kvm.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com>
To: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, kvm <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
	Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>,
	Arthur Chunqi Li <yzt356@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/6] KVM: nVMX: Replace kvm_set_cr0 with vmx_set_cr0 in load_vmcs12_host_state
Date: Tue, 03 Sep 2013 19:44:41 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <52262009.9090401@siemens.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20130902093627.GO22899@redhat.com>

On 2013-09-02 11:36, Gleb Natapov wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 02, 2013 at 11:06:53AM +0200, Jan Kiszka wrote:
>> On 2013-09-02 10:21, Gleb Natapov wrote:
>>> On Thu, Aug 08, 2013 at 04:26:28PM +0200, Jan Kiszka wrote:
>>>> Likely a typo, but a fatal one as kvm_set_cr0 performs checks on the
>>> Not a typo :) That what Avi asked for do during initial nested VMX
>>> review: http://markmail.org/message/hhidqyhbo2mrgxxc
>>
>> Yeah, should rephrase this.
>>
>>>
>>> But there is at least one transition check that kvm_set_cr0() does that
>>> should not be done during vmexit emulation, namely CS.L bit check, so I
>>> tend to agree that kvm_set_cr0() is not appropriate here, at lest not as
>>> it is.
>>
>> kvm_set_cr0() is for emulating explicit guest changes. It is not the
>> proper interface for implicit, vendor-dependent changes like this one.
>>
> Agree, the problem is that we do not have proper interface for implicit
> changes like this one (do not see why it is vendor-dependent, SVM also
> restores host state in a similar way).
> 
>>> But can we skip other checks kvm_set_cr0() does? For instance
>>> what prevents us from loading CR0.PG = 1 EFER.LME = 1 and CR4.PAE = 0
>>> during nested vmexit?  What _should_ prevent it is vmentry check from
>>> 26.2.4
>>>
>>> If the "host address-space size" VM-exit control is 1, the following
>>> must hold:
>>>  - Bit 5 of the CR4 field (corresponding to CR4.PAE) is 1.
>>>
>>> But I do not see that we do that check on vmentry.
>>>
>>> What about NW/CD bit checks, or reserved bits checks? 27.5.1 says:
>>>   The following bits are not modified:
>>>    For CR0, ET, CD, NW; bits 63:32 (on processors that support Intel 64
>>>    architecture), 28:19, 17, and 15:6; and any bits that are fixed in
>>>    VMX operation (see Section 23.8).
>>>
>>> But again current vmexit code does not emulate this properly and just
>>> sets everything from host_cr0. vmentry should also preserve all those
>>> bit but it looks like it doesn't too.
>>>
>>
>> Yes, there is surely more to improve. Do you think the lacking checks
>> can cause troubles for L0, or is this just imprecise emulation that can
>> be addressed separately?
>>
> The lacking checks may cause L0 to fail guest entry which will trigger
> internal error. If it is exploitable by L0 userspace it is a serious
> problem, if only L0 kernel can trigger it then less so. I remember Avi
> was concerned that KVM code may depend on all registers to be consistent
> otherwise it can be exploited, I cannot prove or disprove this theory
> :), but if it is the case then event L0 kernel case is problematic. 

So how to proceed with this?

Jan

-- 
Siemens AG, Corporate Technology, CT RTC ITP SES-DE
Corporate Competence Center Embedded Linux

  reply	other threads:[~2013-09-03 17:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-08-08 14:26 [PATCH v3 0/6] KVM: nVMX: Enable unrestricted guest mode and fix some nEPT issues Jan Kiszka
2013-08-08 14:26 ` [PATCH v3 1/6] KVM: nVMX: Replace kvm_set_cr0 with vmx_set_cr0 in load_vmcs12_host_state Jan Kiszka
2013-09-02  8:21   ` Gleb Natapov
2013-09-02  9:06     ` Jan Kiszka
2013-09-02  9:36       ` Gleb Natapov
2013-09-03 17:44         ` Jan Kiszka [this message]
2013-09-03 17:55           ` Gleb Natapov
2013-09-03 19:11             ` [PATCH v4] " Jan Kiszka
2013-09-08  8:57               ` Gleb Natapov
2013-09-10 13:14     ` [PATCH v3 1/6] " Arthur Chunqi Li
2013-09-10 13:26       ` Paolo Bonzini
2013-09-15 11:01       ` Gleb Natapov
2013-08-08 14:26 ` [PATCH v3 2/6] KVM: nVMX: Do not set identity page map for L2 Jan Kiszka
2013-08-08 14:26 ` [PATCH v3 3/6] KVM: nVMX: Load nEPT state after EFER Jan Kiszka
2013-09-02 13:16   ` Gleb Natapov
2013-09-02 17:58     ` Jan Kiszka
2013-09-02 18:09       ` Gleb Natapov
2013-09-02 18:20         ` Jan Kiszka
2013-09-02 18:38           ` Jan Kiszka
2013-08-08 14:26 ` [PATCH v3 4/6] KVM: nVMX: Implement support for EFER saving on VM-exit Jan Kiszka
2013-08-08 14:26 ` [PATCH v3 5/6] KVM: nVMX: Update mmu.base_role.nxe after EFER loading on VM-entry/exit Jan Kiszka
2013-09-03  8:39   ` Gleb Natapov
2013-09-03  8:51     ` Jan Kiszka
2013-09-03  9:04       ` Gleb Natapov
2013-09-03  9:32         ` Jan Kiszka
2013-08-08 14:26 ` [PATCH v3 6/6] KVM: nVMX: Enable unrestricted guest mode support Jan Kiszka
2013-08-25  6:46 ` [PATCH v3 0/6] KVM: nVMX: Enable unrestricted guest mode and fix some nEPT issues Jan Kiszka
2013-08-25 10:01   ` Paolo Bonzini
2013-08-27 11:18     ` Gleb Natapov
2013-09-12 16:34 ` Paolo Bonzini

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=52262009.9090401@siemens.com \
    --to=jan.kiszka@siemens.com \
    --cc=gleb@redhat.com \
    --cc=jun.nakajima@intel.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
    --cc=yang.z.zhang@intel.com \
    --cc=yzt356@gmail.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).