From: "Shah, Amit" <Amit.Shah@amd.com>
To: "jpoimboe@kernel.org" <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: "corbet@lwn.net" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com"
<pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
"kai.huang@intel.com" <kai.huang@intel.com>,
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"dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
"daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com" <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>,
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"Moger, Babu" <Babu.Moger@amd.com>,
"Das1, Sandipan" <Sandipan.Das@amd.com>,
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"amit@kernel.org" <amit@kernel.org>,
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"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
"Kaplan, David" <David.Kaplan@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/bugs: Don't fill RSB on context switch with eIBRS
Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2025 11:50:38 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5175b163a3736ca5fd01cedf406735636c99a7e5.camel@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241206230212.whcnkib4icz4aabx@jpoimboe>
On Fri, 2024-12-06 at 15:02 -0800, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 05, 2024 at 04:53:03PM -0800, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > On Thu, Dec 05, 2024 at 03:32:47PM -0800, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > > On Thu, Nov 21, 2024 at 12:07:19PM -0800, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > > > User->user Spectre v2 attacks (including RSB) across context
> > > > switches
> > > > are already mitigated by IBPB in cond_mitigation(), if enabled
> > > > globally
> > > > or if either the prev or the next task has opted in to
> > > > protection. RSB
> > > > filling without IBPB serves no purpose for protecting user
> > > > space, as
> > > > indirect branches are still vulnerable.
> > >
> > > Question for Intel/AMD folks: where is it documented that IBPB
> > > clears
> > > the RSB? I thought I'd seen this somewhere but I can't seem to
> > > find it.
> >
> > For Intel, I found this:
> >
> >
> > https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/advisory-guidance/post-barrier-return-stack-buffer-predictions.html
> >
> > "Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control
> > the
> > predicted targets of indirect branches executed after the command
> > on
> > the same logical processor. The term indirect branch in this
> > context
> > includes near return instructions, so these predicted targets may
> > come
> > from the RSB.
> >
> > This article uses the term RSB-barrier to refer to either an IBPB
> > command event, or (on processors which support enhanced IBRS)
> > either a
> > VM exit with IBRS set to 1 or setting IBRS to 1 after a VM exit."
> >
> > I haven't seen anything that explicit for AMD.
>
> Found it. As Andrew mentioned earlier, AMD IBPB only clears RSB if
> the
> IBPB_RET CPUID bit is set. From APM vol 3:
>
> CPUID Fn8000_0008_EBX Extended Feature Identifiers:
>
> 30 IBPB_RET The processor clears the return address
> predictor when MSR PRED_CMD.IBPB is written
> to 1.
>
> We check that already for the IBPB entry mitigation, but now we'll
> also
> need to do so for the context switch IBPB.
>
> Question for AMD, does SBPB behave the same way, i.e. does it clear
> RSB
> if IBPB_RET?
That's correct - SBPB clears the RSB only when IBPB_RET is set.
Amit
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-01-08 11:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-11-21 20:07 [PATCH v2 0/2] x86/bugs: RSB tweaks Josh Poimboeuf
2024-11-21 20:07 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/bugs: Don't fill RSB on VMEXIT with eIBRS+retpoline Josh Poimboeuf
2024-11-30 15:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-02 11:15 ` Shah, Amit
2024-12-02 12:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-02 23:35 ` Pawan Gupta
2024-12-03 11:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-05 23:12 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-12-21 9:13 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-02 9:19 ` Shah, Amit
2025-04-02 14:16 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-02 14:19 ` Shah, Amit
2024-12-05 23:13 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-11-21 20:07 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/bugs: Don't fill RSB on context switch with eIBRS Josh Poimboeuf
2024-12-03 11:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-05 23:32 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-12-06 0:53 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-12-06 23:02 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-12-30 14:54 ` Shah, Amit
2025-01-08 11:50 ` Shah, Amit [this message]
2024-12-06 10:10 ` Shah, Amit
2024-12-09 20:46 ` jpoimboe
2024-11-28 13:28 ` [RFC PATCH v3 0/2] Add support for the ERAPS feature Amit Shah
2024-11-28 13:28 ` [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] x86: cpu/bugs: add AMD ERAPS support; hardware flushes RSB Amit Shah
2024-12-02 17:26 ` Dave Hansen
2024-12-02 18:09 ` Amit Shah
2024-12-02 18:25 ` Dave Hansen
2024-12-02 18:36 ` Sean Christopherson
2024-11-28 13:28 ` [RFC PATCH v3 2/2] x86: kvm: svm: advertise ERAPS (larger RSB) support to guests Amit Shah
2024-12-02 18:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-27 11:10 ` Shah, Amit
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