Re: Verifying Execution Integrity in Untrusted hypervisors

Nakajima, Jun
2014-07-28T21:17:12Z

On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 1:27 PM, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> wrote:
> Il 28/07/2014 20:31, Jan Kiszka ha scritto:
>> The hypervisor has full control of and insight into the guest vCPU
>> state. Only protecting some portions of guest memory seems insufficient.
>>
>> We rather need encryption of every data that leaves the CPU or moves
>> from guest to host mode (and decryption the other way around). I guess
>> that would have quite some performance impact and is far from being easy
>> to integrate into modern processors. But, who knows...
>
> Intel SGX sounds somewhat like what you describe, but I'm not sure how
> it's going to be virtualized.
>

Right. It's possible to virtualize (or pass-through) SGX without
losing the security feature.
With SGX, you can create secure (encrypted) islands on processes in
VMs as well. But I'm not sure if it's useful for solving the problem
described.

--
Jun
Intel Open Source Technology Center