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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com>,
	Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, Venkatesh Srinivas <venkateshs@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 4/4] KVM: x86: AMD's IBPB is not equivalent to Intel's IBPB
Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2024 17:12:40 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <59449778-ad4e-69c6-d1dc-73dacb538e02@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Zsj2anWub8v9kwBA@google.com>

On 8/23/24 15:51, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 23, 2024, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> On 8/23/24 13:53, Jim Mattson wrote:
>>> From Intel's documention [1], "CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0):EDX[26]
>>> enumerates support for indirect branch restricted speculation (IBRS)
>>> and the indirect branch predictor barrier (IBPB)." Further, from [2],
>>> "Software that executed before the IBPB command cannot control the
>>> predicted targets of indirect branches (4) executed after the command
>>> on the same logical processor," where footnote 4 reads, "Note that
>>> indirect branches include near call indirect, near jump indirect and
>>> near return instructions. Because it includes near returns, it follows
>>> that **RSB entries created before an IBPB command cannot control the
>>> predicted targets of returns executed after the command on the same
>>> logical processor.**" [emphasis mine]
>>>
>>> On the other hand, AMD's IBPB "may not prevent return branch
>>> predictions from being specified by pre-IBPB branch targets" [3].
>>>
>>> However, some AMD processors have an "enhanced IBPB" [terminology
>>> mine] which does clear the return address predictor. This feature is
>>> enumerated by CPUID.80000008:EDX.IBPB_RET[bit 30] [4].
>>>
>>> Adjust the cross-vendor features enumerated by KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID
>>> accordingly.
>>>
>>> [1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/cpuid-enumeration-and-architectural-msrs.html
>>> [2] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigations.html#Footnotes
>>> [3] https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1040.html
>>> [4] https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/processor-tech-docs/programmer-references/24594.pdf
>>>
>>> Fixes: 0c54914d0c52 ("KVM: x86: use Intel speculation bugs and features as derived in generic x86 code")
>>> Suggested-by: Venkatesh Srinivas <venkateshs@chromium.org>
>>> Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
>>> ---
>>>  arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 6 +++++-
>>>  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
>>> index ec7b2ca3b4d3..c8d7d928ffc7 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
>>> @@ -690,7 +690,9 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
>>>  	kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_TSC_ADJUST);
>>>  	kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES);
>>>  
>>> -	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))
>>> +	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET) &&
>>> +	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB) &&
>>> +	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS))
>>>  		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
>>>  	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
>>>  		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP);
>>> @@ -759,6 +761,8 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
>>>  	 * arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c is kind enough to
>>>  	 * record that in cpufeatures so use them.
>>>  	 */
>>> +	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
>>> +		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET);
>>
>> If SPEC_CTRL is set, then IBPB is set, so you can't have AMD_IBPB_RET
>> without AMD_IBPB, but it just looks odd seeing them set with separate
>> checks with no relationship dependency for AMD_IBPB_RET on AMD_IBPB.
>> That's just me, though, not worth a v4 unless others feel the same.
> 
> You thinking something like this (at the end, after the dust settles)?
> 
> 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET) &&
> 			 !kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB)))
> 		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET);		

I was just thinking more along the lines of:

	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB);
		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
			kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET);
	}

Thanks,
Tom

>>
> 
>> Thanks,
>> Tom
>>
>>>  	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
>>>  		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB);
>>>  	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS))

  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-08-23 22:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-08-23 18:53 [PATCH v3 0/4] Distinguish between variants of IBPB Jim Mattson
2024-08-23 18:53 ` [PATCH v3 1/4] x86/cpufeatures: Clarify semantics of X86_FEATURE_IBPB Jim Mattson
2024-08-26 20:33   ` Pawan Gupta
2024-08-26 20:59     ` Jim Mattson
2024-08-26 22:28       ` Pawan Gupta
2024-08-23 18:53 ` [PATCH v3 2/4] x86/cpufeatures: Define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET Jim Mattson
2024-08-23 18:53 ` [PATCH v3 3/4] KVM: x86: Advertise AMD_IBPB_RET to userspace Jim Mattson
2024-08-23 18:53 ` [PATCH v3 4/4] KVM: x86: AMD's IBPB is not equivalent to Intel's IBPB Jim Mattson
2024-08-23 19:40   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-08-23 20:51     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-23 22:00       ` Jim Mattson
2024-08-23 22:12       ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2024-08-23 22:48         ` Jim Mattson
2024-08-23 23:49           ` Jim Mattson
2024-08-29  0:21             ` Sean Christopherson
2024-08-23 19:41 ` [PATCH v3 0/4] Distinguish between variants of IBPB Tom Lendacky
2024-08-25 12:17 ` Thomas Gleixner

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