From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Avi Kivity Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/5] KVM: SVM: Add correct handling of nested iopm Date: Fri, 26 Feb 2010 12:33:23 +0200 Message-ID: <4B87A373.9000808@redhat.com> References: <1267118149-15737-1-git-send-email-joerg.roedel@amd.com> <1267118149-15737-5-git-send-email-joerg.roedel@amd.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: Marcelo Tosatti , Alexander Graf , kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org To: Joerg Roedel Return-path: In-Reply-To: <1267118149-15737-5-git-send-email-joerg.roedel@amd.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: kvm.vger.kernel.org On 02/25/2010 07:15 PM, Joerg Roedel wrote: > This patch adds the correct handling of the nested io > permission bitmap. Old behavior was to not lookup the port > in the iopm but only reinject an io intercept to the guest. > > Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel > --- > arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 1 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > index bb75a44..3859e2c 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c > @@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ struct nested_state { > > /* gpa pointers to the real vectors */ > u64 vmcb_msrpm; > + u64 vmcb_iopm; > > /* A VMEXIT is required but not yet emulated */ > bool exit_required; > @@ -1603,6 +1604,26 @@ static void nested_svm_unmap(struct page *page) > kvm_release_page_dirty(page); > } > > +static int nested_svm_intercept_ioio(struct vcpu_svm *svm) > +{ > + unsigned port; > + u8 val, bit; > + u64 gpa; > + > + if (!(svm->nested.intercept& (1ULL<< INTERCEPT_IOIO_PROT))) > + return NESTED_EXIT_HOST; > + > + port = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_1>> 16; > + gpa = svm->nested.vmcb_iopm + (port / 8); > + bit = port % 8; > + val = 0; > + > + if (kvm_read_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm, gpa,&val, 1)) > + val&= (1<< bit); > + > + return val ? NESTED_EXIT_DONE : NESTED_EXIT_HOST; > +} > + > A kvm_{test,set,clear}_guest_bit() would be useful, we have several users already (not a requirement for this patchset). -- Do not meddle in the internals of kernels, for they are subtle and quick to panic.