From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Avi Kivity Subject: Re: [RFC] Unify KVM kernel-space and user-space code into a single project Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2010 18:32:51 +0200 Message-ID: <4BAA3EB3.2070101@redhat.com> References: <20100324134642.GD14800@8bytes.org> <4BAA1A53.20207@redhat.com> <20100324150137.GE14800@8bytes.org> <20100324152653.GA12225@redhat.com> <20100324153746.GF14800@8bytes.org> <4BAA3323.9000405@redhat.com> <20100324155041.GH14800@8bytes.org> <4BAA3556.2040802@redhat.com> <20100324161711.GJ14800@8bytes.org> <4BAA3BD6.8030401@redhat.com> <20100324163119.GL14800@8bytes.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: "Daniel P. Berrange" , Anthony Liguori , Ingo Molnar , Pekka Enberg , "Zhang, Yanmin" , Peter Zijlstra , Sheng Yang , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, Marcelo Tosatti , Jes Sorensen , Gleb Natapov , ziteng.huang@intel.com, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Fr?d?ric Weisbecker , Gregory Haskins To: Joerg Roedel Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20100324163119.GL14800@8bytes.org> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: kvm.vger.kernel.org On 03/24/2010 06:31 PM, Joerg Roedel wrote: > On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 06:20:38PM +0200, Avi Kivity wrote: > >> On 03/24/2010 06:17 PM, Joerg Roedel wrote: >> >>> But is this not only one entity more for >>> sVirt to handle? I would leave that decision to the sVirt developers. >>> Does attaching the same label as for the VM resources mean that root >>> could not access it anymore? >>> >>> >> IIUC processes run under a context, and there's a policy somewhere that >> tells you which context can access which label (and with what >> permissions). There was a server on the Internet once that gave you >> root access and invited you to attack it. No idea if anyone succeeded >> or not (I got bored after about a minute). >> >> So it depends on the policy. If you attach the same label, that means >> all files with the same label have the same access permissions. I think. >> > So if this is true we can introduce a 'trace' label and add all contexts > that should be allowed to trace to it. > But we probably should leave the details to the security experts ;-) > That's just what I want to do. Leave it in userspace and then they can deal with it without telling us about it. -- error compiling committee.c: too many arguments to function