From: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/6] KVM: x86: Play nice with protected guests in complete_hypercall_exit()
Date: Tue, 3 Dec 2024 15:29:59 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <49d0669a-251b-48e2-a705-1c8c6ecea342@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241128004344.4072099-2-seanjc@google.com>
On 11/28/2024 8:43 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Use is_64_bit_hypercall() instead of is_64_bit_mode() to detect a 64-bit
> hypercall when completing said hypercall. For guests with protected state,
> e.g. SEV-ES and SEV-SNP, KVM must assume the hypercall was made in 64-bit
> mode as the vCPU state needed to detect 64-bit mode is unavailable.
>
> Hacking the sev_smoke_test selftest to generate a KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE
> hypercall via VMGEXIT trips the WARN:
>
> ------------[ cut here ]------------
> WARNING: CPU: 273 PID: 326626 at arch/x86/kvm/x86.h:180 complete_hypercall_exit+0x44/0xe0 [kvm]
> Modules linked in: kvm_amd kvm ... [last unloaded: kvm]
> CPU: 273 UID: 0 PID: 326626 Comm: sev_smoke_test Not tainted 6.12.0-smp--392e932fa0f3-feat #470
> Hardware name: Google Astoria/astoria, BIOS 0.20240617.0-0 06/17/2024
> RIP: 0010:complete_hypercall_exit+0x44/0xe0 [kvm]
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x2400/0x2720 [kvm]
> kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x54f/0x630 [kvm]
> __se_sys_ioctl+0x6b/0xc0
> do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
> </TASK>
> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
>
> Fixes: b5aead0064f3 ("KVM: x86: Assume a 64-bit hypercall for guests with protected state")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 2e713480933a..0b2fe4aa04a2 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -9976,7 +9976,7 @@ static int complete_hypercall_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> {
> u64 ret = vcpu->run->hypercall.ret;
>
> - if (!is_64_bit_mode(vcpu))
> + if (!is_64_bit_hypercall(vcpu))
> ret = (u32)ret;
> kvm_rax_write(vcpu, ret);
> ++vcpu->stat.hypercalls;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-12-03 7:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-11-28 0:43 [PATCH v4 0/6] KVM: x86: Prep KVM hypercall handling for TDX Sean Christopherson
2024-11-28 0:43 ` [PATCH v4 1/6] KVM: x86: Play nice with protected guests in complete_hypercall_exit() Sean Christopherson
2024-11-28 3:22 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-11-29 9:01 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-02 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-03 7:29 ` Binbin Wu [this message]
2024-11-28 0:43 ` [PATCH v4 2/6] KVM: x86: Add a helper to check for user interception of KVM hypercalls Sean Christopherson
2024-12-02 18:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-11-28 0:43 ` [PATCH v4 3/6] KVM: x86: Move "emulate hypercall" function declarations to x86.h Sean Christopherson
2024-11-28 3:23 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-12-02 20:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-03 7:33 ` Binbin Wu
2024-11-28 0:43 ` [PATCH v4 4/6] KVM: x86: Bump hypercall stat prior to fully completing hypercall Sean Christopherson
2024-11-28 3:24 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-12-02 20:13 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-02 20:33 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-03 7:37 ` Binbin Wu
2024-11-28 0:43 ` [PATCH v4 5/6] KVM: x86: Always complete hypercall via function callback Sean Christopherson
2024-11-28 3:08 ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-12-02 18:44 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-02 20:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-02 20:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-03 0:14 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-11-28 0:43 ` [PATCH v4 6/6] KVM: x86: Refactor __kvm_emulate_hypercall() into a macro Sean Christopherson
2024-11-28 8:38 ` Adrian Hunter
2024-12-10 16:20 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-12-10 20:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-12 7:32 ` Adrian Hunter
2024-12-12 15:42 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-12-12 18:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-03 8:01 ` Binbin Wu
2024-12-10 16:17 ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-12-10 20:10 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-11-28 1:06 ` [PATCH v4 0/6] KVM: x86: Prep KVM hypercall handling for TDX Huang, Kai
2024-12-19 2:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-15 9:40 ` Binbin Wu
2025-01-17 19:31 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-20 0:37 ` Binbin Wu
2025-01-21 18:04 ` Sean Christopherson
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