From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Jan Kiszka Subject: Re: Verifying Execution Integrity in Untrusted hypervisors Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 07:35:51 +0200 Message-ID: <53D732B7.4030706@siemens.com> References: <53D68593.6020803@amd.com> <53D696E4.50608@siemens.com> <53D6B240.9090607@redhat.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: Joel Schopp , Shiva V , "kvm@vger.kernel.org" To: "Nakajima, Jun" , Paolo Bonzini Return-path: Received: from thoth.sbs.de ([192.35.17.2]:55840 "EHLO thoth.sbs.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1750973AbaG2FgF (ORCPT ); Tue, 29 Jul 2014 01:36:05 -0400 In-Reply-To: Sender: kvm-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On 2014-07-28 23:17, Nakajima, Jun wrote: > On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 1:27 PM, Paolo Bonzini wrote: >> Il 28/07/2014 20:31, Jan Kiszka ha scritto: >>> The hypervisor has full control of and insight into the guest vCPU >>> state. Only protecting some portions of guest memory seems insufficient. >>> >>> We rather need encryption of every data that leaves the CPU or moves >>> from guest to host mode (and decryption the other way around). I guess >>> that would have quite some performance impact and is far from being easy >>> to integrate into modern processors. But, who knows... >> >> Intel SGX sounds somewhat like what you describe, but I'm not sure how >> it's going to be virtualized. >> > > Right. It's possible to virtualize (or pass-through) SGX without > losing the security feature. Interesting thing. Somehow missed this so far. Fairly complicated one, though. Still trying to wrap my head around how attestation practically works. > With SGX, you can create secure (encrypted) islands on processes in > VMs as well. But I'm not sure if it's useful for solving the problem > described. Huh? I thought remote attestation is a key feature of SGX? That is, to my understanding, what Shiva is looking for (though on current hardware, which remains infeasible unfortunately). Jan -- Siemens AG, Corporate Technology, CT RTC ITP SES-DE Corporate Competence Center Embedded Linux