case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
> + vmcs_writel(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE, data);
> + break;
> case MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES:
> if (data & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT) {
> if ((data & PMU_CAP_LBR_FMT) !=
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 460ceae11495..0b67b1b0e361 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -1890,6 +1890,44 @@ static int __kvm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 data,
>
> data = (u32)data;
> break;
> + case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
> + case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
> + if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
> + !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT))
> + return KVM_MSR_RET_UNSUPPORTED;
> + if (!kvm_is_valid_u_s_cet(vcpu, data))
> + return 1;
> + break;
> + case MSR_KVM_INTERNAL_GUEST_SSP:
> + if (!host_initiated)
> + return 1;
> + fallthrough;
> + /*
> + * Note that the MSR emulation here is flawed when a vCPU
> + * doesn't support the Intel 64 architecture. The expected
> + * architectural behavior in this case is that the upper 32
> + * bits do not exist and should always read '0'. However,
> + * because the actual hardware on which the virtual CPU is
> + * running does support Intel 64, XRSTORS/XSAVES in the
> + * guest could observe behavior that violates the
> + * architecture. Intercepting XRSTORS/XSAVES for this
> + * special case isn't deemed worthwhile.
> + */
> + case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
> + if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> + return KVM_MSR_RET_UNSUPPORTED;
> + /*
> + * MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB is not present on processors that do
> + * not support Intel 64 architecture.
> + */
> + if (index == MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB && !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LM))
> + return KVM_MSR_RET_UNSUPPORTED;
> + if (is_noncanonical_msr_address(data, vcpu))
> + return 1;
> + /* All SSP MSRs except MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB must be 4-byte aligned */
> + if (index != MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB && !IS_ALIGNED(data, 4))
> + return 1;
> + break;
> }
>
> msr.data = data;
> @@ -1934,6 +1972,20 @@ static int __kvm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 *data,
> !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDPID))
> return 1;
> break;
> + case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
> + case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
> + if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
> + !guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT))
> + return KVM_MSR_RET_UNSUPPORTED;
> + break;
> + case MSR_KVM_INTERNAL_GUEST_SSP:
> + if (!host_initiated)
> + return 1;
> + fallthrough;
> + case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:
> + if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))
> + return KVM_MSR_RET_UNSUPPORTED;
> + break;
> }
>
> msr.index = index;
> @@ -3864,12 +3916,12 @@ static __always_inline void kvm_access_xstate_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> kvm_fpu_put();
> }
>
> -static __maybe_unused void kvm_set_xstate_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> +static void kvm_set_xstate_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> {
> kvm_access_xstate_msr(vcpu, msr_info, MSR_TYPE_W);
> }
>
> -static __maybe_unused void kvm_get_xstate_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> +static void kvm_get_xstate_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> {
> kvm_access_xstate_msr(vcpu, msr_info, MSR_TYPE_R);
> }
> @@ -4255,6 +4307,10 @@ int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err = data;
> break;
> #endif
> + case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
> + case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP:
> + kvm_set_xstate_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
> + break;
> default:
> if (kvm_pmu_is_valid_msr(vcpu, msr))
> return kvm_pmu_set_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
> @@ -4604,6 +4660,10 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.xfd_err;
> break;
> #endif
> + case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
> + case MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ... MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP:
> + kvm_get_xstate_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
> + break;
> default:
> if (kvm_pmu_is_valid_msr(vcpu, msr_info->index))
> return kvm_pmu_get_msr(vcpu, msr_info);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> index a7c9c72fca93..076eccba0f7e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
> @@ -710,4 +710,27 @@ int ____kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpl,
>
> int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>
> +#define CET_US_RESERVED_BITS GENMASK(9, 6)
> +#define CET_US_SHSTK_MASK_BITS GENMASK(1, 0)
> +#define CET_US_IBT_MASK_BITS (GENMASK_ULL(5, 2) | GENMASK_ULL(63, 10))
> +#define CET_US_LEGACY_BITMAP_BASE(data) ((data) >> 12)
> +
> +static inline bool kvm_is_valid_u_s_cet(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data)
