From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>
To: "Nadav Har'El" <nyh@math.technion.ac.il>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>,
Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>, kvm <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
"Nakajima, Jun" <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: nVMX: Rework event injection and recovery
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2013 15:37:51 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5124DFBF.3070109@siemens.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130220141452.GA11902@fermat.math.technion.ac.il>
On 2013-02-20 15:14, Nadav Har'El wrote:
> Hi,
>
> By the way, if you haven't seen my description of why the current code
> did what it did, take a look at
> http://www.mail-archive.com/kvm@vger.kernel.org/msg54478.html
> Another description might also come in handy:
> http://www.mail-archive.com/kvm@vger.kernel.org/msg54476.html
>
> On Wed, Feb 20, 2013, Jan Kiszka wrote about "[PATCH] KVM: nVMX: Rework event injection and recovery":
>> This aligns VMX more with SVM regarding event injection and recovery for
>> nested guests. The changes allow to inject interrupts directly from L0
>> to L2.
>>
>> One difference to SVM is that we always transfer the pending event
>> injection into the architectural state of the VCPU and then drop it from
>> there if it turns out that we left L2 to enter L1.
>
> Last time I checked, if I'm remembering correctly, the nested SVM code did
> something a bit different: After the exit from L2 to L1 and unnecessarily
> queuing the pending interrupt for injection, it skipped one entry into L1,
> and as usual after the entry the interrupt queue is cleared so next time
> around, when L1 one is really entered, the wrong injection is not attempted.
>
>> VMX and SVM are now identical in how they recover event injections from
>> unperformed vmlaunch/vmresume: We detect that VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD
>> still contains a valid event and, if yes, transfer the content into L1's
>> idt_vectoring_info_field.
>
>> To avoid that we incorrectly leak an event into the architectural VCPU
>> state that L1 wants to inject, we skip cancellation on nested run.
>
> I didn't understand this last point.
- prepare_vmcs02 sets event to be injected into L2
- while trying to enter L2, a cancel condition is met
- we call vmx_cancel_interrupts but should now avoid filling L1's event
into the arch event queues - it's kept in vmcs12
>
>> @@ -7403,9 +7375,32 @@ void prepare_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
>> vmcs12->vm_exit_instruction_len = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
>> vmcs12->vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
>>
>> - /* clear vm-entry fields which are to be cleared on exit */
>> - if (!(vmcs12->vm_exit_reason & VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY))
>> + /* drop what we picked up for L0 via vmx_complete_interrupts */
>> + vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
>> + kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
>> + kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
>
> It would be nice to move these lines out of prepare_vmcs12(), since they
> don't really do anything with vmcs12, and move it into
> nested_vmx_vmexit() (which is the one which called prepare_vmcs12()).
OK.
>
> Did you test this both with PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK (the usual case) and
> !PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK (the case which interests you)? We need to make
> sure that in the former case, this doesn't clear the interrupt queue after
> we put an interrupt to be injected in it (at first glance it seems fine,
> but these code paths are so convoluted, it's hard to be sure).
I tested both, but none of my tests was close to cover all potential
corner cases. But that unconditional queue clearing surely deserves
attention and critical review.
>
>> + if (!(vmcs12->vm_exit_reason & VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY) &&
>> + vmcs12->vm_entry_intr_info_field & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK) {
>> + /*
>> + * Preserve the event that was supposed to be injected
>> + * by emulating it would have been returned in
>> + * IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD.
>> + */
>> + if (vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD) &
>> + INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK) {
>> + vmcs12->idt_vectoring_info_field =
>> + vmcs12->vm_entry_intr_info_field;
>> + vmcs12->idt_vectoring_error_code =
>> + vmcs12->vm_entry_exception_error_code;
>> + vmcs12->vm_exit_instruction_len =
>> + vmcs12->vm_entry_instruction_len;
>> + vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, 0);
>
> I'm afraid I'm missing what you are trying to do here. Why would
> vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD) & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK ever be
> true? After all, the processor clears it after each sucessful exit so
> last if() will only succeed on failed entries - but this is NOT the
> case if we're in the enclosing if (note that vmcs12->vm_exit_reason =
> vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON)). Maybe I'm missing something?
Canceled vmentry as indicated above. Look at vcpu_enter_guest:
kvm_mmu_reload may fail, or we need to handle some async event / perform
some reschedule. But those points are past prepare_vmcs02.
Jan
--
Siemens AG, Corporate Technology, CT RTC ITP SDP-DE
Corporate Competence Center Embedded Linux
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-02-20 14:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-02-20 13:01 [PATCH] KVM: nVMX: Rework event injection and recovery Jan Kiszka
2013-02-20 14:14 ` Nadav Har'El
2013-02-20 14:37 ` Jan Kiszka [this message]
2013-02-20 17:01 ` Gleb Natapov
2013-02-20 17:24 ` Jan Kiszka
2013-02-20 17:50 ` Jan Kiszka
2013-02-21 9:22 ` Gleb Natapov
2013-02-21 9:43 ` Jan Kiszka
2013-02-21 10:06 ` Gleb Natapov
2013-02-21 10:18 ` Jan Kiszka
2013-02-21 10:28 ` Jan Kiszka
2013-02-21 10:33 ` Jan Kiszka
2013-02-21 13:13 ` Gleb Natapov
2013-02-21 13:22 ` Jan Kiszka
2013-02-21 13:37 ` Nadav Har'El
2013-02-21 13:45 ` Gleb Natapov
2013-02-21 13:28 ` Nadav Har'El
2013-02-20 14:53 ` Jan Kiszka
2013-02-20 15:30 ` Gleb Natapov
2013-02-20 15:51 ` Jan Kiszka
2013-02-20 15:57 ` Gleb Natapov
2013-02-20 16:00 ` Jan Kiszka
2013-02-20 16:46 ` Gleb Natapov
2013-02-20 16:48 ` Jan Kiszka
2013-02-20 16:51 ` Gleb Natapov
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