From: "Nikunj A. Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, pgonda@google.com,
seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 03/24] virt: sev-guest: Make payload a variable length array
Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2024 23:42:44 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4fbcdcaa-3238-8dca-4d91-cb645187671e@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240624133951.GDZnl3JxlKXaIvrrJ3@fat_crate.local>
On 6/24/2024 7:09 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 24, 2024 at 08:00:38AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> An alternative to the #defines would be something like:
>>
>> struct snp_guest_msg {
>> struct snp_guest_msg_hdr hdr;
>> u8 payload[PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg_hdr)];
>> } __packed;
>>
>> Not sure it matters, but does reduce the changes while ensuring the
>> payload plus header doesn't exceed a page.
Yes, it does reduce a lot of churn.
>
> Yeah, because that would've been my next question - the requirement to keep it
> <= PAGE_SIZE.
>
> So yeah, Nikunj, please do that also and add a
>
> BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg) > PAGE_SIZE);
>
> somewhere in the driver to catch all kinds of funky stuff.
Sure, here is the new patch. I have separated the variable name changes to a new patch.
Subject: [PATCH] virt: sev-guest: Ensure the SNP guest messages do not exceed
a page
Currently, snp_guest_msg includes a message header (96 bytes) and a
payload (4000 bytes). There is an implicit assumption here that the SNP
message header will always be 96 bytes, and with that assumption the
payload array size has been set to 4000 bytes magic number. If any new
member is added to the SNP message header, the SNP guest message will span
more than a page.
Instead of using magic number '4000' for the payload, declare the
snp_guest_msg in a way that payload plus the message header do not exceed a
page.
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Suggested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.h | 2 +-
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 3 +++
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.h b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.h
index ceb798a404d6..de14a4f01b9d 100644
--- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.h
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.h
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ struct snp_guest_msg_hdr {
struct snp_guest_msg {
struct snp_guest_msg_hdr hdr;
- u8 payload[4000];
+ u8 payload[PAGE_SIZE - sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg_hdr)];
} __packed;
#endif /* __VIRT_SEVGUEST_H__ */
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
index 427571a2d1a2..c4aae5d4308e 100644
--- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
@@ -1033,6 +1033,9 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
snp_dev->dev = dev;
snp_dev->secrets = secrets;
+ /* Ensure SNP guest messages do not span more than a page */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg) > PAGE_SIZE);
+
/* Allocate the shared page used for the request and response message. */
snp_dev->request = alloc_shared_pages(dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
if (!snp_dev->request)
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-06-24 18:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-05-31 4:30 [PATCH v9 00/24] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 01/24] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-12 17:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-06-13 3:40 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 02/24] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg with pr_debug Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 03/24] virt: sev-guest: Make payload a variable length array Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-17 20:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-06-21 16:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-06-23 16:16 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-06-24 6:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-06-24 10:03 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-06-24 13:00 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-06-24 13:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-06-24 18:12 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania [this message]
2024-06-25 12:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 04/24] virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-18 21:06 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 05/24] virt: sev-guest: Fix user-visible strings Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-18 21:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-06-19 5:58 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 06/24] virt: sev-guest: Simplify VMPCK and sequence number assignments Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-18 21:27 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-06-19 6:06 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-06-19 15:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-06-19 15:20 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 07/24] virt: sev-guest: Store VMPCK index to SNP guest device structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 08/24] virt: sev-guest: Take mutex in snp_send_guest_request() Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 09/24] virt: sev-guest: Carve out SNP guest messaging init/exit Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 10/24] x86/sev: Move core SEV guest driver routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 11/24] x86/sev: Replace dev_[err,alert] with pr_[err,alert] Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 12/24] x86/sev: Make snp_issue_guest_request() static Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 13/24] x86/sev: Make sev-guest driver functional again Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 14/24] x86/sev: Handle failures from snp_init() Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 15/24] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 16/24] x86/sev: Drop sev_guest_platform_data structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 17/24] x86/cc: Add CC_ATTR_GUEST_SECURE_TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 18/24] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 19/24] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 20/24] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 21/24] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 22/24] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 23/24] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 24/24] x86/sev: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
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