> +{
> + if (data & CET_US_RESERVED_BITS)
> + return false;
> + if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) &&
> + (data & CET_US_SHSTK_MASK_BITS))
> + return false;
> + if (!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT) &&
> + (data & CET_US_IBT_MASK_BITS))
> + return false;
> + if (!IS_ALIGNED(CET_US_LEGACY_BITMAP_BASE(data), 4))
> + return false;
> + /* IBT can be suppressed iff the TRACKER isn't WAIT_ENDBR. */
> + if ((data & CET_SUPPRESS) && (data & CET_WAIT_ENDBR))
> + return false;
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> #endif
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-09-17 7:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 130+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-09-12 23:22 [PATCH v15 00/41] KVM: x86: Mega-CET Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:22 ` [PATCH v15 01/41] KVM: SEV: Rename kvm_ghcb_get_sw_exit_code() to kvm_get_cached_sw_exit_code() Sean Christopherson
2025-09-15 16:15 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-15 16:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:22 ` [PATCH v15 02/41] KVM: SEV: Read save fields from GHCB exactly once Sean Christopherson
2025-09-15 17:32 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-15 21:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-17 21:47 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:22 ` [PATCH v15 03/41] KVM: SEV: Validate XCR0 provided by guest in GHCB Sean Christopherson
2025-09-15 18:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-15 21:22 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:22 ` [PATCH v15 04/41] KVM: x86: Introduce KVM_{G,S}ET_ONE_REG uAPIs support Sean Christopherson
2025-09-15 6:29 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-16 7:10 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-17 13:14 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:22 ` [PATCH v15 05/41] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Sean Christopherson
2025-09-16 7:12 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-12 23:22 ` [PATCH v15 06/41] KVM: x86: Check XSS validity against guest CPUIDs Sean Christopherson
2025-09-16 7:20 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-12 23:22 ` [PATCH v15 07/41] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Sean Christopherson
2025-09-16 7:23 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-12 23:22 ` [PATCH v15 08/41] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Sean Christopherson
2025-09-16 7:29 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-12 23:22 ` [PATCH v15 09/41] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Sean Christopherson
2025-09-15 17:04 ` Xin Li
2025-09-16 6:51 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-16 8:28 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-17 2:51 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-17 12:47 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-17 21:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:22 ` [PATCH v15 10/41] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Sean Christopherson
2025-09-16 8:33 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-12 23:22 ` [PATCH v15 11/41] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Sean Christopherson
2025-09-15 6:30 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-16 8:46 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-12 23:22 ` [PATCH v15 12/41] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Sean Christopherson
2025-09-15 6:31 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-16 9:00 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-12 23:22 ` [PATCH v15 13/41] KVM: x86: Enable guest SSP read/write interface with new uAPIs Sean Christopherson
2025-09-15 6:55 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-15 22:12 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-16 5:52 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 17:47 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 17:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:22 ` [PATCH v15 14/41] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Sean Christopherson
2025-09-16 7:07 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-16 7:48 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-16 8:10 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 22:11 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-17 7:52 ` Binbin Wu [this message]
2025-09-12 23:22 ` [PATCH v15 15/41] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Sean Christopherson
2025-09-16 7:37 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-17 7:53 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-12 23:22 ` [PATCH v15 16/41] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Sean Christopherson
2025-09-15 17:21 ` Xin Li
2025-09-16 7:40 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-17 8:32 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-17 13:44 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:22 ` [PATCH v15 17/41] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Sean Christopherson
2025-09-16 7:44 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-17 8:48 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-17 21:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:22 ` [PATCH v15 18/41] KVM: x86: Don't emulate instructions affected by CET features Sean Christopherson
