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From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Benjamin Serebrin <serebrin@google.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, luto@amacapital.net
Subject: Re: Fwd: [RFC] Keeping host value of CR4.MCE (and other bits) live during guest execution
Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2015 11:23:51 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <552F7FA7.3020801@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAN+hb0V1ivsNx+_1t_LmPvYW5e-MgBYwt5tTUObRh8nWQ4SKkw@mail.gmail.com>



On 16/04/2015 01:52, Benjamin Serebrin wrote:
> There's a bug in kvm/vmx.c: if the host enabled machine check (CR4.MCE==1),
> the value gets zeroed while the CPU is running in guest context.
> If a machine check event arrives while the CPU is in guest context and
> effective CR4.MCE is zero, the machine raises CATERR and crashes.
> 
> We should make sure the host value of CR4.MCE is always active.  There
> are read and write shadows for the guest to think it wrote its own value.
> 
> For discussion: there's new complexity with CR4 shadowing
> (1e02ce4cccdcb9688386e5b8d2c9fa4660b45389).  I measure CR4 reads at 24
> cycles on haswell and 36 on sandybridge, which compares well with
> L2 miss costs.  Is the shadowing worth the complexity?  CR4 is also
> cached (with no real consistency mechanism) in the VMCS at the time
> of guest VCPU creation.  If there is ever a change in CR4 value
> over time, or if CR4 is different on different CPUs in the system, all this
> logic gets broken.

Good catch.  Please resubmit with your Signed-off-by, and rebased to
Linus's tree.

Paolo

> Thanks,
> Ben
> 
> 
> ---
> 
> The host's decision to enable machine check exceptions should remain
> in force during non-root mode.  KVM was writing 0 to cr4 on VCPU reset
> and passed a slightly-modified 0 to the vmcs.guest_cr4 value.
> 
> Tested: Inject machine check while a guest is spinning.
> Before the change, if guest CR4.MCE==0, then the machine check is
> escalated to Catastrophic Error (CATERR) and the machine dies.
> If guest CR4.MCE==1, then the machine check causes VMEXIT and is
> handled normally by host Linux. After the change, injecting a machine
> check causes normal Linux machine check handling.
> 
> 
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 12 ++++++++++--
>  1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> index a214104..44c8d24 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> @@ -3456,8 +3456,16 @@ static void vmx_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> unsigned long cr3)
> 
>  static int vmx_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
>  {
> -       unsigned long hw_cr4 = cr4 | (to_vmx(vcpu)->rmode.vm86_active ?
> -                   KVM_RMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON : KVM_PMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON);
> +       /*
> +        * Pass through host's Machine Check Enable value to hw_cr4, which
> +        * is in force while we are in guest mode.  Do not let guests control
> +        * this bit, even if host CR4.MCE == 0.
> +        */
> +       unsigned long hw_cr4 =
> +               (read_cr4() & X86_CR4_MCE) |
> +               (cr4 & ~X86_CR4_MCE) |
> +               (to_vmx(vcpu)->rmode.vm86_active ?
> +                KVM_RMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON : KVM_PMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON);
> 
>         if (cr4 & X86_CR4_VMXE) {
>                 /*
> --
> 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-04-16  9:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <CAN+hb0VA6Xrff+YOpKSSqjkdLeZO8S3EGdt6nCLnBaU9Ag-E0w@mail.gmail.com>
2015-04-15 23:52 ` Fwd: [RFC] Keeping host value of CR4.MCE (and other bits) live during guest execution Benjamin Serebrin
2015-04-16  0:05   ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-04-16  9:23   ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2015-04-16 16:41     ` Fwd: " Benjamin Serebrin

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