From: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
To: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>
Cc: Jes Sorensen <Jes.Sorensen@redhat.com>,
"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"gleb@redhat.com" <gleb@redhat.com>,
Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] Disable GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI flag before injecting NMI to guest on VMX
Date: Sun, 29 Aug 2010 11:09:57 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4C7A15D5.6050602@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <4C77EB33.9030407@siemens.com>
On 08/27/2010 07:43 PM, Jan Kiszka wrote:
> Avi Kivity wrote:
>> On 08/27/2010 05:13 PM, Jan Kiszka wrote:
>>>> I forgot them already. What was that, exception during IRET?
>>> Exception during IRET or any instruction under the interrupt shadow will
>>> push the TF we set to step over this issue on the guest stack. We do not
>>> intercept all the possible exceptions, so we can leak TF. Moreover,
>>> multiplexing TF users is currently imperfect on AMD but, before fixing
>>> that, we have to think about the approach in general.
>> Thanks. I think those are all solvable. The key IMO is to take a state
>> based approach to host bits - instead of setting or clearing a bit in
>> response to an event, use the event as a trigger for recalculation of
>> the bit's value. This works for bits which have multiple uses, and for
>> recovery from KVM_SET_*. For guest bits which are needed by the host we
>> also have a working approach - when the bit is overloaded, trap all
>> instructions that can see it, as in CR0.TS.
>>
>> It may take some work but I think we can achieve 100% accuracy without
>> making the code unmaintainable.
> Besides making TF usage robust against multiple users, including the
> guest itself, my complexity concern is first of all about preventing its
> leakage. We will have to trap _all_ exceptions and properly remove TF
> from the guest state.
Note we already trap all exceptions on Intel when virtualizing real mode
via vm86.
> And then there is a potential performance price to pay (yes, accuracy
> should come first): If the guest uses NMIs for profiles, thus at a
> significant rate, AMD processors force us to exit twice per NMI return -
> independent of the fact if there is another NMI pending or not.
Doesn't worry me too much. NMI rate will be limited or
program-under-test performance will suffer. 10K vs 20K exits/sec is
substantial, but not worth worrying about for this fairly rare use case.
I'm more concerned that we don't push VMLOAD/VMSAVE to the heavyweight
exit path, and that we don't use the svm interrupt queue (that could
reduce 10% of the exits on normal interrupts).
--
error compiling committee.c: too many arguments to function
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2010-08-29 8:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2010-08-26 20:06 [PATCH 0/1] Disable GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI flag before injecting NMI to VMX guest Jes.Sorensen
2010-08-26 20:06 ` [PATCH 1/1] Disable GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI flag before injecting NMI to guest on VMX Jes.Sorensen
2010-08-27 8:27 ` Jan Kiszka
2010-08-27 8:31 ` Jes Sorensen
2010-08-27 8:39 ` Jan Kiszka
2010-08-27 9:46 ` Avi Kivity
2010-08-27 11:06 ` Jan Kiszka
2010-08-27 13:58 ` Avi Kivity
2010-08-27 14:13 ` Jan Kiszka
2010-08-27 15:50 ` Avi Kivity
2010-08-27 16:43 ` Jan Kiszka
2010-08-29 8:09 ` Avi Kivity [this message]
2010-08-27 9:44 ` Avi Kivity
2010-08-27 11:06 ` Jan Kiszka
2010-08-27 13:54 ` Avi Kivity
2010-08-27 14:12 ` Jan Kiszka
2010-08-27 11:16 ` Gleb Natapov
2010-08-27 11:23 ` Jan Kiszka
2010-08-27 11:25 ` Gleb Natapov
2010-08-27 11:04 ` Gleb Natapov
2010-08-27 11:09 ` Jan Kiszka
2010-08-27 9:21 ` Avi Kivity
2010-08-27 9:41 ` Jes Sorensen
2010-08-27 9:47 ` Avi Kivity
2010-08-27 9:56 ` Jes Sorensen
2010-08-27 9:59 ` Avi Kivity
2010-08-27 10:01 ` Jes Sorensen
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