2025-09-17 8:16 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-17 21:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-18 14:54 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-18 18:02 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-17 8:19 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-18 14:15 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-19 1:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-17 8:45 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-12 23:22 ` [PATCH v15 19/41] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Sean Christopherson
2025-09-18 1:57 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-19 22:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-18 2:18 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-18 18:05 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-19 7:10 ` Xiaoyao Li
2025-09-19 14:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:22 ` [PATCH v15 20/41] KVM: nVMX: Virtualize NO_HW_ERROR_CODE_CC for L1 event injection to L2 Sean Christopherson
2025-09-18 2:27 ` Binbin Wu
2025-09-12 23:22 ` [PATCH v15 21/41] KVM: nVMX: Prepare for enabling CET support for nested guest Sean Christopherson
2025-09-15 17:45 ` Xin Li
2025-09-18 4:48 ` Xin Li
2025-09-18 18:05 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:23 ` [PATCH v15 22/41] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CR0.WP and CR4.CET Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:23 ` [PATCH v15 23/41] KVM: nVMX: Add consistency checks for CET states Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:23 ` [PATCH v15 24/41] KVM: nVMX: Advertise new VM-Entry/Exit control bits for CET state Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:23 ` [PATCH v15 25/41] KVM: x86: SVM: Emulate reads and writes to shadow stack MSRs Sean Christopherson
2025-09-15 17:56 ` Xin Li
2025-09-15 20:43 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:23 ` [PATCH v15 26/41] KVM: nSVM: Save/load CET Shadow Stack state to/from vmcb12/vmcb02 Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:23 ` [PATCH v15 27/41] KVM: x86: SVM: Update dump_vmcb with shadow stack save area additions Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:23 ` [PATCH v15 28/41] KVM: x86: SVM: Pass through shadow stack MSRs as appropriate Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:23 ` [PATCH v15 29/41] KVM: SEV: Synchronize MSR_IA32_XSS from the GHCB when it's valid Sean Christopherson
2025-09-16 18:55 ` John Allen
2025-09-16 19:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-16 20:33 ` John Allen
2025-09-16 21:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-16 22:55 ` John Allen
2025-09-18 19:48 ` John Allen
2025-09-18 20:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-18 20:44 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-18 21:23 ` John Allen
2025-09-18 21:42 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-09-18 22:18 ` John Allen
2025-09-19 13:40 ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-19 16:13 ` John Allen
2025-09-19 17:29 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-09-19 20:58 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2025-09-22 9:19 ` Kiryl Shutsemau
2025-09-22 9:33 ` Upadhyay, Neeraj
2025-09-22 9:54 ` Kiryl Shutsemau
2025-09-12 23:23 ` [PATCH v15 30/41] KVM: SVM: Enable shadow stack virtualization for SVM Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:23 ` [PATCH v15 31/41] KVM: x86: Add human friendly formatting for #XM, and #VE Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:23 ` [PATCH v15 32/41] KVM: x86: Define Control Protection Exception (#CP) vector Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:23 ` [PATCH v15 33/41] KVM: x86: Define AMD's #HV, #VC, and #SX exception vectors Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:23 ` [PATCH v15 34/41] KVM: selftests: Add ex_str() to print human friendly name of " Sean Christopherson
2025-09-15 9:07 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-12 23:23 ` [PATCH v15 35/41] KVM: selftests: Add an MSR test to exercise guest/host and read/write Sean Christopherson
2025-09-15 8:22 ` Chao Gao
2025-09-15 17:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:23 ` [PATCH v15 36/41] KVM: selftests: Add support for MSR_IA32_{S,U}_CET to MSRs test Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:23 ` [PATCH v15 37/41] KVM: selftests: Extend MSRs test to validate vCPUs without supported features Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:23 ` [PATCH v15 38/41] KVM: selftests: Add KVM_{G,S}ET_ONE_REG coverage to MSRs test Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:23 ` [PATCH v15 39/41] KVM: selftests: Add coverate for KVM-defined registers in " Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:23 ` [PATCH v15 40/41] KVM: selftests: Verify MSRs are (not) in save/restore list when (un)supported Sean Christopherson
2025-09-12 23:23 ` [PATCH v15 41/41] KVM: VMX: Make CR4.CET a guest owned bit Sean Christopherson
2025-09-15 13:18 ` [PATCH v15 00/41] KVM: x86: Mega-CET Mathias Krause
2025-09-15 21:20 ` John Allen
2025-09-16 13:53 ` Chao Gao
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