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From: "Shah, Amit" <Amit.Shah@amd.com>
To: "jpoimboe@kernel.org" <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: "corbet@lwn.net" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com"
	<pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	"kai.huang@intel.com" <kai.huang@intel.com>,
	"kvm@vger.kernel.org" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	"andrew.cooper3@citrix.com" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	"dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"Lendacky, Thomas" <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
	"daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com" <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>,
	"boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com" <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"seanjc@google.com" <seanjc@google.com>,
	"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"pbonzini@redhat.com" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Moger, Babu" <Babu.Moger@amd.com>,
	"Das1, Sandipan" <Sandipan.Das@amd.com>,
	"dwmw@amazon.co.uk" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	"amit@kernel.org" <amit@kernel.org>,
	"hpa@zytor.com" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Kaplan, David" <David.Kaplan@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/bugs: Don't fill RSB on context switch with eIBRS
Date: Wed, 8 Jan 2025 11:50:38 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5175b163a3736ca5fd01cedf406735636c99a7e5.camel@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241206230212.whcnkib4icz4aabx@jpoimboe>

On Fri, 2024-12-06 at 15:02 -0800, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 05, 2024 at 04:53:03PM -0800, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > On Thu, Dec 05, 2024 at 03:32:47PM -0800, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > > On Thu, Nov 21, 2024 at 12:07:19PM -0800, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > > > User->user Spectre v2 attacks (including RSB) across context
> > > > switches
> > > > are already mitigated by IBPB in cond_mitigation(), if enabled
> > > > globally
> > > > or if either the prev or the next task has opted in to
> > > > protection.  RSB
> > > > filling without IBPB serves no purpose for protecting user
> > > > space, as
> > > > indirect branches are still vulnerable.
> > > 
> > > Question for Intel/AMD folks: where is it documented that IBPB
> > > clears
> > > the RSB?  I thought I'd seen this somewhere but I can't seem to
> > > find it.
> > 
> > For Intel, I found this:
> > 
> >  
> > https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/advisory-guidance/post-barrier-return-stack-buffer-predictions.html
> > 
> >   "Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control
> > the
> >   predicted targets of indirect branches executed after the command
> > on
> >   the same logical processor. The term indirect branch in this
> > context
> >   includes near return instructions, so these predicted targets may
> > come
> >   from the RSB.
> > 
> >   This article uses the term RSB-barrier to refer to either an IBPB
> >   command event, or (on processors which support enhanced IBRS)
> > either a
> >   VM exit with IBRS set to 1 or setting IBRS to 1 after a VM exit."
> > 
> > I haven't seen anything that explicit for AMD.
> 
> Found it.  As Andrew mentioned earlier, AMD IBPB only clears RSB if
> the
> IBPB_RET CPUID bit is set.  From APM vol 3:
> 
> CPUID Fn8000_0008_EBX Extended Feature Identifiers:
> 
> 30	IBPB_RET	The processor clears the return address
> 			predictor when MSR PRED_CMD.IBPB is written
> to 1.
> 
> We check that already for the IBPB entry mitigation, but now we'll
> also
> need to do so for the context switch IBPB.
> 
> Question for AMD, does SBPB behave the same way, i.e. does it clear
> RSB
> if IBPB_RET?

That's correct - SBPB clears the RSB only when IBPB_RET is set.

		Amit


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-01-08 11:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-11-21 20:07 [PATCH v2 0/2] x86/bugs: RSB tweaks Josh Poimboeuf
2024-11-21 20:07 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/bugs: Don't fill RSB on VMEXIT with eIBRS+retpoline Josh Poimboeuf
2024-11-30 15:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-02 11:15     ` Shah, Amit
2024-12-02 12:19       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-02 23:35     ` Pawan Gupta
2024-12-03 11:20       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-05 23:12         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-12-21  9:13           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-02  9:19           ` Shah, Amit
2025-04-02 14:16             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-04-02 14:19               ` Shah, Amit
2024-12-05 23:13     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-11-21 20:07 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/bugs: Don't fill RSB on context switch with eIBRS Josh Poimboeuf
2024-12-03 11:42   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-05 23:32   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-12-06  0:53     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-12-06 23:02       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2024-12-30 14:54         ` Shah, Amit
2025-01-08 11:50         ` Shah, Amit [this message]
2024-12-06 10:10     ` Shah, Amit
2024-12-09 20:46       ` jpoimboe
2024-11-28 13:28 ` [RFC PATCH v3 0/2] Add support for the ERAPS feature Amit Shah
2024-11-28 13:28   ` [RFC PATCH v3 1/2] x86: cpu/bugs: add AMD ERAPS support; hardware flushes RSB Amit Shah
2024-12-02 17:26     ` Dave Hansen
2024-12-02 18:09       ` Amit Shah
2024-12-02 18:25         ` Dave Hansen
2024-12-02 18:36           ` Sean Christopherson
2024-11-28 13:28   ` [RFC PATCH v3 2/2] x86: kvm: svm: advertise ERAPS (larger RSB) support to guests Amit Shah
2024-12-02 18:30     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-03-27 11:10       ` Shah, Amit

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