From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Anthony Liguori Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [RFC] Next gen kvm api Date: Tue, 07 Feb 2012 06:51:48 -0600 Message-ID: <4F311E64.10604@codemonkey.ws> References: <4F2AB552.2070909@redhat.com> <4F2C6517.3040203@codemonkey.ws> <4F302E0D.20302@freescale.com> <4F3118EA.7040302@codemonkey.ws> <4F311BBD.5050600@redhat.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: Scott Wood , Eric Northup , qemu-devel , KVM list , linux-kernel To: Avi Kivity Return-path: In-Reply-To: <4F311BBD.5050600@redhat.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: kvm.vger.kernel.org On 02/07/2012 06:40 AM, Avi Kivity wrote: > On 02/07/2012 02:28 PM, Anthony Liguori wrote: >> >>> It's a potential source of exploits >>> (from bugs in KVM or in hardware). I can see people wanting to be >>> selective with access because of that. >> >> As is true of the rest of the kernel. >> >> If you want finer grain access control, that's exactly why we have things like >> LSM and SELinux. You can add the appropriate LSM hooks into the KVM >> infrastructure and setup default SELinux policies appropriately. > > LSMs protect objects, not syscalls. There isn't an object to protect here > (except the fake /dev/kvm object). A VM can be an object. Regards, Anthony Liguori > In theory, kvm is exactly the same as other syscalls, but in practice, it is > used by only very few user programs, so there may be many unexercised paths. >