From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Huaitong Han <huaitong.han@intel.com>, gleb@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH V5 6/9] KVM, pkeys: add pkeys support for permission_fault logic
Date: Mon, 21 Mar 2016 11:55:33 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <56EFD325.7010903@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1458554760-4374-7-git-send-email-huaitong.han@intel.com>
On 21/03/2016 11:05, Huaitong Han wrote:
> static inline u8 permission_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
> - unsigned pte_access, unsigned pfec)
> + unsigned pte_access, unsigned pte_pkey,
> + unsigned pfec)
> {
> int cpl = kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu);
> unsigned long rflags = kvm_x86_ops->get_rflags(vcpu);
> + unsigned long smap = (cpl - 3) & (rflags & X86_EFLAGS_AC);
> + int index = (pfec >> 1) +
> + (smap >> (X86_EFLAGS_AC_BIT - PFERR_RSVD_BIT + 1));
> +
> + if (unlikely(mmu->pkru_mask)) {
> + u32 pkru_bits, offset;
> +
> + WARN_ON(pfec & (PFERR_PK_MASK | PFERR_RSVD_MASK));
> +
> + /*
> + * PKRU defines 32 bits, there are 16 domains and 2
> + * attribute bits per domain in pkru, pkey is the
> + * index to a defined domain, so the value of
> + * pkey * 2 is offset of a defined domain.
> + */
> + pkru_bits = (kvm_read_pkru(vcpu) >> (pte_pkey * 2)) & 3;
> + /* replace PFEC.RSVD with ACC_USER_MASK. */
> + offset = pfec | ((pte_access & PT_USER_MASK) <<
> + (PFERR_RSVD_BIT - PT_USER_SHIFT));
> +
> + pkru_bits &= mmu->pkru_mask >> (offset & ~1);
> + pfec |= -pkru_bits & PFERR_PK_MASK;
> + }
>
> /*
> * If CPL < 3, SMAP prevention are disabled if EFLAGS.AC = 1.
> @@ -167,14 +192,12 @@ static inline u8 permission_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
> * but it will be one in index if SMAP checks are being overridden.
> * It is important to keep this branchless.
> */
> - unsigned long smap = (cpl - 3) & (rflags & X86_EFLAGS_AC);
> - int index = (pfec >> 1) +
> - (smap >> (X86_EFLAGS_AC_BIT - PFERR_RSVD_BIT + 1));
>
> WARN_ON(pfec & PFERR_RSVD_MASK);
>
> pfec |= PFERR_PRESENT_MASK;
> - return -((mmu->permissions[index] >> pte_access) & 1) & pfec;
> + return -(((pfec >> PFERR_PK_BIT) |
> + (mmu->permissions[index] >> pte_access)) & 1) & pfec;
> }
>
> void kvm_mmu_invalidate_zap_all_pages(struct kvm *kvm);
Slightly cleaner:
1) keep WARN_ON together
2) keep smap comment close to smap variable
3) build expression for final return a piece at a time
Does it look good?
Thanks,
Paolo
@@ -149,7 +150,8 @@ static inline bool is_write_protection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
* if the access faults.
*/
static inline u8 permission_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
- unsigned pte_access, unsigned pfec)
+ unsigned pte_access, unsigned pte_pkey,
+ unsigned pfec)
{
int cpl = kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu);
unsigned long rflags = kvm_x86_ops->get_rflags(vcpu);
@@ -170,11 +172,32 @@ static inline u8 permission_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu,
unsigned long smap = (cpl - 3) & (rflags & X86_EFLAGS_AC);
int index = (pfec >> 1) +
(smap >> (X86_EFLAGS_AC_BIT - PFERR_RSVD_BIT + 1));
+ bool fault = (mmu->permissions[index] >> pte_access) & 1;
- WARN_ON(pfec & PFERR_RSVD_MASK);
-
+ WARN_ON(pfec & (PFERR_PK_MASK | PFERR_RSVD_MASK));
pfec |= PFERR_PRESENT_MASK;
- return -((mmu->permissions[index] >> pte_access) & 1) & pfec;
+
+ if (unlikely(mmu->pkru_mask)) {
+ u32 pkru_bits, offset;
+
+ /*
+ * PKRU defines 32 bits, there are 16 domains and 2
+ * attribute bits per domain in pkru, pkey is the
+ * index to a defined domain, so the value of
+ * pkey * 2 is offset of a defined domain.
+ */
+ pkru_bits = (kvm_read_pkru(vcpu) >> (pte_pkey * 2)) & 3;
+
+ /* clear present bit, replace PFEC.RSVD with ACC_USER_MASK. */
+ offset = pfec - 1 +
+ ((pte_access & PT_USER_MASK) << (PFERR_RSVD_BIT - PT_USER_SHIFT));
+
+ pkru_bits &= mmu->pkru_mask >> offset;
+ pfec |= -pkru_bits & PFERR_PK_MASK;
+ fault |= (pkru_bits != 0);
+ }
+
+ return -(uint32_t)fault & pfec;
}
void kvm_mmu_invalidate_zap_all_pages(struct kvm *kvm);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-03-21 10:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-03-21 10:05 [PATCH V5 0/9] KVM, pkeys: add memory protection-key support Huaitong Han
2016-03-21 10:05 ` [PATCH V5 1/9] KVM, pkeys: disable pkeys for guests in non-paging mode Huaitong Han
2016-03-21 10:05 ` [PATCH V5 2/9] KVM, pkeys: add pkeys support for xsave state Huaitong Han
2016-03-21 10:05 ` [PATCH V5 3/9] x86: pkey: introduce write_pkru() for KVM Huaitong Han
2016-03-21 10:05 ` [PATCH V5 4/9] KVM, pkeys: save/restore PKRU when guest/host switches Huaitong Han
2016-03-21 10:28 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-03-21 10:37 ` Han, Huaitong
2016-03-21 10:05 ` [PATCH V5 5/9] KVM, pkeys: introduce pkru_mask to cache conditions Huaitong Han
2016-03-21 17:43 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-03-21 10:05 ` [PATCH V5 6/9] KVM, pkeys: add pkeys support for permission_fault logic Huaitong Han
2016-03-21 10:55 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2016-03-21 12:41 ` Han, Huaitong
2016-03-21 10:05 ` [PATCH V5 7/9] KVM, pkeys: expose CPUID/CR4 to guest Huaitong Han
2016-03-21 11:36 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-03-21 11:56 ` Han, Huaitong
2016-03-21 12:08 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-03-21 10:05 ` [PATCH V5 8/9] KVM, pkeys: disable PKU feature without ept Huaitong Han
2016-03-21 11:01 ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-03-21 10:06 ` [PATCH V5 9/9] Revert "KVM: MMU: precompute page fault error code" Huaitong Han
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