From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Paolo Bonzini Subject: Re: Verifying Execution Integrity in Untrusted hypervisors Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2014 22:27:44 +0200 Message-ID: <53D6B240.9090607@redhat.com> References: <53D68593.6020803@amd.com> <53D696E4.50608@siemens.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: Jan Kiszka , Joel Schopp , Shiva V , kvm@vger.kernel.org Return-path: Received: from mail-wg0-f51.google.com ([74.125.82.51]:59797 "EHLO mail-wg0-f51.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1750921AbaG1U1u (ORCPT ); Mon, 28 Jul 2014 16:27:50 -0400 Received: by mail-wg0-f51.google.com with SMTP id b13so7817798wgh.34 for ; Mon, 28 Jul 2014 13:27:49 -0700 (PDT) In-Reply-To: <53D696E4.50608@siemens.com> Sender: kvm-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: Il 28/07/2014 20:31, Jan Kiszka ha scritto: > The hypervisor has full control of and insight into the guest vCPU > state. Only protecting some portions of guest memory seems insufficient. > > We rather need encryption of every data that leaves the CPU or moves > from guest to host mode (and decryption the other way around). I guess > that would have quite some performance impact and is far from being easy > to integrate into modern processors. But, who knows... Intel SGX sounds somewhat like what you describe, but I'm not sure how it's going to be virtualized. Paolo